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Supplemented Record 
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JOHN N. BACH, 
and all parties claiming to hold title to the hereinafter described 
property, and all unknown claimants, heirs, and devisees of the 
following property, (see file for description) 
Defendant/ Appellant 
Charles A. Homer. Esq. 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
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John N. Bach 
PO Box 101 
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1ate: 4/20/2012 Judicial District- Teton County User: SHILL 
ime: 10:25 AM ROAReport 
'age 1 of 6 Case: CV-2010-0000329 Current Judge: Darren Simpson 
Thomas H Ulrich, etal. vs. John Nicholas Bach 








New Case Filed -Other Claims 
Plaintiff: Ulrich, Thomas H Attorney Retained Charles A. Homer 
Judge 
Gregory W Moeller 
Gregory W Moeller 
Plaintiff: Ulrich, Mary M Attorney Retained Charles A. Homer Gregory W Moeller 
Filing: A- All initial civil case filings of any type not listed in categories B-H, Gregory W Moeller 
or the other A listings below Paid by: Holden Kidwell Receipt number: 
0045280 Dated: 8/31/2010 Amount: $88.00 (Check) For: Ulrich, Mary M 
(plaintiff) and Ulrich, Thomas H (plaintiff) 
Motion for Temporary Restraining Order Gregory W Moeller 
Summons Issued Gregory W Moeller 
Notice Of Hearing Gregory W Moeller 
Hearing Scheduled (Motions 09/07/2010 02:00PM) TRO Gregory W Moeller 
Minute Entry 
Hearing type: Motions 
Hearing date: 9/7/2010 
Time: 2:34 pm 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: 
Minutes Clerk: PHYLLIS HANSEN 
Tape Number: 
Plaintiffs Attorney Charles Homer 
Hearing result for Motions held on 09/07/2010 02:00PM: Continued TRO 
Hearing Scheduled (Motions 09/17/2010 10:00 AM) for preliminary 
injunction 
Affidavit of Service 
Motion for Preliminary Injunction 
Notice Of Hearing 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any File Or Record By The 
Clerk, Per Page Paid by: John Bach Receipt number: 0045375 Dated: 
9/10/2010 Amount: $5.00 (Cash) 
Filing: 11 - Initial Appearance by persons other than the plaintiff or 
petitioner Paid by: Bach, John Nicholas (defendant) Receipt number: 
0045425 Dated: 9/16/2010 Amount: $58.00 (Cash) For: Bach, John 
Nicholas (defendant) 
Gregory W Moeller 
Gregory W Moeller 
Gregory W Moeller 
Gregory W Moeller 
Gregory W Moeller 
Gregory W Moeller 
Gregory W Moeller 
Gregory W Moeller 
Defendant John N. Bach's (Specially Appearing To Contest Lack Of Gregory W Moeller 
Personal Service And Lack Of Personal Jurisdiction) Motion Per IRCP, 
Rule 12(b) (2) (4) (5); Rule 4(i) (2); Rule 3 (a) (1); Rule 3 (b); Rule (d) (1), 
etc., To Strike, Quash And/Or Void Any Purported Service Upon Him, For 
Sanctions Against Plaintiff & His Counsel, Etc. 
Motion By John N. Bach, Specially Appearing, Lack Of Personal Service & Gregory W Moeller 
Jurisdidction, To Peremptorily Disqualify The Honorable Gregory W. 
Mueller, Per I.R.C.P., rule 40 (d) (1) (A) (B) 
>ate: 4/20/2012 
'ime: 10:25 AM 
Judicial District- Teton County 
ROAReport 
User: SHILL 
>age 2 of 6 Case: CV-201 0-0000329 Current Judge: Darren Simpson 
Thomas H Ulrich, etal. vs. John Nicholas Bach 














Minute Entry Gregory W Moeller 
Hearing type: Motions 
Hearing date: 9/17/201 0 
Time: 10:05 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: 
Minutes Clerk: PHYLLIS HANSEN 
Tape Number: 
Charles Homer, Plaintiffs' Attorney 
John Bach, Pro Se 
Hearing result for Motions held on 09/17/2010 10:00 AM: Continued for Gregory W Moeller 
preliminary injunction 
Order of Disqualification Gregory W Moeller 
Order of Assignment 
Lis Pendens (Notice Of Pendency Of Action) 
Notice Of Hearing 
Hearing Scheduled (Motions 10/15/2010 10:00 AM) Preliminary lnjuction 
Defendant John N. Bach's Specially Appearing Notice of Motions and 
Motions Re: 1. Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice, IRCP, Rule 12(b)(6), etc 
2. Motion for Summary Judgment IRCP, Rule 56 (b)- (e); 3. Alternatively, 
Motion for More Definitive Statement, Rule 12(e) 4. Motion for Sanctions, 
Costs and Fees Against Plaintiffs & Their Counsel, ule 11(a)(1) All 
Forgoing Motions Re Requested Sua Sponte 





Affidavit Of Service Darren Simpson 
Order Directing Copies of All Documents to be Transmitted to the Presiding Darren Simpson 
Judge at his Resident Chambers 
Notice Of Intent To Take Default 
Amended Notice Of Hearing 
Motion for Order Shortening Time 
Petition for Order of Survey Pursuant to Idaho Code 6-405 
Minute Entry 
Hearing type: Motions 
Hearing date: 10/15/2010 
Time: 1 0:03 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: Sandra Bebee 
Minutes Clerk: PHYLLIS HANSEN 
Tape Number: 
Plaintifffs' Attorney Dale Storer 
Plaintiff Thoms Ulrich 
Defendant John Bach 
Hearing result for Motions held on 10/15/2010 10:00 AM: District Court 
Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Sandra Beebe 







Memorandum Decision Re: Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Darren Simpson 
Denying Bach's Motion to Dismiss, Motion for Summary Judgment, Motion 
for more Definitive Statement, and Motion for Sanctions, Costs and Fees 
Judicial District- Teton County 
ROAReport 
)ate: 4/20/2012 
·ime: 10:25 AM 
>age 3 of 6 Case: CV-201 0-0000329 Current Judge: Darren Simpson 
Thomas H Ulrich, etal. vs. John Nicholas Bach 




















Bond Posted- Cash (Receipt 45759 Dated 10/29/2010 for 500.00) 
Order Granting Preliminary Injunction 
Verified Answer and Counterclaim 
Reply To Counterclaim 
Order for Hearing 
Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference 01/07/2011 01:00PM) 
Amended Notice Of Hearing 
Hearing Held (in Bingham County) 
Minute Entry 
Court Trial Scheduling Order 
Hearing Scheduled (Pre-Trial Conference 05/06/2011 01:30 PM) 
Hearing Scheduled (Court Trial 06/08/2011 10:00 AM) 
Plaintiffs' Expert Witness and Fact Witness Disclosure 
Defendant's John N. Bach's Expert Witness List And Percipient/Facts 
Witness List 
Notice Of Compliance 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
Affidavit of Thomas H Ulrich in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
Notice Of Hearing 
Hearing Scheduled (Motions 04/08/2011 11:00 AM) for Summary 
Judgment 
























Defendant and Counterclaimant John N. Bach's Memorandum Of Points Darren Simpson 
And Authorities In Opposition To Plaintiffs Summary Judgment Motion 
Affidavit Of John N. Bach, Defendant & Counterclaimant ProSe, Re 
Objections And Opposition To Plaintiffs' Motion For Summary Judgment 
Affidavit Of John N. Bach Re; Receipt Of Plaintiffs' Motion For Summary 
Judgment And Other Documents, Sat., March 12, 2011 
Darren Simpson 
Darren Simpson 
Supplemental Memorandum of John N. Bach, Defendant & Darren Simpson 
Counterclaimant in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment 
Reply Memorandum In Support Of Plaintiffs' Motion For Summary Darren Simpson 
Judgment 
Defendant & Counterclaimant John N. Bach's Objections and Refutations Darren Simpson 
Authorities to Plaintiffs Thomas H. Ulrich's Motion for Summary Judgment 
User: SHILL 
Judicial District -Teton County 
ROAReport 
)ate: 4/20/2012 
-ime: 1 0:25 AM 
)age 4 of 6 Case: CV-2010-0000329 Current Judge: Darren Simpson 
Thomas H Ulrich, etal. vs. John Nicholas Bach 















Hearing type: Motions 
Hearing date: 4/8/2011 
Time: 11:05 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: 
Minutes Clerk: PHYLLIS HANSEN 
Tape Number: 
Charles Homer, Plaintiff's Attorney 
John Bach Pro Se 
Other Claims 
Hearing result for Motions held on 04/08/2011 11:00 AM: District Court 
Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Sandra Beebe 
Number ofT ran script Pages for this hearing estimated at less than 1 00 
Defendant And Counterclaimant John N. Bach's Opposing And Counter 
Memorandum Brief To Plaintiff's "Replys Memorandum In Support Of 





Plaintiffs' Pre-Trial Memorandum Darren Simpson 
Memorandum In Reply To Defendant And Counterclaimant John N. Bach's Darren Simpson 
Opposing And Counter Memorandum Brief 
Defendant and Counter-Claimant John N. Bach's Pre-Trial Memorandum Darren Simpson 
Part "1" 
Hearing result for Pre-Trial Conference held on 05/06/2011 01:30PM: 
District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter:Sandra Beebe 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated at: telephonic in 
Bingham County 
Minute Entry - Pre-Trial Conference 
Affidavit of Charles A Homer in Support of Motion in Limine and for 
Sanctions 
Motion in Limine and for Sanctions 
Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine and for Sanctions 







John N Bach's Notice of his use at Trial/Call ins as Witnesses all Those Darren Simpson 
Persons Named in his List of Witnesses (Filed Feb. 09, 2011) will be Used; 
and Secondly, the Attached Proposed List of Exhibits to be used at Trial, is 
Presented until this Court Rules on the Present Motions Under its 
Consideration. 
Notice of Deposit of Plaintiffs' Exhibits with Clerk of Court Darren Simpson 
Defendant and Counterclaimant John N. Bach's Memorandum Brief RE: Darren Simpson 
Objection & Oppostions (With Motion to Strike, Quash & Preclude in all 
Aspects) Plaintiffs' (1) Motion in Limine & for Sanctions, Affidavit of Charles 
A Homer, & Memorandum Offered in Support Thereof; and (2) Motion to: 
Compel Discovery, Etc., 
Order Vacating Trial Darren Simpson 
Judgment 




Judicial District- Teton County 
ROA Report 
)ate: 4/20/2012 
-ime: 1 0:25 AM 
)age 5 of 6 Case: CV-201 0-0000329 Current Judge: Darren Simpson 
Thomas H Ulrich, etal. vs. John Nicholas Bach 












Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any File Or Record By The Darren Simpson 
Clerk, Per Page Paid by: Ulrich, Mary M Receipt number: 0047703 Dated: 
6/7/2011 Amount: $4.00 (Check) 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Certifying The Same Additional Fee For 
Certificate And Seal Paid by: Ulrich, Mary M Receipt number: 0047703 
Dated: 6/7/2011 Amount: $1.00 (Check) 
Darren Simpson 
Hearing result for Court Trial held on 06/08/2011 10:00 AM: Hearing Darren Simpson 
Vacated 
Affidavit of Charles A Homer in Support of Memorandum of Attorney Fees Darren Simpson 
and Costs 
Memorandum of Attorney Fees and Costs Darren Simpson 
Defendant and Counterclaimant John N. Bach's Notice of Motions re/per Darren Simpson 
IRCP, Rules 59 (a) 1, 3,4,5,6 & 7; 59 (e); and Rule 60 (b) (1) (2) (3) (4) & 
(6). 
Affidavit of John N Bach in Support of All Post Judgment Motions 
Hearing Scheduled (Motions 08/05/2011 10:00 AM) Post Trial 
Darren Simpson 
Darren Simpson 
Defendant & Counterclaimant John N. Bach's Notice of Motions and Darren Simpson 
Motions Per Rule 54(d)(6), to Disallow any or all Parts of Plaintiffs' Attorney 
Fees and Cost; and per Rule 549e)(6), 54(e)(7), 54()(1) through 54(e)(8) 
Notice of Intent to File Responsive Pleadings Darren Simpson 
Motion to Strike Affidavit of John N Bach in Support of All Post Judgment Darren Simpson 
Motions 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike Affidavit of John N Bach in Darren Simpson 
Support of All Post Judgment Motiond 
Notice Of Hearing on Motion to Strike Affidavit of John N Bach and Darren Simpson 
Memorandum of Attorneys' Fees and Costs 
Defendant and Counterclaimant John N. Bach's Objections, Oppositions & Darren Simpson 
Motions to Vacate/Quash Plaintiffs - Untimely & Void in Form & Service -
Motion to Strike Affidavit of John N. Bach and Memorandum of Attorneys' 
Fees and Costs." 
Memorandum in Opposition to All of Defendant john N. Bach's Post Darren Simpson 
Judgment Motions 
Minute Entry Darren Simpson 
Hearing type: Motions 
Hearing date: 8/5/2011 
Time: 10:04 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: 
Minutes Clerk: PHYLLIS HANSEN 
Tape Number: 
C. Timothy Hopkins, Plaintiffs' Attorney 
John N. Bach, Pro Se 
Hearing result for Motions scheduled on 08/05/2011 10:00 AM: Hearing Darren Simpson 
Held Post Trial 
Hearing result for Motions scheduled on 08/05/2011 10:00 AM: District Darren Simpson 
Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Sandra Beebe 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated at: Less than 100 
User: SHILL 
)ate: 4/20/2012 
rime: 10:25 AM 
Judicial District- Teton County 
ROA Report 
=>age 6 of 6 Case: CV-2010-0000329 Current Judge: Darren Simpson 
Thomas H Ulrich, etal. vs. John Nicholas Bach 

















Order Denying Defendant John Bach's Rule 59 and 60 Motion and Granting Darren Simpson 
in Part Plaintiffs' Request for Attorney Fees and Costs 
Civil Disposition entered for: Bach, John Nicholas, Defendant; Ulrich, Mary Darren Simpson 
M, Plaintiff; Ulrich, Thomas H, Plaintiff. Filing date: 9/13/2011 
First Amended Judgment Darren Simpson 
Filing: L4 -Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Supreme Court Paid Darren Simpson 
by: John Bach Receipt number: 0048913 Dated: 10/24/2011 Amount: 
$101.00 (Combination) For: Bach, John Nicholas (defendant) 
Notice of Appeal and Appeal by Defendant Appellant John n Bach, Pro Per, Darren Simpson 
IAR Rules 11, 14,17 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any File Or Record By The Darren Simpson 
Clerk, Per Page Paid by: John Bach Receipt number: 0048922 Dated: 
10/25/2011 Amount: $4.00 (Cash) 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Certifying The Same Additional Fee For Darren Simpson 
Certificate And Seal Paid by: John Bach Receipt number: 0048922 Dated: 
10/25/2011 Amount: $1.00 (Cash) 
Bond Posted- Cash (Receipt 48956 Dated 10/28/2011 for 200.00) 
Request for Additional Record 
Request for Additional Record 
Request For Additional Record 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Comparing And Conforming A Prepared 
Record, Per Page Paid by: Holden Kidwell Hahn Crapo Receipt number: 
0049138 Dated: 11/18/2011 Amount: $2.00 (Check) 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Certifying The Same Additional Fee For 
Certificate And Seal Paid by: Holden Kidwell Hahn Crapo Receipt number: 
0049138 Dated: 11/18/2011 Amount: $1.00 (Check) 
Bond Posted- Cash (Receipt 49493 Dated 12/30/2011 for 260.60) 









Notice Of Hearing and Appellant John N. Bach's Motion for District Court's Darren Simpson 
Order Granting Him Leave to have ( 1) Objectins Heard and Decided to 
Clerk's Transcript and Record Not prepared; (2) for Corrections, Aditions 
and Preparation of all Clerk's Received Filings from April 8, 2011 through 
January 3, 2012. (I.R.E. Rules 28 & 29) 
Hearing Scheduled (Motions 03/16/2012 10:00 AM) Darren Simpson 
Notice of No Objection to Defendant John N Bach's Motion for District Darren Simpson 
Court's Order Granting Him Leave to Have (1) Objections Heard and 
Decided to Clerk's Transcript and Record not Prepared; (2) For 
Corrections, Additions and Preparation of All Clerk's Received Filings From 
April 8, 2011 Through January 3, 2012 
Order Granting Defendant's Motion to Supplement the Clerk's Record on Darren Simpson 
Appeal 
Order Granting Defendant's Motion to Supplement the Clerk's Record on Darren Simpson 
Appeal 





Thomas H Ulrich, etal. vs. John Nicholas Bach 
Hearing type: Motions 
Hearing date: 4/8/2011 
Time: 11:17 am 
Judge: Darren Simpson 
Court reporter: Sandra Beebe 
Minutes Clerk: PHYLLIS HANSEN 
Charles Homer, Plaintiffs Attorney 
John Bach ProSe 
J calls case; ids those present 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
J have read pleadings both in favor and in opposition 
J- Bach objected on some time frames 
Bach- if service by mail looking at 28 + 3 
3 different envelopes on the same day 
Pitney Bowles type of stamp- that is inadequate to start the time running 
Occupied on four other matters 
Only library that is adequate is in Blackfoot 
Have been mostly concern that lack of access to library- terrible 
Asking for opportunity to be prepared 
Rush to Judgment 
Received Memo from opposing council - read for first time page 7 
Don't address verification of my counterclaim 
Lay out motion from the get go 
1125 
PA - file will reflect certificate of mailing - all were mailed on March 08 which would give 
time for filing plus time for mailing 
Bach didn't file response briefs timely 
Filed reply brief on Thursday march 31 
Have filed within 28 days with time for mailing 
J -what about Bach's argument on new issues in reply brief 
P A - 1 - we are allowed to 
2 - I don't believe we have 
J- would you have problem with Bach filing supplemental reply brief 
Would object for additional filings of affidavits 
1130 
Bach responds -
How did I get three different envelopes 
Where is counter affidavit that I received those on time 
Got blindsided 
1131 
J - record does show were mailed on the 8th 
Have been filed timely will allow to stand 
Will allow time after this hearing to day to file memorandum 
They will be able to respond 
No additional affidavits 
Bach need ten working days 
PA- need five working days to respond 
OR 
J- Additional briefing Due April 22 by 5:00 PM 
Homers due by May 02 at 5:00 PM - mailed by then 
1134 
PA- if court grants relief, would dispose of all issues before the court 
Including dismissing counterclaims filed by D 
Alternative way to access his property 
1141 




J is Coward case 
PA- right three theories 
1153 
J -what bearing do the signs have on that analysis 
1155 
Bach- move to strike, quash and preclude following paragraphs 
5, 15, 16, 17 or initial paragraphs 
Renew objection to jurisdiction of this court 
1211 
PA- objection not factual things but legal matters 
J - noted - raised some in affidavit so going to let him raise it 
1224 
PA responds 
Motion to strike untimely and irrelevant at this time 
Verified complaint speaks for itself 
Not claiming this is a public easement; not asking to be public 
Easement dealt with in brief 
Miller case - bound by easement in the record 
Easement on subdivision - issues are irrelevant 
Court can take judicial notice 
Bach indicated Ulrich never asked permission before 2009 - buttresses our position 
We had alternate access- never needed anything else 
Need did not arise until he stopped us prior to that time 
J -have deadline schedules 
1228 
No irreparable harm 
J- briefing scheduled is outlined 
Once received will deem admitted 
JOHN N. BACH, P.O. Box 101 
Driggs, TD 83422/Tel: (208) 354"'8303 
Defendant/Counterclaimant Pro Se 
SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT) IDAHO) COUNTY OF TETON 
THDr1AS HI ULRICH AND f4ARY f'1,· UUUCH~· 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
Vf,_ 
JOI-W N. BACH and all parties claiming 
to hold title to the hereinafter des.ti:' 
ciibed proper pursuant to that certain 
warranty deed record in the records of 
Teton County, Idaho on June 14, 1994 
as InstrU:ment No. 116461 and all unk7' 
nown claimants, heirs and devisees of 
the follov.ring property: 
A portion of the South V:z South liz Section 6, 
Township 5 North, Range 46 East, Boise 
Meridian, Teton County, Idaho, being further 
described as: From the SW comer of said Section 
CAsE No·:' CV 2010~329 
DEFENDANT AND COUNTER~­
CLAIJVI.AN':I' JOHN N. BACH '·S 
OPpOSING AND COUNTER 
MEMORANDUM BRIEF TO PLAIN-
TIFF'S 1:~R@p1ys Memorandum 
In Support of Plaintiff's 
Hd':ltion for Summary Judg-
ment", dated March 31, 
\ 2011 
---'---
6, South 89 50'12" East, 2630.05 feet to the true \ 
point of beginning; thence North 00 07'58" East, / 
813.70 feet to a point; thence North Or37'48" 
East, 505.18 feet to a point; thence South 89 
58'47" East, 1319.28 feet to a point; thence South 
00 07'36" West, 1321.69 feet to a point on the 
Southern Section Line; th~nce North 89 51'01" 
West, 1320.49 feet along the Southern Section 
Line to the Soutfl'l4Comer of smd Sectwn 6, a · 
point; thence North 89 50'13" West, 12.13 feet 
along_the Southern Section Line to the -point of 
beginlling. SUBJECT TO a 60 foot road and 
utility easement along the Western Property lines. 
AND SUBJECT TO a 60 foot road and utility 
easement along the Southern Property Lil{es. 
' . "'" ,, ,, 
I. PREFACE: Due to not just the late iling of Plaintiffs' 
REPEY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDG~1ENT, bUt. the fact, that such brief addresses in part for 
the first time some, but not all issues ,.~'Jtised by John N. Bach 
JNB's Opp/Counter Memo t0 Plt's Reply Memo re S/J' P. 1. 
' . -- .. , 0. 1-' . 
00 6 
his Affirmative Defenses, as reincorporated (Per IRCP, Rule 
10 (c),,, his.· counts and causes of actions via his courrtenclaim, 
and due to John N. Bach~s objections as to violations not only 
of the provxsions of Rule 56(a) through 56(d), but both the 
violations of his constitutional procedural and substant&ve 
rights of due process and equal protections, this Court has 
allowed defendant and counterclaimant to file this additional 
opposing and counter wemorandum to refute and address those2 
issues 1and cited authorities by said Plaintiffst Reply Memoran, 
dum which they never addressed nor raised in their initial 
mmm0randum in support of their motion for summary judgment, 
Defendant and counterclaimant JOHN N. BACH, still reasserts 
and incorporates all his objections, motions to strike and refut~ 
ations previously filed herein, still claiming and contending 
that in the first instance and even with said Reply Memorandum, 
plaintiffs have both untimely, improperly and in vioJJ.ations 
failed and ignored the mandatory requirements of said Rule 56 
sections to even have the Court consider~ let along hear and rule 
upon granting their said motion in any particulars, whatsoever. 
Sun Valley P~oes v. Ros:holt,, RoiJertson"'~~~~~er 133 Idaho 1, 5-ct;, 981 P2d 
236 (1999) (No basis for granting Summary Judgment due to late untimely filing) 
Even the rehasfuill.ngr)l6y Plaintiffs of their previous argu~ 
ments and tha cases they cited f~o:t their arguments A, 1, 2, and 
3, pages J through 9, are more than inapplicable, misrepresented 
and dispite their citations and reliances upon the three!(3) cases 
(Suchan v. Rutherford, 90 Idaho 288, 295; Tower Asset Sub, In~. 
v. Lawrenc!='r 143 Idaho 710, 714, and Kofu&uch v. Kramer, 120 Idaho 
JNB' s Opp!Counter Merro to Pl ts' 
65) such cases in fact, undermine Plaintiffs'' contentions and 
arguments and in truth of their,c::particular opinions, support, 
sustain and require the granting of summary judgment in fa¥or 
of defendant and counterclaimant''s positions perviouslv stated 
and now herein reevalutated and analyzed correctly. 
A. JOHN N. BACH has raised, supported and presented 
previously and again now, that there are properly, 
adequate, complete and primary legal remedies.s which 
which preclude plaintiff~s quiet title, declaratory 
and injunctive c1aims. 
Plaintiffs admdlt, pages 4 .,..5 of their Reply J'llemo, that 
John N. Bach has raised and presented more than legal, case 
authorities and support, especially per Defendant 1' s J'llemor.- of 
Points and Auth. page 3, that legal remedies are more than avail,.. 
able to Plaintiffs which preclude this Court 1 s jurisdiction~eand 
even discretion to consider quiet title, declaratory relief, etc., 
herein. 
The sole attack by Plaintiffs' to John Bach~s objection of 
lack of equitable jurisdiction) discretion, justicibility and 
standing/capacity, is the statement with cited case~Jas follows: 
"A legal remedy, i.e_. 9-a~ag~~, "i's ins~fi;-i~~)lt,i~\th;;i~\)l;l'a'tt:er 
because real propert , i's ~e,0l:i:Silidered ·'tin~ ftie_~. As the Idaho 
Supreme Court has repeated :i' ~-iecoqnizea ,---,.a specific tract (of 
land ) is unique and impossible of duplication by the use of 
a:r:rvr'amount of money.'· Suchan v. Rutherford,. 90 Idaho 288, 295, 
410 P.2d 434, 428 (1966} (discussing the uniqueness of land in 
context of specific perfovmance of land contracts.)_ ~ .CEmph Added). 
The Idaho Supreme Court, said nothing of the sort as quoted supra, 
but ln point 6f law and fact stated/rules exactly to the contrary. 
JNB' s Opp/Counter Memo to Pl ts 1:- Reply MerTIC}> re S(J' P. "· 3 ~ 
Here •·s what Taylor, Justice's opinion in ~ucl:"J,~ Accurately 
stated, held and is now controlling~ 
l. The remedy at law via damages is adequate, plain, 
speedy and completel 
2. Land involved was not unique.,~ that sale of similar 
land involved was frequent, 
3. Equity will not enforce a contract when to do so woulill·~ be 
unjust, oppressive or unconscionable. 
4. The land here involved is not uni~ue. It is irrigated 
farm land co:mrnon to the-general area in. which it is 
located and the court '·s haven '·t hesitated to determ:zime 
market value of farm.. landsin breach of a contract cases 
and of lands in general. in condemnation proceeding, nor 
have they hesitated to determine the damages to be allow, 
ed. 
5. As to the speculation that the vendor may otherwise ilJose 
t~e opportunitit;es for otif£;p2s:l \«. invest in it, is pate:n,~· 
'that such a·· reasQn is' o·, ~emot·.' 'a':rld• s}sle<;::u'9_a1tive as to 
have no standin~g J:n, a;o;; u:rt< of Utw. { 90 Idaho. @ :5 29 5.,..29 6) 
(Emphasis Added} 
At pages 301 through 303, the Idaho Supreme Court further 
held, such not being related nor quoted by Plaintiffs t· R,eply Brief: 
6. (Even) Equity will not strictly enforce a contract when · 
to do so would be unjust, oppressive or unconscionable 
---or would produce harship or injustice~,not reasonably 
wihhin contemplation of the parties at the inception of 
contract; .such {lardship or injustice need not arise from 
fraud or mistake and need not be such as :will prevent th~ 
contract fro~ becoming an obli<~ration in point of law~ but 
exists whenever the contract would produce a co~ditlon 
to the defendant followed by injurious consequence.s w'tli.ch 
could not be deemed to have been conte;rnp1a te.d when t'tl.e 
contract was executed. (Citing to 49 Nner. J·ur 1 . $pee. 
Performance Section 59)' (J$lpbAsis AP.cted): · 
7. Rem~ at law was adequate, plain,. speedy and, complete, 
So besides Plaintiffs' counsel inaccurate representations 
of what principles Suchap hold and requires to be followed, he 
adds a personal accomodation/request to this Court: "Consequently, 
Defendant's argument regarding Plaintiffs'· alleged failure to pur-
sue their 'remedies at law' as listed by Defendant should be dis-
regarded." 
P. 4. 
How blatantly obvious is plaintiffs' counsel's re-
quest of Suchan'~ holding principles? Judge ignore the law 
and principles enunciated clearly and required herein~ do us 
a favor. . look the otner way and discriminate against defen~ 
dant and counterclaimant '· s cited binding and controlling cases. 
B. PLAINTIFFS' ARGUMENT AND CITED CASE AUTHORITY IS 
IS ALSQ FRIVOLOUSLY- UTTERLY TA7ITHOUT MERIT, THAT 
THEY HAVE B;EFUSED /FAILED TO JOJN ALL INDISPENSABLE 
' 
On pages 5 and 6 of their Reply Memorandum,, plaintiffs 
quote _from the cited case, !ower Asset~u£_rnc. v, Lawrence 
143 Idaho 710, 714: "joinder of all parties with an interest 
in the subject matter of the suit is not required; rather, only 
those who have an interest in the obiect of the suit should be 
joined." At this second fundamental, without jurisdiction and 
justicibility issues, since Judge Simpson has made the defaulted 
defendants in Teton Civil Action 02-208 once again somehow parties 
in this acbion, Plaintiffs again, but so blatantly: and patently-
corruptly, :maKes a requBst: "Although the other property owners 
of the Bach Property may have an interest in the subject 
!!_latter of the suit, as property owners, only Defendant 
Defendant has attempted to interfere witn Plaintiffs' int'::'" 
erest in the property. Consequently, the other property 
owners do not have an interest in the object of the suit. 
Therefore, the other owners of the Bach Property are not 
indispensible parties.~ 
Attached hereto, is a complete copy of JOHN :N, B,ACHt;:; 
AP:p~~lallt Is. C?P~l1~:ty;r ~~t~:L tJ!., ~Q@D9 $1)p!;;$;n~ ~ GQ1JJ3~~ o9C:ket "No' '38 3 7 0. 
The issues he raises/raised therein and to be determined in said 
appeal docket, necessitates that· as to any reest.ablisn.ed .fiduciary 
duties, dblig~tions and/or possible future activites in this action, 
JNl3 '-'$: opp;courrter 11enP' to 'P :t t$ r:. RePl:rM61)0 ~e' ·s;J , P _., 5 • 
of the positions, assertions of rights and consequences thereof, 
against them, that he has raised herein. Secondly, if they are 
in fact indispensible parties, which they arer they must, be served, 
so as to appear and any counts, causes of action or relief against 
them, must be presented herein, so that a comrlete, final and 
sp~edy resolution of all joint venturers differences, rights 
and partitioning of the Peacock Parcel be finalized. Tower cited -
Pro Indiviso, Inc. v. Mid~le Holding Trust 131 Idaho 741, 746 (Y.fuere the Bowles 
argued the district court should 've disrrissed the suit as such trust, owner of 
the property was not a party, an indispensible party, to the suit. This Court, 
stated:"Had this been a quiet title action this argument would have merit." 
The Tower Asset Sub Inc, case, miscited and deliberately 
misstated as to its principles, requires such joinder. 430 Idaho 
713-715. (See Justice Eismann's concurring in part and in result 
Opinion In Tower, a tenant brought a declaratory and injunc-
tive relief counts, claiming he had the right to use a road over 
the neighbor's property. Summary judgment was granted to him, 
but the Idaho Supreme Court vacated and remanded such order 
and judgment for him. (This was second of two cases involving 
the E}asic questions: l) Whether Tower has standing? 2 )Is-was Hall an 
indispensible party? and 3} Did the district court error in declar~ 
ing the existence of an express easement on summary judgment? 
Starting at 403 Idaho 713, the Idaho Supreme Court held that; 
the issues of "@tanding" is a subcateory of justiciability, a 
preliminary question oo be determined by the Court before reaching 
any merits of the case. Held-since HalJ;l;s 0\.JTiership of the easement not ques-
tioned he was not indispensible party since no qoiet title sought re his ownership. 
JNB's Memo to Plts' p. 6. 
Herein Plaintiffs seek a quiet title against all the 
ownership held in four one~quarter (~) undivided ownership in 
ihe=:§penathr:ilft:. trusts forming a joint venture. ,Pro Indi-v~o, Inc. , 
131 Idaho 741~ 746, and Tower, supra, hold that where quiet title 
is sought to Plaintiffs" claimed easement, all the undivided 
owners via said spendthrift trust joint venture, must be joined 
as indispensible parties, otherwise this action must be dismissed. 
Thus, plaintiffs' own aforesaid cited cases require: 
'."l1.'l 
l. That the equitable counts of quiet title, injunctive 
relief be dismissed with prejudice as plaintiff~t have clear, ade-
quate, plain-;; speedy and complete remedies at law. Suchan, supra. 
2. That all party members of the Spendthrift Joint 
uenture trust (Exhibit "1 " to John Bach's Affidavit In Opposi-
tion to Sllimmary Judgment) are indispensible parties who must be 
made defendants to this current complaint~ served and allowed to 
appear, a:.::aise their individual answers, affirmative defenses and 
counterclaims and/or cross complainants. Indiviso Inc.' and 
Tower , supra. Also, Barlow v. International Harvester Co. (1994) 
95 Idaho 881, 893 (inaccurately cited by Plaintiffs as 85 Idaho 
881) 522 P.2d 1102, 1194, in which counts for slander and tort 
interference with contract issues were held to RAISE genuine 
issues of fact precluding summary judgment, the Idaho Supreme Court, 
specifically held: a) A contract voidable because of noncompliance 
may still be subject matter of action for interference with contr~ 
act; and b) A Plaintiff cannot make a lack of mutuality of the 
contract to which he was not a party, available as an excuse for 
his wrongful and unjustiified conduct.(95 Idaho@ 893-895,); and 




c) Failure to join indispensible party lS of such importance S''Ch 
cannot be waived. Barlow, supra, also analyzed~d applied 
the principles of d) violation of ttertd.'OQ~:: -interference , ' o 
lllithl: cent:raet:; aBdc~wi:tg.sprospecti ve economic advantages, per 
which cause of action recovery is not limited to those damages .l. 
within the contemplation of the parties to the contract as the 
probable and foreseeable result of a breach, citing to: Wl L. 
Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts, sec.l29, pp 948-949 (4th 
Ed. 1991); Rest (Second of Torts, Sec 774A, Coro~ent A~c, pp 86-
90, (Tentative Draft No. 14, 1969) Barlow, 95 Idaho @ 896) (See 
also, Akers v. D.L. White,C:ohst':h'uction·\Inc. 142 Idaho 293, 301, l 
127 P.3d 196, 2004 (2005), also miscited and misapplied by Plain-
tiffs. In Akers, A record land owner of reality brought actions 
against adjoining. land owner for i) trespass, , ii) negligence and 
iii} quiet title. Case was remanded for purpose of conducting 
additional fact finding re whether at time of serverance of alleg~ 
ed dominant and servient estate, use of access through servant 
easement "was reasonably necessary to enjoyment of alleged domi-
inant estate." ) Such is also a factual genuine issue of fact herein. 
The misuse of equitable claims.L s.uch as quiet title and 
declarator7/injuncitve relief is exemplified by the holdings of 
not just the above citedlisted cases, but, National Bank v. &i\ss 
Valley_ Foods, Inc:.: 121 Idaho 266, 272.,-289 1. ~24 P2d 841, 862.,-868. 
The bank brought foreclosure proceedings and additional legal 
claims arising from loan to a partnership, general partners, 
and limited partners, all who raised several affirmative defenses 
and actions at law counterclaims. After the trial court realigned 
the parties, the case proceeded to a.· jury trial as· a: tort- case 
.~~ 
JNB's Opp/CoUnter Memo to Plts' Re~:~" \\M f~S/J P. 8. 
against the bank rather than as a foreclosure proceeding. The 
jury returned a verdict of $5,7 million dollars against the 
plaintiff and counterclaim defendants, especially on the torts 
of bad faith, violation of implied 2c~enants of good faith and 
fair deiiings, interferences with contractual relationshipp and 
with prospective economic advantages. The tr~al court failed to 
make its own findings as required by IRCP, Rule 52(a) re denial 
of equitable issues on foreclosure by the bank and gave several 
incorrect jury instructions re law and issues for jury to decide. 
National Bank v Bliss'-Val 
herein along with Suchan , supra, that at law remedies took 
exclusive precedent to the omission of equitable foreclosure 
action brought by the bank. From 121 Idaho @ 283-89, the Idaho 
Supreme Court, citing a Washington State Case, and other out 
of state authorities to adopt the tort of wron~f~l interference 
of contractual relationships and pros~ective economic relation-
ships or advantages, and, along with the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealings, citing therewith Badge"t _v.;J'z~~~curity State 
Sank 116 Wash 2d 563, 807 P.2d 356 (1991) applied said implied 
covenant. repeating the conclusion: 11 A violation of the implied 
covent is a breach of the contract.u Such covenant occurs 11only 
when either party violates, nullifies or significantly impairs 
any benefit of the . . contract." Barloo·,, pcJ 7.,..3, also precludes plts ,_ 
S/j motion! 
Thusly, even though the realestate purchase contract 
which defendant and his cojoint venturers purchase.fi per their 
recorded spendthrift trust joint venture deed/agreement nowhere 
in negotations or in any purchase contract or deeds is/are the 
individual names of the Ulrich'·s,'i'Thomas nor Mary stated, ~i:gnated 
JNB's Opp/Counter Merro to Plts' Repi::{ Merro Y~ 'sy,:f P. 9. 
l~ 
nor disclosed. No one is disclosed in name, by entity or title 
whatsoever as to the purported 60 foot easement: no one! 
As was the case in C0~~rd'V~-~adley(2010)246 P.3d 991 
the easement deed mentioned notihing about the easement bene-
fiting no one~s adjoining lot, noththe predecessor~s of Ulrichs, 
nor how far back in time if at all such easement existed, and 
most certainly, not any trusts or trust which was immediately 
adjacent to the north, west or even south of Peacock Parcel. 
Two main principles apply, supported by,Coward till wit: 
l. "In construing an easement in a particular case, the instru-
ment granting the easement is to be interpreted in connec-
tion with the intention of the parties, and the circumstan-
ces in existence at the time the easement was granted.~· 
Kolouch v. Kramer, 120 Idaho 65, 69, 813 P.2d 876, 880 (1991) 
. :{and)If, however, the instrument of copveyance is amfu~g..,.. 
uous, interpretation of the instrument is a ioatt::gr of :flact for 
the trier of fact.• . . ~ (Herein no ~eve~lation ~xisted 
in any contract or deed benefiting defendant and his undivided 
one quarter spendthrift trust owners, what person, nor even 
mention of an adjoining real property owner was a dominant 
or even implied, inferred to use exclusively the 60 foot right 
of way. Simply put no adjoining owners, nor tenants nor irri-
gation easement holders had standing nor capacity whatsoever 
to make a quiet title claim nor for equitable declara~ory re-
lief! Plaintiffs had not purchased their acreage to the north 
until two (2) years plus later, 
2 An express easement does not grant rights in the easement to 
the parcels other than the dominant estate, Further, there 
can be no private dedication to a restrictd class of indiv-
iduals, such as those only owning property abutting an right 
of way. The rule that a common~law dedication must be for 
public use Has always been a part of Idaho jurisprudence. 
Requiring the dedicatin to be to the public, and not to in-
dividuals or to a class of private gra:h:tees, is a widely 
accepted p~inciple~ 246 Idah6 @ 396~98 
From not just the Coward v. Hadley case alone, even if 
a quiet title action by Plaintiffs had standing or the capacity 
justiciability to pursue their equitable claims, which are invalid 
JNB's Opp/Counte-r Meno- to Plts'' Reply Memo re £/J P, 10. 
if not void, the Plaintiffs'', even to this date, have nev€r 
had, never claimed any form of actual or constructive possession 
of the 60 foot road right of way over the westerly boundary of 
the Peacock 40 acre parcel~..,..-NEVER!· 
Therefore, the Plaintiffs never had a dedic.ated easement 
for them as a dominent easement estate, never had an implied 
easement, even if they had earlier asserted they did, by the 
doctrine of not just waiver, abandonment, but agreement, by 
acquiesence and estoppel, promissory, in pais, quasi estoppel 
etc. They do not nor could they acquire any easement. What is 
there for them to bring other than a legal action at law, cert-
iaaiy never having possession over, on or using the 60 foot ease-
ment claimed on defendant~s 40 acre parcel; no" quiet title action 
can lie nor be pursued. Dizick (Oregon, 2010)0r. App.) 
234 P.3d 1037, 23 Or. App. 594, (A party who is not in possession 
of land may not maintain a qUiet title action against a party in 
possession. 'Nor does an equitable remedy lie where there is an 
adequate remedy at law. (234 P.3d@ 1039.) 
No showing has been made per any survey result or other 
relevant admissible civil engineerts plat or overview of the 
claimed lJl:J? ich 1 s 60 foot easement, that such Ulrich::s easement 
abuts, adjoins and lies immediately upon the northern boundary 
line of the Peacock weiterly 40 acre parcel. We are left to 
speculate, conjECture and assume that it does 1 but such is a 
genuines question of fact that is more than required to have been 
established without dispute per Plaintiffsh moving affidavits and 
all memos, Just on that fact alone, their sununary judgment motion 
must be denied. _They have no dominant easement estate. No standin.sr: 
JNB' s Opp/Counter Memo to Plts 1 Reply_ Memo re = S/J P. ll. 
t~ 
II. IF PLAINTIFFS 13 VERIFIED COMPLAINT IS NOT DISMISSED 
BECAUSE THEIR LEGAL REMEDIES ARE ADEQUATE, COMPLETE, 
SPEEDY AND CLEAR, THEN CO'V'JARD"v~ HADLEY IS CONTROL,.,.' 
LING AS DISPOSTIVE OF THE *~SUES"'-~, TH*~' CASE, AI.pNG 
'WITH SHELTON V. BOYSDSTEN' ~EACH"-~SS'''N\ \C'ITED SU:gRA. 
,_. ~- ., . e;- " . .. - - ~~-..,...-.: 
In Plaintiffs' REPLY MEMORANDUI1, pages 6-10, 'Ehey 
jump a chasm of issues unaddressed not subject to the granting 
in any form or degree the genuine issues of fact which they 
have not addressed. Plaintiffs failure to carry their burdens 
of showing the complete absence of any genuine faet,.::.issnes -:i;s-:::faiJal. 
~ 
Their so called and offered "trump card case decision 1' 
is Ko lauch; v • Kramer 1 12 0 Idaho 6 5 , 813 P . 2 d 816 (19 91) now 
not only an anarchronism, but inapplicably distinguishable, 
1
unconstitutional and against the legal principles and control-
ling facts 1 issues add rulings of"c'oa~rct \r~.:<B:adley 1 24 6 P. 3d 391, -... ,~. ~-
and Sheltc.n v. Boysdesten, Beach'Ass''ti (Ct.,App, 1983}102 Idaho 818. 
In Plaintiffs" quoting fromT~Koiouch re the distinquislidng 
factors of Shelton, Reply Memo page ], .. g, thev show that, Shelton 
' •. ~ ' ~ · .. , ' 
is in fact the controllinq case; (In Shel bsn~:" . , 11 The trial 
court found that the plaintiffs had prevent as,sociated :me:ml::Jerrs 
from using the property for the express purpose o:t the easement 
and that the easement had :therefore been extinqu,~s,n,ep py adverse 
possession. That holding was· affirmed on appeal: ~ : ~ Th,e record 
in Shelton reveals that the easement was' i:n fact be;[,ng used per.;Lod~ 
ically for the purpose for which,it was· des~igned an.d that the plain~ 
tiffs were forced on several occasions t.o actually ch,a,se people of;f 
the easement area. As the trial court Q,Oi:;:ec:l\in its F.;Lndings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, ,,. I't'- ;j;s: al,s~b\e'!Lea)'' that: this· use of 
the property by the Shel tons", prey~·:n't.-e·a.\_~ez 'i:ise::: b:f:;. that< ]?ropei-t~i by 
others for the expr'EiSS pui:)?'6'se' '()j:Z tfu':fe~ eas~e~t\ \ \ lf '(BffiPfusis -Added) 
In Kolouch , @ p. 67 , the compla,int was f.or declaratory re~ 
lief; no objections were made that.there was an adequate remedy at 
law which precluded any equitable issues or count within said declar-
~5~0ppjeounter ·Memo to PJts' Ret;Jy~.Merro re S,/J P~ 1,_2. 
1 See Pages 19-21- infra 
atory relief complaint. 
But the ~rule~ stat~5, at page 67 is now not only 
overturned, superseded and moreover, unconstitutional, having 
sloU<§'lled not t accurately researched <re subsequent Idaho Supreme 
Court cases, after the cited supporting cases offQui~~v,,St0ne 
~.--\ fl- ~ .... ,·-. 
75 Idaho 243, 245 (1954), (now over 55 years unaddressed) and 
the further cited New York Castle'- Ass(')ciates v'1 Schwartz case, 
407 N.Y.S.2d 717, 83 A.D.2d 481 (1978} (Kolouch 120 Idaho~@ 67-68.) 
These are the Kolouch rules, now inapplicable, overruled, 
inaccurately applied:and more than voided by Cowar~v. , supra, 
and even earlier""I:\-~ppett \t.'·Davis, 102 Idaho 527, 633 P~2d 592. 
\ '\ . . 
tha-t mere 
of the easement." (Emphas±s Added) What is well known,. shown by a physical 
view of the Ulrich '·s acreage to the north of the Peacock 40 acres, is 
U!hrich-'s southern boundary, not shown to be the same as Defendant's 
northern boundary, is some eight and a half (8~). to ten HLO) feet 
higher in elevation that the Peacock •·s north2~::- boundary, which 
northern boundary is in a wash, couliee or drain area and creek 
bed 6rd.1ginating from South Leighi~Creek meandering southwesterly 
within the westerly portion of Peacock draining into Dry Creek, 
also known as Bear Creek, but traversing through the IdaboTlDepart,.. 
ment of Transportation 12 acre borrow, gravel and sand pit. About 
fifty (50) yards from Peacock's northwest corner is a very large 
agricultural irrigation well and electric pump wfuth underground 
irrigation water pipes/conduits to irrigate parts of Ulrich•s 
land and the Stillwater Ranch Subdivision to the west and north 
of Ulrich~s and beyond. Peacock when purchased in 1994 did not 
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have irrigation rights from said big wel,l and agricultural pump. 
However, approximately within 75~yards south of the north west 
corner, a pond bed of 2~3 acres would fill upn with subwaters 
to place pumps to irrigate approximately one quarter to one third 
of the northwest internal acreages of Peacock. Thusly, visually 
anyone claiming whatever easement of 60 feet for roadway purposes, 
as the Ulti~h•s now are had more than mere nonuse notice, that bhey 
could not use nor access said 60 foot right of way regardless if 
theY' claimed it was per grant or implied existence. Most critical-
l:¥y brought to their attention of nonuse if that wanted a road 
constructed through such depressed, water well and subterranean 
seasonaly pond accumulations, they could not pass through it. 
At- the internal northwest corner of Peacock is where Defen-
dant placed a fence, po~ts, rails and no trespassing, no entry, 
keep out signs and a large tractor front rake to prevent passage 
whatsoever. Such barriers, warning signs and obstacles were 
enforced by defendant personally, -especially with regularity from 
March of 2003 through the present date~ stopping, precluding and 
even removing persons trying to access through said northwest 
corner into the rest of the Peacock forty acres and especially 
all along the internal westerly 100 foot corridor of Peacock to 
the southerly hound !ary , along such westerly 100 foot corridor 
inst~lling and maintaining three (~) separate fences and gates 
also with multiple no trespassing, no entry, keep out, etc., signs~ 
He also planted mutiple trees, over twenty five (2521, over thirty 
(30) r:'tidsize to large schrubs, , bushes. and annual flowers, farm 
and garden crops, and restricted completely access to said strip, 
other than upon personal request and individual permission granted 
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only for such person so requesting and on/for no other use, 
date or event whatsoever. 
The Ulrich~s saw, witnessed, observed, experienced 
Defendant's restrictions, control of very limited access and 
enforcement of preclusions of :;any unauthorized intrusions 
or attempts at trepassings w-ithout defendant ''s express permission, 
limited in purpose uses of access over any part of Peacock. THey 
accepted.....~. abided, agreed to and more than acquiesced to Defendant ''s restrictions. 
Trappett v. Davis 102 Idaho 527, 531-.-34; Coward v. Hadley,246 P.3d@ 395-98. 
For the Plaintiffs to argue thai: Kolouch is dispositive 
and not Shelden, nor Coward v. Hadley, supra, without the trier 
of fact, 11 construing an easement, claimed by Ulrichs in this parti-
cular case, if they even have one and can proceed per quiet title 
claim,never having had nor still not having actual possession, 
nor their name revealled as granted to them ati'the time Peacock 
was purchased by Defendant via said Spendthrift Trust Joint Ven7 
ture Agreement, ignores/avoids and,prevents,·interpreting all 
deeds and documents, d€:),-e'nni~ing\ the i~t·ention":~ 
the which did not include 'and the circums.,-
tances at the time the easement granted or created. 
And further the like or ancillary question of whether a 
particular use of an easement is reasonable and commensurate with 
the parties intention when the easement was granted/created is a 
question of fact for the trier of fact in, a constitutional jiJ\7Y 
trial~ a iury upon a required legal remedy at law.·"B'axber v·,', 
116 Idaho 767, 780 P.2d 89 (1989} 
Thus, Kolouch .i:-sr:t't authority ;re precluding defendant to 
have inconsi?ten'i:;ly constructed,fu1d rrnaintained· a holding irrigat-
tion water pond, or any irrigation undergound pipes, condutt:s with 
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a very large agriculture deep well with large electrical pump 
supplying up to or more than 5000 gallons per minute water for/ 
with above ground aluminum pipes, sprinker irrigating dispensing 
outlets to irrig~te the entire 40 acre Peacock Parcel, for crops, 
defendant's horse, farm and domestic stock animals., all within the 60 foot 
claimed easement. 
Rem"B:mber, the Ulrich's were not present or around 7 except 
for two (2) times during the summer to early fall, to service 
and tend to their beehives, from 2004 through emcl,(,!)f summer 2010, .?-
six (6) year period, they never occupi:eEL' .l?Ossessed or use.d 
whatsoever the claimed 60 foot right o.f_w~TQey didn't need i...:Lat <31l. 
The case holding and analysis of'~:J?'appett"-:V~' DaVis, 102 Idaho 
527, 530-532, dealt with the quieting title of a boundaxy not 
just by adverse possession,. prescription or adverse use/, but 
"by acquiescense'{ At pa,ge 53l th.e Jdah.o Supreme Court set forth 
the premise of 11Adverse J?ossession and Agreed boundary a,re dis-
tinct theories, "and at p, 532 h.eld; 
uA third exception is not really an exceRtion at all• 
but rather a different rule, having as· ;bts 'source a dif". 
ferent doctrine, Idaho has recogni~ed the 'Cloetrine of 
-agreed boundary or bounda.rv by<~cquie'$'Ceh~e • .:. , \;: \ (Emphasis Added) 
In a ~NOTE 11 , page 532, it referencedly stated: 
''Note, Boundaries by Agreement and A.cquiescen;(;le in Utap, 
1975, Utah L. Rev. 221 (1975} Although th.e ¢ioctrines are dis-
tinct, they have had some common attributes. For example, in 
Kesler v. Ellis, supra, this Court borrowed the statutory 
period from adverse possession theO.¥¥ and applied it to a,greed 
boundary cases, holding that ~it is but log±cal to sa,y that 
such acequiescence must be for a period of less th.an five yea,rs, 
thus conforming to the period, established by,,t.he sta~ute of 
limitations in cases of adverse. possession.''''· Kes~re·r"· V\"- E'ilis, r, 
47 Idaho at 744i' 278 p'·. at J67 ~. Subsequently·') howevf;r~, in· 
t;aurle:y;. v/' Barr! s. 7 5 Idaho 1.12. 268 P !2d 351 (19 54 U t)1i.s 
Court abandoneE! the five-:-year requirement ~-for acqLJ.iescen~e, 
holding that the period of acquiescenc~,, .i:s merely regarded 
as competent evidence of the agreement~ ~. .. "'Id. at 117 f;' 2 6l P 
P.3d at 353.u (See also pages 533~341 
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Paurley v~ Barris, 75 Idaho 112, 268 P.2d 381 (1954), 
(decided same year as Quinn v. Stone, 75 Idaho 243, 250 l 
· •was a legal action of ej ectrnent of a boundary dispute. At 
page 117 of Paurley , especially pages 120~121, the dissenting 
opinion, S''CC;nc+ly' evaluates and analyzes what the majority 
opinion then and therafter did not require for acquiescence. 
Defendant 1's affidairit and even Plaintiffs •· own incom-
plete and hearsay complaint ''s paragraphs and the further affi-
davit of Plaintiff Thomas Ulrich, have already admitted if not 
confessed defendant•s proof of open, not~rious, continuous and 
unn~ppted use of the claimed easerent for all periods, if 
..,.any there still be because of 'Trapper.v,. Davi\S ·~ supra, at page 532, 
he ' is entitled to the presumption of adverse, ac:;q'uies£.,s;;nc~ ,' _:lc,fa.i)ze r, 
and abandonment use and purpo'ses" 9f use, inconsi"s'tent wi t;b a:n)[ c·of 
i-Bt-errtions or purpose in the all'e_9ed . ea:-s,ement. 
Kolouch •· following sentence is senseless,, contradictory 
and implausibledn both form 1.,.. intentions and application, at Pages 
68-69: ~Applied here, we may paraphrase this rule to read that 
where the easement was created, but no occasion has arisen 
for its use, the owner of the servienV·itenement may plant 
trees, erect a fence, etc., and such use will not be deemed 
to be adverse, until tfie:::need to use the easement arises (or 
inconsistent to use 'Shelton '·s terml until the neecll to use 
the easement arises, etc. We think this rule makes sense 
in light of the well established rule that the owner of the 
servient estate is entitled to u~e his:__ ic:~pd,, evep though 
encumbered by an easement, f0r ~n:Y'· ·pl.fr{l&'S~ · hbt· '-i\pconsist-ent 
with the purpose reserved in the easE!I.'rlffit. · , · t· · ·~ '' (Etnpnasis Added) 
The many so.,..called rules of Kolouch as cited, supra, are 
more than contradictory and ambiguously con,trived, and misapplied 
to rewrite a written easement which is not applied with cognent 
clear, sdctint rules of the intention of the parties, and, most 
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HIS'TAKENL'X", without mutuality of j_ntention or meeting of the 
minds, gives to a nonexistent pa;rty· or pa;rtj:_es·, ll.e;r;e th~ 'Ulrichs 1 
an unagreed condition of subjective cond;L_tj:_on precedent of 
when they can start the running o;f; any applicable statute of 
limitations and further violatesthe statute of fra,uds~ The 
more the ULrich's deny or refuse to a,dn)it t:P.e precj_se date/time 
the "Ulrich ''s need to use the easement a;r:-ose·-~·, Ul:'rich ''s can 
without impunity and without any arlqJitted knowledge of in~onsis.,-
tent uses, purposes or a,ctions of their claimed easement, simply 
snooze, sleep on their rights~ ignore and evade all responsibili~ 
:ties of any statutes of limitations or of fraud, because under 
the Alice in Wonderland principles of Ko:I_oucl}.~ the trial court 
can rewrite, reform and modify the true and mutality of agree-
ment and meeting of the minds, at will of th.e servient easement 
holder, discriminating against him, without any semblance C[r 
application of all terms, conditions a,nd covenants actually agre-
ed upon. Put Dlaintiffc:: contend, -if the erlsement in nuec:tinn insirle dPfen-
dant'c: wec:tern boundarv was just fnr their fu+urp families c:pendthrift trusts' 
3 . 
lots~ splits- the~ bvthP dortrine of mergPr, there w~s nn gr~ntPd or otherwisP 
easement. berause of thP dortrine of mPrger. Fxactlv, such meraer is binding! 
Tp-;aUow,:; ·CRrbj_ trary rules and uncertain implied terms, 
understandings and claimed rules of policy re reconstructing 
the intenti<D:r.ES of the parties apa;rt of origina,l conveyances ·toc;create the 
easement, "ALLOWS~· a trial court judge to ignore, misuse and 
act in excess of jurisdiction, without consistent rules of 
discretion, maliciously and biasedly violating a,ny standards of 
permitted discretion or public policies enumerated, thus, engaging 
in arbitrary, capricious, whimsical and prejudicial favoritism· 
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III. IF PLAINTIFFS' CURRENT VERIFIED COMPLAINT IS NOT DISMISSED 
FOR BOillH OF THE REASONS, THAT THEY HAVE A CLEAR, IMMEDIATE, 
ADEQUATE, COMPLETE AND PLAIN Rfit,1~DIES AT LAW AND THE TOTAL 
FAILURE TO JOIN INDISRENSIBLE PARTIES, THEN DEFENDANT'S CON-
STITUTIONAL RIGHTS UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE 
U.S. CONSTITUTION, OF DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION TO 
A PUBLIC JURY TRIAL IS A STRUCTURAL DEFECT THAT ALSO REQUIRES 
THE ENTIRE PLAINTIFFS" COMPLAINT DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 
Plaintiffs' current complaint, which their counsel have framed 
in two (2) equity counts of quiet title, ~nd of declaratory relief with 
injunctive issuance orders, is more than a deliberate tactic and ploy 
cuntenanced by this dist*ict court to not just prevent, but completely 
eliminate defendant's U.S. Constitutional, trourtheenth Amendments rights 
of due process and equal protection to a public jury trial of required 
remedy at law issues that are required to be addressed and raised solely 
by Plaintiffs only herein. Suchan v. Rutherford, 90 Idaho 2888, 295; 
National Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc. 121 Idaho 266, 278-289; Spears v. 
Dizick, (Oregon 2010, Or. App) 234 P.3d 1037, 23 Or:. App. 594; and Trappett 
102 Idaho 527, 531-34 (see page 15,-1;8;tiS'upraL and Towe.!:_A~e.!_S~Inc:2.. 
v. Lawrence, 143 Idaho 710, 714, and Pro Indiviso, Inc., v. Mid-Mile Holdinq 
Trust, 131 Idaho 746, 746 (Part B., pages 5-11, supra). 
This Court has further violated the aforesaid U.S. Constitutional 
rights by bring in as equitable issues, supposedly reached with finality, 
but no so at all, when the Court took full judicial notice, knowledge and 
inserted it's Decision in Idaho SupremP Court Dkts #34712 and 35334 (Teton 
CV Ol-265J as controlling the individually named trusts, persons and entities 
who owned and still own the Peacock 40 acres. The district court judge who 
after remand rendered a SECOND AMENDED JUDGMENT in TEton CV 01-265, which 
was not then nor now final, but appealed by JOHN N. BACH herein and as 
ap?e,llant Complainant In Intervention, who has filed his Openina Brief in 
.. •. . 
the Idaho ~uoreme Court's Docket 38370, is Judge Darren Simpson, the assigned 
jurist in this quiet title action. The facts as stated above, raised overtly 
and critically, not just the appearances, but the actuality of a biased trial 
judge herein, who to protect his SECOND AMENDED JUDGMENT, now on appeal in 
Teton CV 01-265, I.S.C. Docket 38370, has so far denied and overruled Defend-
ant's requests to dismiss Plaintiffs' entire complaint herein for failure 
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and refusals to oroceed solely on legal remedies at law causes of action 
and to join all indispensable parties. Such refusals and failures as 
currently allowed by Judge Simpson are in fact and constitutional effect, 
violations and deprivations of John Bach's said Fourteenth Amendment Rights 
to du~orocess and equal protection as set forth in State v. Perrv 245 Idaho 
961, 974-979. Althouah Perrv dealt with oroceedinas and errors in a crim-
inal trial, the citing and quoting of Chief Justice Rehnauist, writina in 
Mizona_'!_._l_u~inat_g_, 499 U.S. 27q, lll S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d (1991), 
at £eLLy. starting oage 974-top right, 975 is most relevant, applicable 
and controlling. 
Herein anrl in Teton CV 01-265, upon remand before Judae Simpson, 
is appears that such .iurist has followed, oer under color of law. Idaho 
judicial custom, oractice and procedures, to unconstitutionally favor 
and aoply equitable actions of quiet title, declaratory and injunctive 
relief. when none of such equi table actions are allowed, nor mandated, 
but do short en and reduce involvments of the trial district court judge 
sitting without a jury, who under Idaho statutes will make almost imoos-
sible to overturn findings of fact and conclusions of law, rather than 
the verdict of a public trial jury who award damages as instructed, and 
whose verdict and the iudament thereon to be entered are given greater 
confirmations. verifications and validities by Idabo Statutes. (See Perrv 
page 97Ll, right column, as to such due process and eqllal nro+ection riohts 
violations which are structural defects. 
The following reworded quote from Sullivan v. Louisian~_a 508 
U.S. 275, 113 S.Ct. 2078. l2Ll L.Ed.2s 182 (1993) .. "the jury was given a 
defective instructions and the U.S. Supreme r.ourtfound that (the pnrtj 1s) 
Sixth Amendment riqht to a jury trial had., therefore been violated ... such 
violation constituted a structural defect . as it 'vitiate (d) all the jury's 
findings' II J11st on the Suchan case alone defendant's Fourteenth AmF>ndment 




Per all of .lQHN N. RA(I-.t's motionc, momoc, a-ffirlavits and this, 
most cur-rent nppnSINh AND COIINTER MEMORANDUM BRIFF, this rourt should, 
ospoci~llv for lark o-f or warrant of cubiect matter jurisdiction anrl fail-
ure of joining mndispensihle narties orrler the following: 
DATED: 
1. Oismiss wibh Prejudice the Plaintiffs' VerifiPd Complaint. 
? · R~cuse itself of decline to hear any matter further inrlurlinn 
Plaintiffs' rleficient luncupportahleMotion for Summary Judgment 
3 Gr~nt nefondrlnt rlnd rounterclrlimrlnt's JnHN ~~. B8CH motion ~nd 
;.pplic~tinn por lilic filinns and momoranrta, romnla+e S"mmrlry iudn-
mont rlgainst bo~h P'ai-ti£fs Ulr;chs. 
4. Olf' Ahate, Stay all nroreerlinns in this ar.tinQ, 1rntil the rosolll-
tion with Finality nf all i<::SUPS in tho current anperll in Idi'lhO 
<:upremo Co"rt rlocket 18370, Tetnn C" 01-265 
5. Tmpnse sanrtinns nf cnstc, roserlrch feos, ros+s and exnences 
etr., attornev's 7 paralPgal fees/expensPs anainst hath 
6. 
Phintiffs and their twn COIInsol, Mr. Womor and Mv-. in 
vinla+ions of Rule 11 (a\(1\, e+ al for failure tn do cimnly 
rasos. reserlrch to loc;'~te- cite and arivice tBP C011rt nf SIIChi'ln ' 
~~~r·s "· Dizirk, Tr"p~tt u. Drlvic, P~uerlev v. Warris rlnd 
Cowarrr-v-.-Hadl ey caces anrlfor deli bPratemi sst atementS-i'lnd 
misrepresonti'ltfons of tho orinciples and anplications of the 
defective cases thev diri cite. 
Terminate, abate anrl vacate anv restraining order or nrelimin-
ary i nj1mcti on issued or further reauesterl. (The rourt has a 1 ready 
found/helrl that therP is no bi'lsis for anv iniunrtive relief. 
(The ordered survey could have been rlleri per IRrP, RulP ~4, 
ner disr.overy rules and prinr.iples ) 
April 22, 2011 
/1/A/\ 11 !) (,1' (! 
l . ,, , vtet" 
J• N N. BACH./Pro Se 
rERTIFTCATE OF SERVIEF BY MAil; I the tmdorsign rprt .Y'this April ?2, ?011, 
that T dirl place this/a ropv of the foregiing documen. in the li.S.Mail with 
first class postane affixed to SPparatP envelopes adrlre<::serl to: l) rharles 
Homer. P.O. Box 5 0130 Idaho Falls, ID G3405; and T~~~norable Darren Simpson. 
Bingham County Courthouse.501~!.Maole #310, Blackfoot Id<\ho 83221. 
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JOHN N., BACH t·s OPENING APPELLANT BRIEF 
I. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL, Filed Dec. 9, 2010 
(C.T. 76~86) 
Appellant JOHN N. BACH, filed a NOTICE OF APPEAL , 
Prose, I.A.R., Rule 17, etc., from: 1.) ORDER GRANTING 
PLAINTIFF WAYNE DAWSON ''S MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT 1 
dated October 29, 2010 (CT 11~31), 2.) SECOND AMENDED 
JUDGMENT, filed October 29, 2010 (CT 7 ~ 10) and 3) ORDER 
DENYING INTERVENOR~COMPLAINANT JOHN N.. BACH's MOTION TO STRIKE, 
TO ALTER OR AMEND,'OR RELIEF FROM FINAL JUDGMENT, 1(;) pages, fil~ 
-ATTACHMENT hereto is a copy of "3) ORDER." ad directly with this Court. · · 
Through the issues and motions made by Appellant during 
the REMAND of thcis Honorable Idaho Supreme Court to d&strict 
court Judqe, the Honorable Darren B. Simpson, no hearings were 
allowed by him either on what he was to consider on Remand, nor 
did he permit nor allow any hearings, in person or via telephone 
conferences, on Appellant~s Re: 1.) To Strike, Quash & Vac~te 
Court's Order Granting Wayne Dawson'· For Relief from Judgment 
& Second Amended Complaint, I.R.C.P., Rule 12 (f), 12 (g), (2) (4), 
19, et seq~ 2) Order Granting New Hearing Before Unbiased, 
Qualified Judge, I.R.C.P., Rules 59 (a) (6) (Insufficency of Evi-
dence, error in law/against the law) & Rule 59(e)} and 3) Ord-
er Per I.R.C.P., Rule 60(b) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) & (6), filed Novem-
ber 15, 2010. (CT 32-4 3) Appellant Notice for hearing all said 
three (3) motions on Friday, December 17, 2010, (CT 51-870). 
- l -
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III. STATEMENT OF THE. CASE., REMANDED 
A. ~~Nature of the 
The verified complaint brought by plaintiffs Jack 
Lee McLean and Wayne Dawsons, as trustees of their family 
trust labelled Quiet Tile and Partition Real Estate, filed 
December 18, 2001, (R.Vol 1, pp 1~5; R. Vol.II. p. 479, was 
served upon John N. Bach, as successor trustee of the defen-
dant €ASA N. BACH FAMILTURST. JOHN N. BACH, was not named 
nor served as an indiv~dual defendant, although he was one 
of the four joint venturers, dba as TARGHEE POWEDER EMPORIUM, 
LTD., who was a holder of an undivided one-fourth interest in 
the PEACOCK FORTY ACRE PARCEL, the sole real property involved. 
B. CoUrse of Proceedings 
John Bach, 1 on FebrRary 26, 2002 was granted leave to 
intervene in the case asserting his personal interests therein. 
He filed a verified Complaint:' illntervention March 26, 2002 nam-
ing as Intervenor Third Bai:ty defendants: JACK LEE McLEAN, Trus-
tee, WAYNE DAWSON, Trustee, DONNA DAWSON, ALVA A. HARRIS, ind~v­
idually and dba SCONA, INC., a sham Idaho entity, KATHERINE M. 
MILLER, and DOES 1-30, Inclusive. 
2 
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No answer no other responsive pleading was filed 
by the Third Party Defendants, although Alva Harris as their 
attonney did file an appearance for them, but not for Katherine 
Miller. 
Appellant made various motions to dismiss, for 
sanctions, etc., all being denied. Jan. 3, 2005 entered an 
Order dismissing Jack Lee McLean, who had died Dec.5, 2005 (R. 
Vol. I, pp 61-66. A DISMISSAL with PREJUDICE FOR LACK OF 
D;LLIGENT PROSECUTION of both Plaintiffs Complaint was granted 
by the district court, upon duly noticed motion brought by 
Appellant, heard on August f , 
349-369.) 
2007 (R. Vol I, pp 61466, 
Appellant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment in 
this Action and companion action Teton CV 01-33, with numerous 
supporting af~idavits, exhibits and memorarlda of points and 
authorities; Respondent Dawson's attorney, Alva A. Harris filed 
no counteraffidavits, no memoranda opposing said summary judgment 
and did not argue, although he was present at the noticed hearing 
and oral argument by Appellant for his summary judgment motions. 
which the court granted without opposition, without objections 
and which the Court determined was stipulated and consented in 
full by the Third Party Defendants who had appeared b~t who 
had filed no. responding valid pleading. 
Respondent DAWSON~s newly substituted counsel, 
Marvin Smith of Idaho Falls, filed Oct 17, solely a Motion for 
Reconsideration per Rule ll(a) (2) (B, IRCP, seeking reconsider-
3 3:8 
ation of the Court''s Septel1l.ber 11, 2007 Joint Cases Opinion 
Memorandum, etc and the Quieting Title Judgment solely in 
favor of Appellant John N. Bach with permanent injunction 
provisions against all named third party defendants. 
The motion for reconsideration was not accompanied by any 
timely affidavits by DAWSON nor his two attorneys, Alva Harris 
as his first counsel, nor his then newly substituted counsel, 
Marvin Smith, nor any one explaining or trying to show under 
oath why there was any good, sufficient legal cause to recon~ 
der the said summary judgment granted and imposed, Without 
such timely 14 days period in which affidavits could have been 
filed, and per the holding of Jensen v. State 139 Idaho 202, 
(Idaho 2003) the trial court lost jurisdiction over DAWSe>N's 
motion for reconsideration. DAWSON's said v6id motion for 
reconsideration did not raise any basis of facts or law, that 
it extended or was sought to reverse, the Dismissal with Prej-
udice of Dawon's and also McLean's complint for lack of dili~ 
gent prosecution. 
February 8, Dawson and McLean ''s Estate and purported 
heirs, of which there we~e no estate or heris with standing or 
capcity fileda motion to set aside order and quieting title 
judgment per IRCP, Rule 60(b) (6) with a rambling affidavits 
and exhibits thereto, but premising said Rule 60(bl (6) motion 
on DAWSON's earlier filed motions for reconsideration, which 
failed to timely and properly be filed within the required 14 
days, thus making it void ab initio~- (R. Vol II~ pp 617~628, 654-660) 
April 8, 2008 a Memorandum Decision:aiid Order Denying 
4 
Plaintiffs'/Third Party Defendants~ Motion for Reconsider~tion 
was entered. R. Vol. II, 667,686. Among several April 10, 
2008 orders granted was that of Denying As Moot Plaintiffs' 
Motion to Change Caption, R. Vol II, 686~697. 
April 16, 2008 DAWSON filed a Motion to Alter or 
Amend a Judgment. which was denied July 2, 2008 .• R"Vol II, 
710-717, 753-756. 
The district court entered its First Amended Judg-
ment.:--alt:ering the early judgment so it did not>qihiet title to 
John N. BAch in an 8 plus acre Zamona Casper parcel, and revi-
sing the language of the mandatory injunctioncprovisions. 
R. Vol II, 730-738. 
July 9, 2008, Respondents Dawsons and whoever should 
have been McLean~s representatives, but weren't and di~pite 
the absence of any proba~e representative or duly appffiinted 
estate, filed a Second Amended Notice of Appeal. R.Vol II 757-761. 
C. IDAHO SUPREME COURT DECISION IN DOCKET 3~312 
DAWSON in his appeal, docket 34712, filed his 
APPELLANT"S BRIEF, 8:JL pages, June 19, 2009. The name of 
JACK LEE McLEAN, NOR HIS ESTATE NOR ANY REPRESENTATIVES OR 
DAUGHTERS were presented nor d:ilsclosed anywhere ffin the cover 
and in said brief as an named or interested party in said appeal. 
The five denominated issues on said appeal clearly w~~e limited 
to appellant therein DAWSON and only DAWSON,. Throughout the 
ARGUMENT portion and the Conclusion requested its was only DAWSON, 
so appealing and seeking relief. (DAWSONr'S OPENING BRIEF, PP 5-20) 
DAWSON admitted that hlhs Rule 60(b) (6) motion which 
had not been ruled upon, could o~ly be granted for "any other 
reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." 
."only upon a snowing of unique and compelling circumstances." 
He cited Palmer v. Spain, 138 798, 802, 69 P.3d 1059, 1062 (2003). 
In Dawson's quote from Palmer, he accepted its statement that: 
"it would be an idle exercise and a waste of judicial resources n 
to set aside a judgment if, in fact, there is no genuine justi-
ciable controvery. (Citations omitted}. While this requirement 
that a Rule 60(b) movant must show a meritorius defense has gen-
erally been applied in Idaho appellate decisions where the chal~ 
lenged judgm:emn.was taken by default, e. g. Reeves,. its is equal.,.. 
ly applicable in the present circumstances where the judgment 
was rendered on the merits. It would be pointless to vacate a 
summary judgment and reopen the proceeding iif the party seeking 
relief has not shown taht it can raise genuine factual issues 
to defeat the summary judgment motion. •· (Dawsons' AOP, Pg 6-7 
Respondent JOHN N. BACH's brief in opposition to 
DAWSON's cited two most recent cases which had cogent control-
ling application, to w~t: 
l. Esser Electric v, Lost River Ballistics Tech, Inc. 
decided May 20, 2008(30 days befor~ D~~s6n~~ Opening 
Brief was filed) 145 Idaho 912, 916~920,. 188 P.3d 854. 
(@ 917: "For over 110 years this Court has held that 
a party is not entitled to a relief from a judgment on 
the ground that judgment was entered due to the negli-
gence or unskillfulness of the party~s attorney, Esser 
Electric has not convinced us that we should change 
that policy. Therefore, it is not entitled to a new 
trial on the gounrd that its counsel committed misfea-
sance in failing to respond to the motion for summary 
judgment. 11 ) 
(@ 917-918: ''we have not required the trial court to 
rule on the admissibility of the affidavit where there 
is no objection to it. If there is no timely object-
tions, the trial court can·. grant summary judgment bas 
ed upon an affidavit that does not comply with Rule 56·,, 
(e) . " 
I 
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2. United Student Aid Fund"', :rnc ~r. Espi:o.osa, __ u.,_s. 
Sup£eme Court decision Mar. 23, 2010, L.A. Daily 
Journal, D.A.R. 4307, 4309~4311. Re: A losing party 
can not rely on Rule 60 (b) (4), Or 60 (b) (6) 1 as a 
substitute for a timely appeal. Rule 60 (b) does not 
provided a licenses for sleeping or avoiding timely 
to perfect his rights as he"s forfeited them on any 
basis via a claimed of 60(b) application. 
Respondent John Bach~s brief cited over 7 other Idaho 
case authorities which not just voided any application of 
Rule 60 (b) (1) thourgh BO (b) (6), but held such efforts to 
seek relief per section 60(b) (4) through (b) (6 were beyond 
the court's jurisdiction and authority. ((These cases will be 
addressed under the appeal points, infra, all of which were 
either not cited or misapplied by Judge Simpson upon remand.) 
The Idaho Supreme Court •· s TOp inion by Justice Jones, 
in Dock~t 34712, overlooked and failed to apply any of the 
foregoing cited:·cases authorities bucft did ai!Ifirm the denial 
of DAWONS"Motmon for Redonsideration, per Rule ll(b) (2) 
The opinion REMANDED the case back to the district court, 
Judge Darren B. Simpson to rule upon Dawson '·s motion per 
Rule 60(b) (6) which Judge Simpson had failed to address and 
rule upon. 
D. AFTER RECEIPT OF REMAND, TRIAL COURT REFUSED TO ALLO\i'J 
GRANT'_ OR SET HEARINGS AND ARGUMENTS ON THE ISSUE REMANDED 
':'TO IT ANF REFUSED ALL FURTHER INPUT FRO:M APPELLANT. 
Upon receiving the file pack July 30j. 2.010, 1the Court 
sua sponte issued a Status Order, Sept. 1, 2010, stating: 
" .• this Court has requested the transcript of the oral 
argument before the Court on February 14, 2008, regarding 
he Plaintiff's Rule 60(b} (6) motion. Upon receipt .• the 
matter will be deemed submitted for purposes of tfuis Court 
issuing its ruling upon said motion. The Court will review 
the previous and relevant pleadings and argument made in 
support and opposition to said motion, 
No additional brief may be submitted without a 
written order of the Court. n Remand Clerk~'s Transcript" Rcr P. l-3 
Septerrber 16, 15 days later, a Second Status Order, informed 
such FEb. 14, 2008 transcript has been received and the matter 
was submitted for purposes of the Court''s consideration, reit~ 
era ted no additional briefing without a written court order. :<C' 
RCT: P 4-5. District Court Judge Simpson did not serve the par-
tires with a copy of such transcript, nor was there any notice 
if, what documents would be given judicial notice per I. R. E. , 
Rule 20l(b) (c) (d) (e), etc. The trial court cited no local nor 
I.R.C.P, it was following. 
October 29, 2010 a SECOND AMENDED JUDGMENT was filed at 
Blackfoot County, in Chambers (CRT: 7-10) along with an ORDER 
GRANTING PLAINTIFF WAYNE DAWSON 1'S MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDG-
MENT. RCT: ll-31. 
The pertinent parts of the SECOND ~1ENDED JUDGMENT read: 
"THIS COURT, having gr:ante4 Plaintiff Wayne Dawson 1 s Motion 
for Rel.ief: from Judgment, finds that the First Amended Judgment, 
entered in this case on May 27, 2008, should be vacated and this 
Sl3cond Amended Judgment should be substituted thher·ecEor. 
Plaintiff's Complaint, as it pertains to Wayne 
d~smissed with prejudice for failure to p~osecute. 
Jack Lee McLean, TrusteEj_f: was previously dismissed 
dillce from this lawsuit. 
Dawson, is '\('~-·· 
Plaintiff 
with preju-
Intervenor-Complaint John N, Bach 1·s JY\Oti'On for S1.lff1Ilary Judgment is 
granted upon :_-:.D:aw:si,:m •·s failure to respond the!Eeto ~ In accord:t-v :·.: 
arice with his verified Complaint in Intervention, John N. Bach, 
individually, shall have quiet title to an undivided one~fourth 
(~) interest in the forty (40)~acre parcel of land referred to 
as the "Peacock Parcel"' or the RPeacock 40-::-Acre Parcel. 'J· The 
P~acock Parcel is described as? 
(Legal Description omitted herefrom) 
8 .,... 
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Defendant Cheyovich Family Trust, Milan and Diana 
Cheyovich shall have quiet4titl~ to an undivided one-fourth 
(~) to the Peacock Parcel. 
Tnr~ Court takes judicial notice that Plaintiff Dawson 
was granted an undivided one-fourth interest in:bhe Peacock 5 
Parcel in Bach v. Miller, Teton County case no. CV-2008~202. 
This Court also takes judicial notice that Plaintiff 
McLean, deceased, by and through his representative Lynn 
McLean was granted an undivded one-fourth interest in the 
Peactfck Parcel in Bach v. Miller, Teton County case no CV-2008-W~rJ~-
2 OB -. 
'This is a final order, appealable as a matter of right pursuant 
to Idaho Appellate R\i{le ll (a) (l}. u: = 
IT IS SO ORDERED.·~- RCT ~ 7,..-9 
The Order Granting Plaintiff Wayne Pawson~\ Mot;ton for Rel;tef 
from Judgment, states, in pertinent pB,rt ··~II, ISSUES"'; 
McLean. and D~wson ''~ 6~ (b) Motion. rei;te~ uJ?op tp_e argu,. 
ments made ln their Mption-, for Reconsideratton ,_ A;Ll, of t\le 
arguments raised in McLean and Dawson ''S' Motion ,for Recons.td-::--
era tion were addressed in the Hemorandum Decis-ion and Order 
Denying Plaintiff~V-·/Third Party Defendants-!·. M,ot-cbon for 
Reconsideration. 
The :Idaho Supr:sme Court directed tl:l.is Cou,rt. to cons;Lder 9 
relieving Dawson.of the original judgml_IQt entered in.this case. 
as well as the Flrst Amended Judgment, - · on the basls of the 
inconsistency be'95_een the relief requested by Bach in his inter"' 
vening complaint and the relief granted in the Judgment and the 
First Amended Judgment. 12 
Based upon this Supreme Court's directive, the issues pres- r:.h• ·: 
sented include: 
l. Has Dawson shown unique and compelling circumstances 
justifying relief from the First Amended Judgment? 
2. If Dawson meets the standard for Rule 60(b) (6). what 
relief is he entitled to received? 
. RCT; 12-13 
The rest~of Order granting Dawson's motion, failed il!ocurately 
to state, analyze, apply or quote the Jo~nt IY~EMORANDm-r issued by Judge-=-
,Jon. Shindirling controlling in the -Quiet Title Judgements,_ in < 
November 15, 2010 Appellant filed three (3) motions, 
to wit: 1) To strike, quash & Vacate Court's Order Granting 
Plaintiff Wayne Dawson •·s for Relief from Judgment & Second Amen..::. 
ded Judgment, Jli_R.C.·P,, Rules 12(f), l2(g) (2)*4), 19, et seqi 
2) Order Granting New Hearing Before Unbiased, Qualified Judge, 
:LR.C.P., Rule 59 (a) (6) insu·fficiemy of Evidence, error in law/ 
against the law) & Rule 59(e}; and 3) Order Per I,R.C.P. Rule 
60(b) (l) (2) (3) (4) (5) & (6) ,, RCT: 32.,..43 
Respondent DAWSON, filed along with McLean, on Nov. 19, 
2010 a series of Objections to Appellant's said motions. RCt: 44- rl 
50. Appellant , Dea. 3, 'nQ!:iced,. .called Up;,~.:: for hearing his said 
three (3) motions· fo~ Friday, Dec. 17, 2010 at 10:30 a:m., whihh 
included to strike McLean•sjDawson•s objections, intfu~ding ~oid+ 
ing Marvin Smith's Dec. l, 2010 letter to Judge Simpson, (RCT: 53), 
and setting forth further points and authorities in support of 
his three ( 3) motions. ( (RCT: 50.,..70. 
After McLean and Dawson sought to appear telephon±cally, 
which included their request to deny Appellant oral argument and 
decide his motions on briefing, etc., (RCT: 71~75~)D~c~'9} 1appellant 
filed his Notice of Appeal 1 (RCT: 76-79) along with his Opposi~ 
tion and a motion to strike McLean's & Dawon' s objections to the 
Dec. 17 hearing date. (RCT: 80-82. A second copy of i'Rppellant' s NOTICE OF 
APPEAL is set forth at RCT, Pages 83.,..86, wherein as ISSUE 7: he 
raises the Question: "DID THE TRIAL COURT ERROR FURTHER IN DENYING 
ALL OR ANY OF APPELLANT"S THREE (3) MOTIONS 
WHICH WERE (TO BE ) HEARD ON OR ABOUT DECEM~ 
17 I 2010? (RCT: 85) 
Dec. 13, 2010, four days before the notice Dec, 17 hearing 
McLean and Dawson brought a motion to strike Appellant's Reply 
Memorandum, along with an order E'-~ ...... .r-ning time for service. RCT: 87-95 
1o -004G ., .. 
December 14, 2010, the next day after McLean/Dawson's said 
filed motion and obiectisn, Appellant his written Objections, 
opposition and refutations to McLean's/Dawson's reply memo, etc., 
raising again the McLean has no standing, capacity nor any basis 
of repEesentation as he is dead, having no estate established 
legally, nor any duly appointed, recognized represenuative; and 
that even Dawson, lacks standing or capacity to make such objec~ 
tions or motions, that the October 28, 2010 said Order arid Second 
Amended Judgemnt are VOID AB INITIO , per his several memos filed 
ln support of his said three (3) motions and that ''NO AFFIDAVIT 
IS FILED IN SUPPORT OF (Respondents' ) REQUESTED ORDER TO SHORTEN 
TIME, etc., "no could it be made, as DAWSON and his counsel, 
still seeking in violation of the basic rules of procedural 
and substantive due process and equal protection of JOHN N. 
BACH's said rights, special, baised and favorably judicial 
treatment and renderings by this Court,· all in contravention 
of both the ORDER and SECOND AMENDED JUDGMENT which are void 
ab initio. Nor does Dawson and Mr. Smith address how McLean, 
etc., could be a party herein at this date, See. I.e. section 
15-3-1600. II (RCT: 96-98 
Dated December 2 0, 2 010, but itemized in the Remand Clerk,. s 
Transcript as filed without date is an erder Augmenting Appeal, 
Supreme Court Docekt No. 38370.,-2010 Teton County Docket No. 2001, 
265, filed May 05, 2009, at RCT, 99-100. Immediately following at 
RCT, 101-1057 filed Dec. lA,-2010 filed at 5:00 p.m (filed one day 
after--McLean/Dawson •·s -unsupported by an affidavit- motillon to 
strike. etc., filed also at 5:00p.m) Judge Simpson issed an 
ORDER DENYING ORAL ARGUMENT ON PENDING MOTIONS AND OBJECTIONS. 
(RCT: 101-105, ) especially finding: ~ , , oral arg1Iffieht wdiuld 
not produce any additional benefit to the Court for purposes of 
rendeting a decision on the various motions before this Court." 
-.-
All pending motions and objections thereto are 
hereby deemed submitted to his Court, A written decision will 
issue within thirty (30) days.'·' RCT: 101-104. 
Thereafter, forty~four (44) days later, January 27, 2011, 
at 11:49 a.m., Judge simpson issued an ORDER DENYING INTERVENOR-
' 
COMPDAINT JOHN N. BACH'S MOTION TO STRIKE, TO ALTER OR AMEND, OR 
FOR RELIEF FROM FINAL JUDGMENT, consist:i:ng of nine pages, wherein 
at the last three (3} pages thereof, Judge Simpson Per IRCP, 
Rule 11, holds: McLean and Dawson's request for attorney fees 
pursuant to Rule ll shal be granted. 0 :'This Order is believed 
to have been filed directly with the Idaho Supreme Court although, 
J. 
the Order's proof of sevice by mail does not so indicate/state. 
As ATTACHMENT NO. 1 , a complete copy of sucn ORDER 
DENYING, etc., Appellant's said three (3) motions, is made a 
part of the Remanded Clerk's T:ranscrigtt on Appeal. 
During the entire period of time, this matter was 
returned to the trial court judge, no oral hearing was allowed, 
recognized nor perfected as required by the decisions, orders 
and rulings of Judge Darren B. Simpson. 
~2 
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IV. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. DID MCLEAN OR DAWSON HAVE ANY STANDING 
OR CAPACITY TO CHALLENGED JUDGE SHIN7 
DIRLING SEPT. 11, 2007 NUNC PRO TUNC 
JUDGMENT AND THE JOINT CASES MEMORANDUM? 
2. WBRB THE ISSUES REMANDED TO THE DISTRICT 
BARRED BY LACK OF JURISDICTION VIA MOOT~ 
NESS, ACQUIESENCE, INVITED ERROR OR WAIVER 
DOCTRINES? 
3. DID THE DISTRICT COURT UPON REMAND VIO-
LATE BOTH PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE RIG7 
HTS OF DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION 
OF APPELLANT RENDERING THE ORDERS AND 
SECOND AMENDED JUDGMENT VOID AB INITIO? 
4. WERE THE ORDER AND SECOND AMENDED JUDGMENT ,-~ 
OCTOBER 29, 2010, PRECLUDED BY THE DOCTRINES 
OF d'UfHCUAL, 'ESTOPPEL, QUASI-::-ESTOPPEL r RES 
JUDICATA, COLLATERAL ESTOPBEL OR CLAIM PRE-
CLUSION? 
5. DID THE TRIAL COURT UPON RE~~ND FAIL TO APPLY 
REASONABLE AND DILIGENT DUE DISCRETION IN RUL-
AS IT DID, ESPECIALLY IN GRANTING RESPONDENT'S 
RULE 60(b) (6) MOTION AND TAKING JUDICIAL NOTICE? 
6. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERROR IN DENYING ALL 
THREE (3) APPELLANT'S MOTIONS SET FOR NQT7. 
ICED FOR HEARING DECEMBER 17, 2010? 
13 "00.43: 
I V, ARGUMENT 
A. THE DISTRICT COURT~S DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE 
FOR LACK OF PROSECDTliJON OF McLEAN 1 S AND DA\A7SON 1 S 
--VERIFIED COMPLAINT & THEIR LACK OF FILING AN 
ANSWER TO INTERVENOR COMPLAINT BARRED THEIR 
STANDING OR CAPACITIES 
The plaintiffs McLean and Dawson, herein, have not 
appeall~d nor attacked directly nor collaterally, nor can 
they at ail1 the district court 1's granting of John N. Bach's 
motion heard August 7, 2007, to dismiss with prejudice 
their verified complaint with ·prejudice; moreover, both 
of them, even if McLean as a deadman had any claim to 
assert, which he could not nor did he have any duly appoint-
ed appearing estate representative for him, he and Dawson 
~ 1 
had never filed an acceptable answer putting ln issue the 
averments of John Bach's intervenor complaint. For all 
purposes of fact and law, they had defaulted and admitted 
all the a~erments of John N. Bach's said complaint in inter-
~ention and further as that complaint was expaned per the 
a!Efidavits, exhibits and other admitted facts and evidence 
by the granting of John Bach's motion for summary judgment. 
Anderson-Bl~~e, Inc. v. Los Caballerose, Ltd. (Ct. Appl991) 
120 Idaho 660, 818 P.2d 775 
Under\GUdt circumstances of dismissal with prejudice and 
default admissions by all appearing third party defendants, 
specifically DAWSON, and even McLean's lost all their titles, rights 
etc,viathe affidavits, exhibits and even memos of points and 
authorities filed in support and referenced and judicially 
noticed. ~ong such irrefutable facts, determinations and 
unassailable legal conclusions were the following by Judge 
Shiridirling, at pages 9, 13~15 of fuis JOINT CASES (9-11-2007) 
MEMORANDUM AND ORDERS, ETC.: 
11 JOHN N. BACH •· s initial memo brief in support of 
said motions for summary judgment and dismissal 
with prejudice for lack of diligent prosecution 
presented more than adequate, if not overwhelm::. 
ing case authorities, statutest etc., for the 
Court •·s immediate granting of both motions on all 
grounds/basis. He further sought a permanent in.,.. 
junction. JOHN BACH in his EX 2: Affid.,..Teton CV 
02-208 (testified) that he and DAWSON as to the 
ZAMONA and PEACOCK parcels had an oral agreement 
if JOHN BACH dissolved said joint ventures DAWSON 
·(would) . seel to JOHN BACH any interest at book 
value, such oral agreement being governed by Calif. 
law and authorities, Masterson v. · Sine (196 8 J 6 8 
C.2d 222. DAWSON never timely acted to attempt 
to enforce such oral at;greement and against per 
Rule 13(a) as well as the two (2} year STATUTE 
O:f LT~HTATION :for breach of oral agree;men.t? in '' 1. · 
Calif. , DAWSON was barred and estopped by s·uch. ~:~. 
statute (to) claim any moneys due h.i:m, (It is 
noted that said EXH. 2 Aff, incorpora:t,ed otl!.er 
affidavits of JOHN BACH, along with severa~ :memos 
of authorities he filed in Teton CV Q2.,--2Q8, which 
this Court had previously considered and did so 
again in granting the motions herein} u.- (@ p. 9) 
"This Court is required per Rule ·1, JRCP, to provide 
expeditious, fair, just and conclusive order and 
judgments when required. JOHN N. BACH has shown, 
proven and despite the intents of plaintiffs and 
their counsle in both CV ij;J:l~.33 and CV 01,-265 clear 
and convincing evidence and authorities for the 
granting of his motions for summary judgment. •t 
'"The Court -firids and determines that PLA;t.NT1:E'FS 
and their COUNSEL have waived, abandoned (and by 
their violations of the provisions of Rule ll(a) (1), 
their answers, affirmative defenses and all/any op.,.. 
position to the relief sought by JOHN N. BACH per 
his compaint in intervention in CV 01,-265, which 
also applies to their complaint in CVol,.33 1 per the 
express provisions of the Idah.o Racketeering Statute, 
l.C. 18-:-7804 (a) (b) (c), (d), (g} (1) (20 and (h) with 
with Judgments and permanent injunctions to 
be issued in both said actions, CV 01~33 and 
01-265, per I.e. 18.,..7805 (a), (c), (d) (1) (2) (3) 
( 4 ) ( 5 ) (6 ) & ( 7 1 • 
The COURT ORDERS THE IMMEDIATE DISMISSAL WITH 
PREJUDICE OF BOTH CV 01-33 and CV 01.,-265 FOR UTTER 
LACK BY THE PLAINTIFFS AND THEIR COUNSEL OF DILI-
GENT PRSOECUTION, AND SEVERE PREJUDICE TO JOHN N, 
~BACH, his witness to be called and to thie very 
Court. u (@ P. 13) 
By Appellant's said granted motions by Judge Shindirling, 
John Bach had both amended, expanded and been guanted full 
relief including such expanded=amended issues and facts est-
blishing their inclusion in the summary judgment and Judgment 
September 11, 1007 Nunc Pro Tunc, As statd in 61B Am, Jur. 2d, 
Section 955, page 224: 
II .. the doctrine is that where the parties-have attem-
pted to joint an issue to be tried and it has been tried, how-
ever defective ih form the pleadings may be a verdict for one 
or the other will beheld to cure such defective pleadings 
pleadings, that is cure them as to form and supply all omitted 
averments concerning essential facts, relief of, provided the 
proof of or admission of such facts was necessarily consider-
ed favor the verdict (ordetermining order of the court). The 
evidence presented to the (trial court) constitutes the claim 
of a party, superceding the party's description of the claim. 
Where a theory of recovery is tried fully by the parties, the 
court may base its decision on that theory and deem the plea~ 
68 
dings amended accordingly. '' (N .. 68.,-ci tes, Aridere_on:13~C:lke Inc v. 
Los Caballeros Ltd, 120 Idaho 660, 818 Pl2 775 (Ct. App 1991). 
16 0046 
It should be emphasized that 'lAs a general_ rule, facts 
alleged by one party need not be pleaded by another. So, 
a defective pleading of one party may be aillded by the plea-
ding of his adversary for a party will not be heard to insist 
that his adversary has committed to allege the very facts which 
such party has SllP~- in his piLeadings t Where the alle~ea:.:,::. 
~efegt is not only supplied by the adverse party, but where 
he has also obtained the benefit of a full, fair and impart-
ial trial in which he was given full opportunity to offer 
every fact and circumstance tending to relief him from lia-
bility, he will not 1again be permitted to retry the cause." 
Geros v. Harries, 65 Utah 227, 236 P. 220, 39 A.L.R. 1297 (1925). 
Therefore, Judge Shindirling had broad discretion in 
view of the total absence of any opposition, no argument at 
the hearing of the motions and no stated/voiced objections 
to the affidavits and memos submitted by Appellant, to frame 
~ 
his JOINT CASES MEMORANDUM and QUIET TITLE JUDGMENT herein, 
so that both conformed to the unopposed facts, law and 
circuustances proven Herrman,_' v. Woodell, 107 Idaho 916, 
693 P.2d 1118 (Ct. App. 1985) The issues expanded if such 
they were and the rulings thereon by Judge Shindirling were )' 
not misleading, nor unclear but with finality. (It is noted 
that Alva Harris DAWSON's counsel had over three (3) court 
hearings to present contravening evidence, but did nothing, 
made no opposition nor objections. 
Even when Marvin Smith was substituted in to represent 
DAWSON and the without standing estate and heirs of McLean, 
no time, proper in form (unde~uen~ty of perjury) affidavits 
were filed by Smith, nor Dawson and most conspicuously, 
not by Alva Harris, explaining a)why/reason he couldn't or 
didnt' file any opposition/counteraffidavits to summary judgment, 
nor -b) Wl).y Dawson didn 1 t/couldn' t file affdaiv it. denying John 
Bach's acquiring all his title, interests, etc., in Peacock. 
Parcel and c) possible abatement or stay of any statute of 
limitations which allows him to claim his original one fourth 
undivided interest in Peacock. 
Appellant had thus obtained all of Dawson's ownership 
title, interests and benefits to Peacock. Dawson nor any of 
his attorneys have denied it via a~ relevant, factually detail-
ing affidavits otherwise. 
McLean via Teton Instnment No J48042 , copy presented 
via John Bach's affidavits submitted in supported of su~ary 
judgment to Judge Shindirling, was never disputEd/cha1le~ged. 
Appellant unquestionafuly had acquired any/a±l of McLean's 
former title/interests in Peacock even before his death. His 
daughers after were denied by Uudge Simpson as substituted 
named successors to McLean, dismissed witn prejudice their 
appeal. Such copy of dismissal is EXHIBIT ~B 0 , p~~~ 10, to In-
tervenor-Complainant JNBACH's three (e1 motions. RCT: 41 
Appellant's Affidavit in Support of said 3 motions further 
expanded and clarified the overlooked facts of these conveyed 
interests to him, by Judge Simpson. RCT; 33.,.-37 All such facts 
were unassailable and without jurisa~¢tion for reconsideration 
or Rule 60(b) (6) review and striking or setting aside by Judge 
Simpson. Cnnmbs v. Churnow and Griffith~ 2009 Opn 124, Oct 13, 
citing/applying Donaldson v. Henry 63 Idaho 467, 473, 121 P.2d 445 
_.0.048 
Among the controlling cases decisions cited by 
Appellant to this Idaho Supreme Court, and even Judge Simpson, 
(RCT: 57-70) (who refused to allow not just oral argument of 
said case;=; but failed to even acknowledge them, their appli-
cation or the fact he never shepardized nor wanted to address 
them,) reveals a premindset of actual prejudice and bias againt 
appellant, The following cases are not mentioned at all by 
Judge Simpson's SECOND AMENDED JUDGMENT nor o~~GRANTING DAWSONT.S 
MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT: 
1. Esser Electric v. Lost River Ballistics Tech, Inc. 
(May 20, 2008) 145 Idaho 912, 916-20; 188 P.3d 854. 
"For over 100 years this Court has held that a party 
is not entitled to a reliAf from a judgment on the 
ground that judgment was entered due to the neglig-
ence or unskillfulness of the party's attorney. Esser 
Electric has not convi nc~ed us that we should change 
that policy. Therefore, it is not entitled to a 
new trial on the ground that its counsel committed 
misfeasance in failing to respond to the motion for 
summary judgment.'" 
"We have not required the trial court to rule on the 
admissibility of the affidavit where there is no 
objection to it. If there is not timely objections, 
the trial court can grant summary !iJ.udgment based upon 
an affidavit that does not comply with Rule 56(e) ." 
(~ee rest of opinion pages 918~920.] 
2. United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v~ Espinoza March 23, 20~ 
2010, L.A. Daily Journal, D.A.R. 4307; Rule 60 (b) (6) 
motion past 4 months from determinative order/judg.,.-
ment does not provide any basis for relief to recon~ 
sider/reopen original decision. 
3. Hooper v. Bageley, Estate of Bageley, 117 Idaho 1091, 
793 P. 2d 1263 (Ct.App. 1990) Where plt uses a 60 (b) (6} 
motion for substitute to amend judgment via reconsid-
eration such 60(b) (6) motionis inappropriate and must 
be denied outright. 'c:~ 
4. In Re Bli Farms Partnership (6th Cir.2006)465F.3d654Late 
lU1supr:or'SEfi.' Rule_ 60 (b) motion is without jurisdiction, a 
p:q;ll,~,jzy~' - } 
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Therefore, McLean, long deceased, without any 
probated estate nor personal representative duly appoi-
nted for any estate (Alva Harris having falsely/deceptively 
misled the court ln Teton CV 02~208 that one of his daugh-
1 
ters had been so appointed when in fact she hadn't) had no 
interest in Peacock, nor did Dawson. Not having appealled 
the dismissal with prejudice of their complaint, and such 
transfer of their titles and interests in Peacock, being proven 
via Appellant's summary judgment motion granted by Judge Shin-
dirling res judicata, collateral estoppel, claim and issue 
preclusion doctrines were sua sponte to be applied, 
One point whic Judge Simpson overlooked or decided not 
to consider in attempting to return McLean, deceased, and 
DAWSON' titles and interests to Peacok: The facts, issues 
and his determinations in granting said summary judgment, 
1) went far beyond the limited issues of the amended judgment 
in 02-208 re Dawson's interest, such issues now being decided 
with finality by him when 2) Teton CV 02-208 was on appeal in 
Docket No. 3717, not final and not involving the same issues 
which he had decided. 
This Idaho Supreme Court held in Inc. v. 
Hanks, 224 P.Jd, 468, 477 claim preclusion bars further adju-
dication not only on matters offered and received to defeat a 
claim but also "every matter which might and should have been 
litigated in the first suit~." Therein, this Court noted sua 
sponte application re the "transactional concept of a claim 
is broad."; that claim preclusion "may apply even where 
1. Whatever judicial noticed documents, filings , etc. , Judge Simpson took 
of cv _o2-_ta2_os hedwould havethad to takE ~~mat McLe_an hadtno estate 
~:r;epres~. tiv~. lu:Ly app;:lln ec1 and swor ~ --~'LLI.uste:r tfie-esta e. rlf:Jpel-
. so· notlflfd,tl.in~ Court ln an9there;appea). ,QlJt~s derul'ed oral argument 
ln the appeal which led to sal9 ~. U U :1 U 
there is not a substantial overlap'betw.een~the theories 
advance in support of a claim or in the evidence relating 
to those theories.~ The holding of Storey bars both Dawson~s 
motion for reconsideration, which was not supported by any 
affidavits either timely nor untimely, and further bars any 
other motion for relief per Rule 60(b) (4) through (6). What 
has been continually overlooked by nop trial Judge Simpson 
is that Rule ll(b) (2) (B) motion for reconsideration has a 14 
day mandatory time period from the entry of a final judgment 
of the entry of an interlocutory judgment which is made 
Final by a Rule 54(B) Certificate of Appealability. 
The motion for recons&deration whibh Dawson and McLean's 
people rely upon required.·affidavi ts sworn under oath testi~ 
many to be filed within said 14 days manaatory period. No such 
affidavits were filed timely nor at any other time which 
could be accepted, considered or applied. The time require~ 
ment of Rule ll(a) (2(B) motion for reconsideration is like 
the 42 day limit for appealing from a final judgment; if the 
NOTICE OF APPEAL with filing fees/moneys is not filed and paid, 
the Appellate Court jurisdiction is lost. In Jensen v, State~ 
(Idaho 2003) 139 Idaho 202, cited by Appellant repeatedly, the 
motion there for reconsideration was not ser:ved nor filed with.,.. 
. :!.o~" 
in said mandatory 14 days. The trial court judge struck such 
reconsideration papers, as he had lost all jurisdiction to hear 
such late, untimely, and incomplete motion fe reconsideration. 
The fact that firstly Judge Simpson denied Appellant ''s motion 
to strike the untimely motion to reconsider, .but denied· the rno-
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ion to reconsider on the merits, which was reviewed 
and affirmed by the Idaho Supreme Court before remand 
for him to rule on Dawson's 60(b) (6) motion, does not 
give either jurisdiction, nor any discretion nor any 
right of further review and analysis even by secretive 
judicial notice taken by current Judge Simpson of some 
aspects of the AMENDED JUDGMENT against DAWSON, in CV 01-28 . 
See Ponderosa. Paint v Yack(Id Ct.App 1994) 195 P3d 745, il.;25,:Idaho 310, 
317-318 
Whatever judicial notice and application of certain 
facts of ruling sa taken was done in violation of the prov~ 
~~ions of Idaho Rules of Evidence, Rule 20l(a} (b) and espec~ 
ially 20l(c) (d) and (e). No exact copies were ever presented 
nor served upon Appellant prior to such judicial notice, by 
Judge Simpson, nor by the Court Clerk, to have complaince 
with due process procedural and substantive rights; nor 
was any date, time and place of being heard allowed re whatever 
documents were judicial noticed and applied by Judge Simpson. 
In Pmderoso Paint Mfg v. Yack, supra, 125 I6.8ho @ 318 appellate 
Court said Rule 60(b) motion essential is for reconsideration 
of summary judgment motion and was properly denied. (see also 
Plg 319~320.) Thus where both an untimely without affidavits 
or relevant memo of points and authorities is not filed within 
said mandatory 14 days and a motion for Rule 60(b) (6) relief 
is likewise incomplete, inadequate, eto., ~t is based upon and 
incorporates whatever basis is presented per the motion for re~ 
consideration, such motion per 60(b) (6) must be considered late, 
unsupported, a nulli~y and without~court having no-jurisdiction. 
In Re Bli Farms PartnershiJ? (6th Cir 2006) 465 F.3d 654, 657-78. 
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By virture of the foregoing analysis of refusals, 
failures and avoidances by McLean, Dawson and their at-
torneys, first Alva Harris and now Marvin Smith, NOT ONE HAVE A 
timely, admissible, basred upon personal knowledge and testi-
monies of Dawson ever SHOWN a meritorius defense to Appel-
lant's intervenor complaint as amended and expanded, all 
proven by his summary judgment granted him and quieting title 
to three -• Quarte~ title, interests and rights, undivided, 
v..i th the only other one quarter undivided owners, Milan and 
Diana Cheyo::Vii::h. 
What showing after the unappeal~bl~, ~naasail~ble and 
final dismissal with prejudice of Dawson's verified complaint, 
has even been attempted by DAWSON or his current counsel, 
that he can plead, show, present evidence of facts, etc., 
that he hasn•t viblated the Idaho Racketeering Statute, as 
Judge Shindirling rules and entered judgment that he had, 
along with McLean? All avoidances of the facts and law are 
established that both McLean, Dawson and even their counsel, 
Alva Harris have repeatedly and flagrantly violated such 
statute againt John Bach, his property titles, interests, 
de~pement and commerical uses, expansions and commercial 
benefits, etc., which the court reserved the award of damages, 
treble, attorneys fees, costs, etc., to be reset for trial 
upon return from the Idaho Supreme Court after reaffirming his 
Order and Judgm-ent. of Sept 11, 2007 Nunc Pro Tunc. 
In Dawson's Appellant ''S.:-Brief in Dkt No 34 712, pages 6-7 
125 Idaho 310, 317-18, that even a Rule 60(b} movant 11TI1ust show 
2 
what admissible 1 relevant still to be decided facts 
constituting both the capacity/standing to recover 
with and to defense of the expanded/amended intervenor 
complaint. As stated VTfuis polcicy recognizes that it 
would be an idle exercise and a waste of judicial resources 
for a court to (allow the filing of an answer) if, in fact, 
there is no justiciable controversy.~ 
The major second deceptive and frivolous contention 
in said Dawson's O~ning Brief, Dkt 34712 is that "This case 
I• 
presents a set of unique and compelling circumstances 11 , 
No it doesn't!· Dawson failed to answer John Bach's com-
plaint in Teton CV 02-208, He failea to timely persoanlly 
and as required by Rule 56(c) through (e) timely execute 
and filed within the mandatory reconsideration motion period 
any affidavit that presented any factual showing to avoid 
the legal rule of liability application against him and 
Alva Harris as followed for over 100 years, as stated in 
Esser Electri, supra 1425 Idaho 912, 916-920., and the 
lack of both standing and jurisdiction issues decied in 
United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v,Espino~~ 2010 L.A. D~ily 
Journal, D.A.R. 4307 
As a matter of law, Dawson is without standing or capacity 
to benefit from the Order and Second Amended Judgment of Octo-
ber 29, 2010 wfuich now per Appellant~s appeal mus~ be reversed 
vacate/invalidated as void, and the JOINT CASES MEMORANDUM and 
ORDERs and QUIETING TITLE JUDGMENT WITH PREMANENT INJUNCTION of 




B. THE ISSUES REMANDED TO Tf!E DJST:RlCT COURT WERE 
ALREADY RESOLVED IN Ji.PPE.LLA.NT 1·S FAVOR, BARRED BY 
LACK OF FUTHER JURTSDTCON VIA MOOTNESS, ACQUIESENCE, 
INVITED ERROR AND WAIVER DOCTRINES. 
The issue or objection that a court lacks jurisdiction 
over the subject matter may be raised in any manner. ~ta!!:_ger, 
v. Hunter 291 P. 1060, 49 Idaho 723. The corolla:ty.:cwhen 
some performance or condition of a judgment results in a 
lack of jurisdiction is that such is now moot or mootness. 
There is a further corollary called the doctrine of invited 
error, wh~ch occurs to deny the court jurisdiction when-.a 
party such as Dawson and McLean acquiresced, r:invi ted or 
led the court into committing the error. Costco 
WholesaleCorp. 95 P.3d 34, 140 Idaho 416. 
For the further need to analyze this issue, Appellant 
refers hereto to all his points, authorities and arguments, 
etc., under Part A. supra and incorporates the same in full. 
The Esser Electric v. Lost River Ballistic\:; Tech case 
is a special form of not just invited error but waiver of 
any subsequent motions for:neeconsideration and Rule 60 (b) (6}, 
where there has also been a dismissal with prejudice of 
any affirmative defenses or mandat.ory counterclaim counts 
aiidccauses of action, as was granted determined by Judge Jon 
Shindirling, which latter dismissal \is final and without any. 
appeal nor challenged whatsoever, at any time or stage. r.? Re 
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There is also a lack of subject matter jurisdiction 
when a court violate both procedurally and substantively 
a party rights of due process and equal protection. Such 
rights are basically constitutional, U.S.Constitution and 
Idaho State Consiution. These violations did not occur until 
Remand was ordered back to Judge Simpson. As Appellant was 
denied all allocution, notices of a meaningful hearing with 
specific day, time and place to present his argument and auth-
orities, this is the first time that he has been able to raise 
such constititional violations, besides his three (3)motions 
wfuich were also denied any meaningful hearing and allocution, 
although notieed for hearing on Dec. 17, 2010. McGloon0et~i 
Gwynn,g, ISC Dkt 29450, 2004 Opn 113, Oct. 24, 2005; "Dragotoius_ 
v. DragotoiuiJ 113 Idaho 644, 647, 991 P.2d 372 (1998). 
As both said ORDER and SECOND AMENDED JUDGMENT of Oct. 
29, 2010 were issued in violations of said due process and 
equal protection rights, they are ¥oid ab initio~ 
But another right of due process was violated by Judge 
S'irriE'son, that of an unbiased and impartial judge to try the 
proceedings before him. He revealled that the reasons he did 
~enyr argument is that Appellant did not object to his two stat-
us order and therefore he waived his such rights. 
No citation is made of any Idaho Civil Rule of Court 
that allows/presents such basis of the Judge's selfimposed 
waiver, but two I.R.C.P. Rules more than operate to the con-
ta) . to wit, Rule l (c) and Rule 16 (a) . These two rules 
prohibit any local judges subjective unapproved rules of pro-
2t- oasn 
cedure that has not peen brought to the Idaho Supreme 
Court's attention with request for approval and a written 
enactment approval by this very Court for such rule. Rule 
l6(a) pertaining to status and procedural setting and motion 
orders, requires that all counsel be informed and their input 
received in advance or their objections. Such determination 
of Appellant 1'S waive is unsupportable and not just unconstit-
utional but without authority, or judicial basis of jurisdic-
tion. 
A December l, 2010 from Dawson's counsel, Marvin Smith is 
RCT: 53. It is written to Judge Simpson, informing him on 
a personal basis to make a correction for SMith on the written 
objection by Dawson to Bach,, s November 15, Motions. Smith 
sets forth the correction he requests be made and then states: 
"Please contact me if you have any questions about the foregoing." 
The direct request ip of/for a,n e:x pa,rte contact from Judge 
Simspon. Such. overture is not simply that of an innocent 
nor proper request. It violates the n.1ies of professioanl 
and judicial conduct that an attorney and judge in a particula 
case cannot have personal ex parte contact and requests for 
more follow upnof the same. Such is highly improper, urlethical 
per se. Complaint of Judicial Misconduct (9th Cir. 2005) 425 
F.3d 1179, 1187, 9w1sey v. I.A.C. (2005) 141 Idaho 125, 132-38 
No reply was received by Appellant with a copy or any 
copy or responding letter to Mr. Smith to stop nis unethical 
ex parte contacts requests. 
In such letter is revealled a personal relationship that 
does not adhere to judicial rules or principles of ex parte con-
2 7 " .:. i)1) 5 7 
contacts that are precluded from personal requests 
of a clerical nature which impact the objectivity and 
impartiality required of Judge Simpson. 
A question is brought up which cannot be answered 
by the secretive and silent procedure followed by Judge 
Simpson re his taking whatever judicial notice that he 
did, relied upon and based his ORDER and SECOND AMENDED 
JUDGMENT of Oct. 29, 2010. Such unknown and how complete 
judicial notice, Judge S~mpson did not declare specifically 
in advance to Appellant, did not provide him copies or an 
transcript on the record of as required, nor afforded Appel~ 
lant the protections of I.R.E. Rule 20l(b) (c) and (d) nor given 
any opportunity to be heard per (f). 
If such lack of due process, procedurally and substan-
tively produces VOID or VOIDNESS in Judge Simpson's order and 
Second Amended Judgment, the following statement he inserted 
in said ORDER, par. 12, page 9, RCT: 18 : 11Nothing in the 
record show that McLean either sought or was granted a rever~ 
sal of tile 1-3~05 Order which dismissed McLean from the Lawsuit." 
McLean was dead by such time being deceased for over a year and 
almost two (2) months with no personal representative) 
C. THE FOREGOING ANALYZE AND AUTHORITIES RESULT ON 
REMAND THAT JUDGE SIMPSON'S ORDER & SECOND AMENDED 
JUDGMENT ARE VOID AB INITIO 
The same analysis under part A. and B. incorporated 
herein and more than result and establish the conclusion 
supra, under this Part C. 
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D. THE ORDER AND SECOND JUDGMENT OF -'OCT 2 9 , 
2010 ARE BARREb:::BYccTHE DOCTJRTN.E S OF JUD-
ICIAL ESTOPPEL, QUASI ESTOPPEL, RES JUDICATA, 
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL OR CLAIM PRECLUSION 
All foregoing analysis per PARTS A thrbugh C 
are incorporated herein as though set forth in full 
Two cases already cited further support the foresaid 
conclusion: 1) Storey Canst~~ Inc, v. Hanks 224 P.3d 468, 477 
re claim preclusion is brought about by the finality of 
Dawson's verified complaint bE1ing dismi;:;sed with prejudice/ 
any claims and every matter which might and should have been 
litigated by reason of said dismissed verified complaint re-
sults in all claim preclusiveness as to such included or 
related claims that could have been pursue with supporting 
evidece. Such evidence was not presented and is now barred 
further by res judicata and as a matter of law judicial estop-
pel, the latter to stop any repetitious regurgitation by 
DAWSON in any further attacks or motions to reopen the JOINT 
CASE MEMORANDUM, et., and QUiETING TITLE JUDGMENT, NUNC PRO 
TUNC issued by Judge Shirdling, September 11, 2007. 2) Coombs 
. Churnow Griffiths 2009 Opn 124, applying Dona~dson v. · 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Henry, 63 Idaho 467, 473, that Judge Simpson had no jurisdic-
tion nor authority regardless of what this Court on remand dir-
ected him to do, or so he thought he was to do, becuase he could 
not reopen thE record nor redo whatever judicial notice and 
admission thereform, Judge Shindirling had accepted and inserted 
in his JOINT CAESE MEMORANDUM and ORDER9, etc. Judge Simpson 
neither had authority nor jurisdiction to attempt to correct what 
he believed were judicial errors guieting title to Zamora parcel. 
The foregoing and incorporated authorities and 
arguments, supra, Parts A and C require the complete 
unaltered 1 reinstatement and binding effects of the JOINT 
CASES MEMORANDUM and ORDERS, along with the QBIETTNG TITLE 
JUDGMENT SOLELY IN JOHN N. BACH'· s favor with Permanent 
Injunction, being reinstated, of September 11, 2007 Nunc 
Pro Tunc. 
E. THE TRIAL COURT UPON REMAND FAILED AND ERRORED 
GREATLY IN ATTEMPTING TO CONSTRUCT DUE DISCRE-
TION WHICH IT DID NOT HAVE NOR PROPERLY EXERCISED: 
I'M GRANTING DAWSON'S RULE 60(p) (6) MOTION AND 
VIA TAKING UNDESIGNATED FACTS,. JUDICIAL NOTICE. 
The foregoing analys±s and arguments per parts A. 
through D are referred to and incorporated herein as though 
set forth in each and every particular~ 
. Judge Simpson ''s ORDER GRANTING DAW$0N' $ Iii(') (b} (6) 
he misstates and misapplies what specific facts and evidence 
must be not demonstrated but include in es·tabl.;i:shing a unique 
and compelling unequivocal circumstances justifying relief. 
" At his page 12 of said n~DER (RCT: 221 he cites Firat Security 
l ·' 1. ' I 
Bank of Idaho v.'Stauffer , 112~ Idah.o 133 (Ct.App. 1986). pecause 
the district court amended its judgment wtthout a hearing. But 
the facts and issues therein are far distance and none compar~ 
able to the issues raised by Judge Shindirling'·s wording of 
the JOINT CASES MEMORANDUM and ORDERS plus the QUIETING TITLE 
JUDGMENT, etc.,of Sept 11, 2007 Nunc Pro Tunc. 
Without any such factual analysis of facts, issues and 
evidence involved, Judge Simpson leaps to Idaho Supreme Court 
case Berg v. Kendall, 147 at 579,. 212 P~3 at 1009 re reversal 
3ol O_OF\;. 
dismissal of a minor '·s personal injury action by the 
ineptitude of her guardian, that the representative 
of a minor lacking capacity to sue, "competely fails to 
prosecute a meritorious claim that results in the claim 
being dismissed with prejudice't·, granting relief under 
Ru 1 e 6 0 (b) ( 6 ) . 
The facts ~nd probable issues, along with the 
existence of a meritorious claim in Berg are clearly 
and immediate worlds apart and more than distinguishable 
from the facts and issues/evidence resvlved by Judge 
Shindirling. Jst a few facts/issues to note in dist.inctions 
and without correlation herein; Dawson and McLean were not 
minors. They hired -A·lva Harris who did file a verified complaint. 
for Dawson and McLean, both experienced senior citizens and 
adults, who invested in developmental properties and Living 
JOINT VENTURER SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS. It was juust Alva Harris 
who for some 6 and a half years dragged on said lawsuit, 
··but both McLean and Dawson did nothing to have him bring it 
to fruition and resolution, wnich would h.ave been via a court 
nonjury issues via final resolution of partition of the realty 
involved. The rest of the clearly distinguishable facts hav 
been set forth in A and B, incorpoated herei~. 
It wasn't just Alva Harris that was misfeasant and mal7 
feasant, it was also Dawson, who even after said Quiet Title 
judgment issued in John Bach's favor, who never filed an affi-
davit or presented any relevant· evidentiary showing to excuse 
under the other subparts of Rule 60(b} (1) through 4, why not 
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a motion for reconsideration per Rille'. 11 (a)_ (2)_ (p). wasn '·t 
filed. What parts of the evidence herein and the issues 
resolved per Judge Shindirling 6n Sept. 11, 2007 Nunc Pro 
~unc are duplicative of any of the s~lient issues in Berg.P 
Are arenlt even close , nor did Judge Simpson in his said 
ORDER even attempt to make such identical facts, issues and 
procedural points in his said order. (See RCT: 22~25. The 
assertions Judge Simpson attempts to use as somehow a trump 
card is nonexistent, irrevlevant and against the public 
policy decisions of Esser Electric;, supra,. re the establishment 
of over 100 year precerltint, Pthat a party is not entitled to 
relief from a judgment on the ground (it) was entered due to 
the nso~ligence of unskillfulness of the party •·s attorney." 
Whether such negligence of unskillfulness be misfeasance, 
malfeasance or intentional deception, some criminal act or 
blaCkmail-:·-' extortion of his clients. 
BERG's biggest and sole issue was to somehow stay or 
barred the running of the applicable statute of limitation 
to be able to file a lawsuit via a competent attorney to 
prosecute the minor's merimorius claim. 
To determine whether a court abused its discretion 
involves a three part test: l) Whether the trial court cor~ 
rectly perceived the issue as discretionary; 2) Whether the 
trial court acted within the boundaries of its discretion 
and consistent with the applicable legal standards; and 3) 
Whether the trial court reach its determination through an 
exercise of reason. Campbell v.Kildew 141 Idaho 640, 645, 
115 P. 3d 731, 736 (2005) 0062 
However, Judge Simpson in failing to properly re-
search and shepardize for the Esser Electric and U .18· .Suprme 
Court case, United Student Aid Funds v. Espinoza, and the other 
cases cited, supra, page 19, would not have utilized any d±s-
cretion to abuse herein; he did not have any discretion whether 
to apply the principles of said above cases, as such was mandated 
by the very holdings of said Esser Electric and Espmnoza cases-
Espinoga specifically held that a litigatn cannot sleep on his 
appeal rights and utilize 60(b) (4) (5) and (6} in lieu of a 
timely perfected appeal. 
JJ:udge. Simpson •: ~ . ORDER DENYING TNTERVENOR.,-COMPLAINT JOHN 
N. BACH's MOTION TO STRIKE, TO ALTER OR AMEND, OR FOR RELIEF PB0M 
FINAL JUDGMENT (see copy of said Order in Attachment hereto. E1age 
5-6 contains two very inaccurate statements of the law which 
he seeks to impose contrary to the above cited Esser Electric 
and Espinoza cases. He is in error when he states, "The Second 
Amended Judgment is neither again the law nor in conflict with the 
great weight of evidence as the relief granted tracks the very 
relief upon which Bach based his Complaint ih::Intervenion" and 
that "Rule 60(b)" .. provides a means for an aggrieved party to 
obtain relief from a "final judgment, order or proceeding'' directly 
form the trial court without resorting to an appeal. These:' arerJnot 
accurate and true correct perception of the issue as being dis-
cretinaly nor acting applying said inaccurate conclusions within 
the boundaries of a coutt•s discretion her~in if it had such dis-
cretion, which it did not. Finally even if there existed such 
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. discretion the court did not·· q:J~ilize . it thDough any exercise 
of reason, but revealled a predetermined and biased, partical 
and unopened mindsetL Judge Simpson, besides violating Appel-
lant's rights of due process, abusing h±s authority and po~±tion 
to not follow the Esser Electric case, further created both legal 
erros and perfunctorily undermines his entire analysis by his 
conclusion, Attachment page 6: Furbhermore, Rule 60(b) (6) 
is the catahall for the rule, was not intended to allow 
a court to reconsider the legal bais for its original decision." 
citing First Bank.& Trust of Idaho v. Parker Bros, 112 Idaho at 
32. Such cited case is now controlled and overruled if not inval-
idated by Esser Electric and the Espinosa cases, supra. 
JUDGE SIMPSON ABUSED NOT JUST A NON EXISTENT AND INACCURATELY 
INSERTED DUE DIS(?RETION ST:PIRDARD INTENTIONALLY MISAPPLIED THE 
LEGAL PRINCIPLES AND LAW HOLDINGS OF ESEER ELECTRIC AND ESPINOZA. 
A last point ne Judge Simpson•s repeated reliance on what 
Appellant's First Verified-Compl~int in-Teton CV 02~208 and his 
Complaint in Interv,ention averred that Dawson and McLean, who 
non exitent estate and non existent representative dismissed 
themsel~es with prejudice from=mhis Appeal, had originally an un-
divided one quarter interest in the JOint Venture Agreement, In 
paragraph 21 of such Fir:st Amended complaint, 02-208 he requested 
he be awarded mo~e; in view of both Daweon~s and McLean's default 
and the effect and required application of IRPC, Rule 13(at the 
trial court acted without jurisdiction or authority to ordered 
such one quarter:; interests to Dawson and McLean. The Intervention 
complaint herein as amended, expanded and relief granted per the 
Idaho Racketeering Act, all error if any of which was invited by 
Alva Harris mslfeasance in not op 
?A 
· 0Q($~ch summapyjudgment . 
F. TRIAL COURT ERRORED IN DENY+NG A.LL T:UR.E.E 
(3) APPELANT'S MTIONS SET FOR/NOTICE FOR 
HEARING DECEMBER 17, 2010. 
Appell~nt refers to all the issues, analysis and argu7 
ment presented in A through E supra and incorporates the same 
herein as though set forth in full. 
All of said incorporated parts A t~rough E, reveal and 
Appellant contends more than sufficiently establishes the mis-
application, miscitation, and misunderstanding of the issues, 
legal authorities and cases cited which required as a matter 
of law, especially p:er the violations of jurisdiction, due proc:: 
cess rights denial and the prejudging and bi~ed mindset and 
ulterior motive of Judge Simpson ''s ruling, t.Order and Second Amen,-, 
ded Judgment, as being greatly in exces-s of and beyond his auth,.. 
ori ty and judicial powers/process •. Last-no attorneys fees are-;justified 
as awarded DAWSON and MCLEAN.per Rule 11; appellant cited applicable 
and material case authorities wh~ch Judge Simpson voided-ignored. 
CONCLUSION: f0pon the limited record a:Llowed py th.is Court, 
the cited case law prec( @dents and issues· analyzed and arguments 
p:tesenteq, Appellant respectfully requests that this Court: 
1. Reverse the district court~s Oct. 29, 2010 ORDER 
and SECOND AMENDED JUDGMENT in its entirety 
2. Reinstate, by granting this Appeal in full, and 
t:Ji:mledia tely reaff,i rm the JOINT C1>:S.ES MEMORANDUM AND 
ORDER and JUDGE SHINDIR LING's QUIETING TITLE JUDGMENT 
with All Provisions of the Permanent Injunction, all 
filed Sept 11, 2007 Nunc Pro Tunc. 
3. GRANT IN FULL AND EACB MOTION of the THREE MOTIONS 
AND ORDERS SOUGHT, REVERSING THE ORDER DENYING THEM 
OF JANUARY 27, 2011. 
4. Reverse the district court~s decision granting Dawson's 
and McLean's Rule ll Award of any attorneys fees. 
5. ~Awarding Costs and attorneys fees expenses to Appellant 
per I.e. 12-121, etc. 
DATED: April 4, 2011 0085 
. JOHN N. BACH PRO SE Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVJCE BY MAIL 
I ·hereby'rcertify that i served two (2) copies of 
the foregoing document this date,r;Apriln4, 2010, via U.S. Mail, 
withthe necessary postage affixed thereto, to: 
MARVIN M. SMlTR, SIIIliTH & BANKS, PLLC 
591 Park Ave., Ste 202 
Idaho Ealls, ID 83402 
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Case No. CV-2001-265 
ORDER DENYING INTERVENER-
COMPLAINANT JOHN N. BACH'S 
MOTION TO STRIKE, TO ALTER OR 
AMEND, OR FOR RELIEF FROM 
FINAL JUDGMENT 
BEFORE THIS COURT is the Motion by Intervener/Complainant John N. Bach 
(hereinafter "Bach") to strike the Second Amended Judgment, entered on October 29, 2010, for a 
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new hearing, or for relief from a final judgment. 1 In essence, Bach seeks reconsideration of this 
Court's Order Granting Plaintiff Wayne Dawson's Motion for Relief from Judgment? 
Plaintiffs/Third-Party Defendants Jack Lee McLean, Trustee, and Wayne Dawson, Trustee 
(hereinafter "McLean & Dawson") objected to Bach's Motion and requested attorney fees under 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure ll(a)(l) (hereinafter "Rule 11").3 Bach then moved to strike 
McLean & Dawson's Objection, for the same reasons argued in his Motion.4 McLean & Dawson 
moved, pursuant to Rule 11, to strike Bach's Reply and Motion to Strike. 5 
Intervenor-Complainant John N. Bach's Motions re: 1.) to Strike, Quash & Vacate Court's Order Granting 
Plaintiff Wayne Dawson's for Relief [sic] from Judgment & Second Amended Judgment, LR.C.P., Rules 12(f), 
l2(g)(2)(4), 19, et seq; 2) Order Granting New Hearing Before Unbiased, Qualified Judge, I.R.C.P. Rules 
59(a)(1)(0rder & Second Amended Judgment Abuse of Discretion &/or Prevented from Having any Fair Hearing) & 
59(a)(6) (Insufficiency of Evidence, error in law/against the law) & Rule 59(e); 3) Order per I.R.C.P., Rule 
60(b)(l)(2)(3)(4)(5) & (6), McLean v. Cheyovich Family Trust, Teton County case no. CV 2001-265 (filed 
November 15, 2010) (hereinafter "Bach's Motion"). 
2 Order Granting Plaintiff Wayne Dawson's Motion for Relief from Judgment, McLean v. Cheyovich Family Trust, 
Teton County case no. CV 2001-265 (filed October 29, 2010) (hereinafter the "60(b) Order"). 
3 McLean's and Dawson's Objection to Bach's November 15, 2010 Motions and Motion for Attorney's Fees, 
McLean v. Cheyovich Family Trust, Teton County case no. CV 2001-265 (filed November 24, 2010) (hereinafter 
"McLean & Dawson's Objection"). 
4 Intervenor-Complainant John N. Bach's Motion to Strike/Opposition Response to McLean's & Dawson's 
Objection to Bach's Nov. 15, 2010 Motions and for Attorneys Fees' and Further Reply Memorandum by John N. 
Bach in Support of his Nov. 15, 2010 Motions, McLean v. Cheyovich Family Trust, Teton County case no. CV 
2001-265 (filed December 7, 2010) (hereinafter "Bach's Reply and Motion to Strike"). 
5 McLean's and Dawson's Motion to Strike Bach's Reply Memorandum Dated December 7, 2010 and Response to 
Bach's Motion to Strike, McLean v. Cheyovich Family Trust, Teton County case no. CV 2001-265 (filed December 
13, 2010) (hereinafter "McLean & Dawson's Motion to Strike"). 
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This Court shall not reconsider the 60(b) Order. The findings therein are based largely 
upon Bach's own pleadings. Furthermore, Bach offers no authority for the applicability of Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) (regarding motions to strike another party's pleading) to a 
judgment. 
Neither does Bach explain the applicability of Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(l) 
allowing a new trial to be granted on the grounds of irregularity in the proceedings or abuse of 
discretion which prevented a fair trial. The Idaho Supreme Court issued its decision on June 4, 
2010, and remitted the case back to this Court on July 30, 2010. This Court issued its Status 
Order on September 1, 2010, wherein the parties were informed: 
Based upon the Idaho Supreme Court's ruling, this Court has requested the 
transcript of the oral arguments made before the Court on February 14, 2008 
regarding the Plaintiff's Rule 60(b )( 6) motion. Upon receipt of the transcript the 
matter will be deemed submitted for purposes of this Court issuing its ruling upon 
said motion. The Court will review the previous and relevant pleadings and 
argument made in support and opposition to said motion. 
No additional briefing may be submitted without a written order of the 
Court.6 
On September 16, 2010, this Court issued a Second Status Order, and informed the 
parties that the transcript of the February 14, 2008 hearing had been received and that the matter 
was submitted for purposes of this Court's consideration.7 This Court reiterated that "No 
6 Status Order, McLean v. Cheyovich Family Trust, Teton County case no. CV 2001-265 (filed September 2, 2010) 
(hereinafter the "First Status Order"). 
7 Second Status Order, McLean v. Cheyovich Family Trust, Teton County case no. CV 2001-265 (filed September 
16, 2010) (hereinafter the "Second Status Order"). 
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additional briefing may be submitted without a written order of the Court."8 The 60(b) Order 
issued on October 29, 2010. 
Bach never objected to the Court's First or Second Status Order or moved for additional 
briefing. Furthermore, he presented arguments against Dawson's motion for relief from 
judgment at the hearing held on February 14, 2008, which argument was reduced to a transcript 
and analyzed by this Court. For these reasons, Bach has not shown harm, nor has he overcome 
the inference of waiver created by his failure to object, when he had the opportunity, to the 
Court's communicated procedure. 9 
Bach's arguments under Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 59(a)(6), 59(e), and 60(b)(l-6) 
reiterate the same positions Bach took in his pleadings and at oral argument. With regard to Bach's 
passing reference to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a) and (e), a new trial may be granted where 
the evidence is insufficient to justify the verdict, 10 where the verdict "is against the law" 11 or if, after 
the court makes its own assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence, 
the court determines that the verdict is not in accord with the clear weight of the evidence. 12 A 
motion to alter or amend judgment, made pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59( e) ("Rule 
59( e)), provides a mechanism to correct legal and factual errors occurring in the proceedings_B 
8 Id. 
9 See, e.g.: Beale v. Speck, 127 Idaho 521, 535, 903 P.2d 110, 124 (Ct. App. 1995). 
10 Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(6). 
11 Tiegs v. Robertson, 149 Idaho 482, 236 P.3d 474, 477 (Ct. App. 2010). 
12 Johannsen v. Utterbeck, 146 Idaho 423, 430, 196 P.3d 341, 348 (2008) [citing: Hudelson v. Delta International 
Machinery Corporation, 142 Idaho 244, 248, 127 P.3d 147, 151 (2005)]. 
13 Slaathaug v. Allstate Insurance Company, 132 Idaho 705, 707, 979 P.2d 107, 109 (1999). 
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A trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion for new trial under Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 59(a), or to alter or amend a judgment under Rule 59( e), is discretionary. 14 A court's 
discretion is examined under a three part test: (1) whether the court correctly perceived the issues as 
one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and 
consistently with the legal standards applicable; and (3) whether the court reached its decision by an 
exercise ofreason. 15 
In this case, the evidence upon which the 60(b) Order is based comes from Bach's pleadings 
and the related lawsuits which Bach repeatedly referred to in his pleadings and in the orders he drew 
for Judge Shindurling's signature. The evidence is sufficient to justify the 60(b) Order and the 
Second Amended Judgment. 16 The Second Amended Judgment is neither against the law nor in 
conflict with the great weight of the evidence, as the relief granted tracks the very relief upon which 
Bach based his Complaint in Intervention. 17 Therefore, neither a new trial, nor alteration of the 
Second Amended Judgment, is warranted. 
Finally, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) (hereinafter "Rule 60(b)") provides a means 
for an aggrieved party to obtain relief from a "final judgment, order, or proceeding" directly from 
the trial court without resorting to an appeal. 18 The rule requires a showing of good cause and 
14 Tiegs v. Robertson, 149 Idaho at , 236 P.3d at 477. 
15 Sun Valley Shopping Center v. Idaho Power Company, 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991). 
16 See: Second Amended Judgment, M~cLean v. Cheyovich Family Trust, Teton County case no. CV 2001-265 (filed 
October 29, 2010) (hereinafter the "Second Amended Judgment"). 
17 60(b) Order, at p. 13. 
18 Matter of Estate of Bagley, 117 Idaho 1091, 1093, 793 P.2d 1263, 1265 (Ct. App. 1990) [citing: First Security 
Bank of idaho, N.A. v. Stauffer, 112ldaho 133, 730 P.2d 1053 (Ct. App. 1986)]. 
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specifies particular grounds upon which relief may be granted. 19 These grounds include mistake, 
excusable neglect, newly discovered evidence, fraud, misconduct, or satisfaction of the 
judgment.20 In addition to listing specific grounds upon which relief can be granted, the rule 
contains a clause allowing reconsideration for "any other reason justifying relief from the 
operation of the law."21 Like decisions under Rule 59( a) and (e), consideration of a motion under 
rule 60(b) involves an exercise of discretion.22 
Bach's Motion does not reach any of the grounds for relief listed in Rule 60(b )( 1 ), (2), 
(3), (4), or (5). Furthermore, Rule 60(b)(6), which is the catchall for the rule, was not intended to 
allow a court to reconsider the legal basis for its original decision.23 Furthermore, a Rule 
60(b)(6) must present 'unique and compelling circumstances' justifying relief.24 
Bach's Motion is a reiteration of previous arguments, and, to the extent he criticizes the 
60(b) Order and the Second Amended Judgment, he does not present unique or compelling 
circumstances for granting relief under Rule 60(b)(6). 
19 Matter of Estate of Bagley, 117 Idaho at 1093, 793 P.2d at 1265 [citing: Lowe v. Lym, 103 Idaho 259, 646 P.2d 
1030 (Ct. App. 1982)]. 
20 Matter of Estate of Bagley, 117 Idaho at 1093, 793 P.2d at 1265 [citing: First State Bank & Trust of Idaho v. 
Parker Brothers, Inc., 112 Idaho 30, 730 P.2d 950 (1986)]. 
21 Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6). 
22 Wallerv. State Department of Health and Welfare, 146 Idaho 234,237, 192 P.3d 1058, 1061 (2008). 
23 First Bank & Trust of Idaho v. Parker Brothers, Inc., 112 Idaho at 32, 730 P.2d at 952. 
24 Villa Highlands, LLC v. Western Community Insurance Company, 148 Idaho 598, 604, 226 P.3d 540, 546 (2010) 
[citing: Miller v. Haller, 129 Idaho 345, 349, 924 P.2d 607, 611 (1996)]. 
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McLean and Dawson's request for attorney fees is premised upon Rule 11 .zs Rule 11 
requires that the signature of an attorney on any pleading or motion: 
... constitutes a certificate that the attorney or party has read the pleading, motion 
or other paper; that to the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief 
after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing 
law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of 
existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to 
harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. 
* * * 
If a pleading, motion or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, 
upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed 
it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an 
order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses 
incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a 
reasonable attorney's fee. 26 
Rule ll(a) requires that the pleadings be: (1) well grounded in fact, (2) warranted by 
existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, 
and (3) not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or cause unnecessary delay or 
needless increases in the costs of litigation.27 
A decision whether to award sanctions under Rule ll(a) is discretionary.Z8 Therefore, 
this Court must correctly perceive the issue as discretionary, act within the outer boundaries of its 
discretion consistent with consistently with the legal standards applicable to the consideration of 
an award, and through an exercise ofreason.29 
25 McLean & Dawson's Objection, at p. 5. 
26 Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 1l(a)(l) (relevant portions). 
27 Riggins v. Smith, 126 Idaho 1017, 1021, 895 P.2d 1210, 1214 (1995). 
28 Gubler by and through Gubler v. Brydon, 125 Idaho 112, 114, 867 P.2d 986, 988 (1994). 
29 Gubler, 125 Idaho at 114, 867 P.2d at 988 [citing: Sun Valley Shopping Center, Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 
Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991)]. 
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Bach's Motion must be evaluated for reasonableness under the circumstances?0 In other 
words, Rule ll(a) sanctions shall be assessed if the pleading is frivolous, legally unreasonable, or 
without factual foundation. 31 The appropriate focus is whether Bach conducted a "proper 
investigation upon reasonable inquiry" into the facts and legal theories of the case.32 
The intent of Rule ll(a) is to grant to courts the power to impose sanctions for discrete 
pleading abuses or other types of litigative misconduct.33 It is considered "a management tool for 
the district court to weed out, punish, and deter specific frivolous and other misguided filings" 
and should be exercised narrowly.34 
McLean and Dawson contend that Bach's Motion is "not well grounded in fact and not 
warranted either by existing law or a good faith argument."35 Since the Rule 60(b) Order is 
based upon Bach's own pleadings, as well as the judgment in Bach v. Miller, Teton County case 
no. CV-2002-208, upon which Bach relied as controlling precedent, Bach's attack upon the Rule 
60(b) Order is without reasonable basis in fact or law. 
Marvin Smith, counsel for the McLean and Dawson, shall file an affidavit, within 
fourteen (14) days of the date of this opinion, detailing those hours spent preparing his responses 
to Bach's Motion, and Bach's Reply and Motion to Strike. The issue will be submitted seven (7) 
days thereafter, in which interim Bach may file any written objections. 
30 Durrant v. Christensen; 117 Idaho 70, 74, 785 P.2d 634, 638 (1990). 
3t Id. 
32 Riggins v. Smith, 126 Idaho at 1021, 895 P.2d at 1214 [citing: Hanfv. Syringa Realty, Inc., 120 Idaho 364, 369, 
816 P.2d320, 325 (1991)]. 
33 Campbellv. Kildew, 141 Idaho 640,650, 115 P.3d 731,741 (2005). 
34 Id., [citing: Curzon v. Hansen, 137 Idaho 420, 422, 49 P.3d 1270, 1273 (Ct. App. 2002)]. 
35 McLean & Dawson's Objection, at p. 5. 
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Therefore, in consideration of the above premises, Bach's Motion is hereby denied. His 
Motion to Strike is likewise denied. McLean and Dawson's Motion to Strike is hereby denied 
as moot. McLean and Dawson's request for attorney fees pursuant to Rule 11 shall be granted. 
Counsel for McLean and Dawson shall file an attorney fee affidavit, as outlined above, within 
fourteen (14) days of the date of this Order. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
·nt 
DATED this J{ day of January 2011. 
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Marvin M. Smith, Esq. 
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P.O. Box 101 
Driggs, Idaho 83422 
Alva A. Harris, Esq. 
~US.Mail 0 Courthouse Box OFacsimile 171 S. Emerson Ave. 
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Dale W. Storer, Esq. (ISB No. 2166) 
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. 
P.O. Box 50130 
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Telephone: (208) 523-0620 
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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TETON CO., ID 
DISTRiCT COURT 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TETON 
THOMAS H. ULRlCH and MARY M. ULRICH) 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
JOHN N. BACH and all parties claiming to hold title 
to the hereinafter described property pursuant to that 
certain warranty deed recorded in the records of Teton 
County, Idaho on June 14, 1994, as Instrument No. 
116461 and all unknown claimants, heirs and devisees 
of the following property: 
A portion of the South Yz South Yz Section 6, 
Township 5 North, Range 46 East, Boise Meridian, 
Teton County, Idaho, being further described as: From 
the SW corner of said Section 6, South 89 50'1211 East, 
2630.05 feet to the true point of begiMing; thence 
North 00 07'58" East, 813.70 feet to a point; thence 
North 01 37'48" East, 505.18 feet to a point; thence 
South 89 58'47" East) 1319.28 feet to a point; thence 
South 00 07'36" West, 1321.69 feet to a point on the 
Southern Section Line; thence North 89 51'01" West, 
1320.49 feet along the Southern Section Line to the 
South ':4 Corner of said Section 6, a point; thence 
North 89 50'13" West, 12.13 feet along the Southern 
Section Line to the point of beginning. SUBJECT TO 
a 60 foot road and utility easement along the Western 
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Property lines. 
AND SUBJECT TO a 60 foot road and utility 
easement along the Southern Property Lines. 
Defendants. 
208-523-9518 T-183 P0003/0017 F-256 
COME NOW Plaintiffs Thomas H. Ulrich and Mary M. Ulrich, husband and wife, 
(hereinafter "Ulrich"), by and through their counsel of record, Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, 
P.L.L.C.} and submit this Pre-Trial Memorandum pursuant to the COUlt Trial Scheduling Order 
entered in this Matter. 
I. EXHIBITS 
A. Deed transferring title to the Ulrich Property, as defined in the Verified Complaint 
(hereinafter the ''Ulrich Property''), from Philip J. Sarasqueta and Marilyn R. Sarasqueta, 
husband and wife, and Louisa S. Sarasqueta, Trustee of the Sarasqueta Living Trust, dated 
October 30, 1990, to Thomas H. Ulrich and Mary M. Ulrich, husband and wife. 
B. Deed transferring title to an additional30 acres of property, adjacent and contiguous to the 
Ulrich Property (hereinafter "IRA Property"), from Philip J. Sarasqueta and Marilyn R. 
Sarasqueta, husband and wife, and Louisa S. Sarasqueta, Trustee of the Sarasqueta Living 
Trust, dated October 30, 1990, to the Bank of Commerce IRA Fund #8768 for the Benefit 
of Thomas H. Ulrich IRA. 
C. Title insurance policy for the Ulrich Property. 
D. Title insurance policy for the IRA Property. 
E. Deed transferring title to the Ulrich Property from Teton West Corporation to Philip J. 
Sarasqueta and Marilyn R. Sarasqueta, husband and wife, and Joaquin F. Sarasqueta and 
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Louisa Sarasqueta, husband and wife (predecessors in interest to the Sarasqueta Living 
Trust, dated October 30, 1990). 
F _ Deed transferring title to the Bach Property, as defmed in the Verified Complaint (hereinafter 
the "Bach Property"), from Teton West Corporation to, among others, Defendant John N. 
Bach's predecessor in interest. Targhee Powder Emporium, Ltd. 
G. Copy of the final plat for Grouse Landing PUD approved by the Teton County 
Commissioners 
Ulrich and Defendant John N. Bach (hereinafter "Bach") have not stipulated to the admission 
of any of the above exhibits because Bach is appearing prose_ At this time, Ulrich is unaware of any 
objections or any basis for any objections Bach may have to the above exhibits. 
II. EVIDENCE IN LIEU OF LIVE TESTIMONY 
No depositions have been conducted in this matter. Additionally, Ulrich does not plan to use 
any admissions, interrogatory responses or other discovery responses in lieu oflive testimony at the 
trial of this matter. 
III. DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE SUPPORTING DAMAGES 
Ulrich has not requested damages as part ofthe relief requested in this matter. Rather, Ulrich 
has requested that this Collit quiet title of the Ulrich Property Easement in Ulrich, or, alternatively, 
issue a declaratory judgment regarding Ulrich's right, title and interest in the Ulrich Property 
Easement. Further. Ulrich has requested a permanent injunction prohibiting Bach from interfering 
with Ulrich's right, title and interest in the Ulrich Property Easement. Consequently, because Ulrich 
has not asked for damages, Ulrich will not submit any documentary evidence on that issue. 
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IV. WITNESSES PLAINTIFF MAY CALL TO TESTIFY AT TlUAL 
A. EXPERT WITNESSES 
1. Mike Quinn, c/o Nelson Engineering, 30 North First East, Driggs, Idaho 83422. Mr. Quinn 
is the lead engineet for Nelson Engineering, which conducted the survey of the Ulrich 
Property Easement, as defined in the Complaint in tlris matter. Mr. Quinn will provide 
testimony regarding the existence and location of the Ulrich Property Easement as described 
in the Ulrich Property Deed and Bach Property Deed. Mr. Quinn's testimony will be based 
upon his personal observations ofthe Ulrich Prope1ty Easement, the survey of the Ulrich 
Property Easement, and his review of Teton County land records .. 
2. Grant Moedl, or, alternatively. if Grant Moedl is not available, Chris Moss, c/o First 
American Title Insurance Company, 81 North Main Street, Driggs, Idaho 83422. Mr. Moedl 
is the manager of First American Title Insurance Company located in Driggs, Idaho. Mr. 
Moss is an officer in the title depmtment of First American Title Insurance Company located 
in Driggs, Idaho. Mr. Moedl or Mr. Moss will testify regarding the chain of title of the 
Ulrich Property, the Ulrich Property Easement and the lack of any other legal access to the 
Ulrich Property. Mr. Moedl or Mr. Moss will also provide testimony regarding the chain of 
title of the Bach Property and the existence of the Ulrich Prope1ty Easement in both the 
Ulrich Property Deed and the Bach Property Deed. Mr. Moedl or Mr. Moss will base their 
testimony on their review of the Teton County land records. 
B. FACT WITNESSES 
L Thomas H. Ulrich, 281 W. Harvest Run, Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404. Mr. Ulrich will testify 
as to all aspects of this matter. 
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2. Mary M. Ulrich, 281 W. Harvest Run, Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404. Ms. Ulrich will testify as 
to her knowledge regarding the routes Ulrich used to access the Ulrich Property. 
Ulrich is not aware of any impeachment or rebuttal witnesses at this point in time, but 
reserves the right to present any rebuttal or impeachment witnesses not listed here if necessary during 
the trial, and to call any witnesses identified by Bach. 
V. FACTUAL SUMMARY OF CASE 
In December 1996, Ulrich purchased an approximately forty acre parcel of property located 
in Teton County, Idaho. At the time of purchase, the Ulrich Property was conveyed to Ulrich by 
Warranty Deed from Philip J. Sarasqueta & Marilyn R. Sarasqueta, husband and wife, and Louisa 
S. Sarasqueta, Trustee of the SarasquetaLiving Trust, dated October 30, 1990.1 Such Warranty Deed 
gave Ulrich fee simple title to the Ulrich Property. The Warranty Deed contains an express grant 
of easement providing acces~ to the Ulrich Property as follows: 
TOGETHER WITH a 60 foot road and utility easement being the 60 
feet directly East of the following described lines: Beginning at a 
point North 89°50'12" West, 12.13 feet from the South lf4 Cotner of 
said Section 6; thence North 00°07'58" East 813.70 feet to a point; 
thence North 01 °37'48n East, 505.18 feet to the SW property corner. 
(the qUlrich Property Easement'). Access to the Ulrich Property was also guaranteed via a policy 
of title insurance. The Ulrich Property Easement traverses the western boundary of 
property allegedly owned pa1tially by Bach. Additionally, the Ulrich Property Easement is reserved 
1 The Ulrich Prope1iy described herein contains appmximately lO acres. Ulrich bought the 
remaining 30 acres through the Bank of Commerce IRA Fund #8768 for the Benefit of Thomas H. Ulrich 
IRA. Pursuant to their deeds, the Ulrich Property and the IRA Property were required to be purchased 
together. Both t11e Ulrich Property and the IRA Property contain a grant of easement which traverses the 
western boundary of the Bach Property. 
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in the Corporation Warranty Deed granting title to Bach's predecessors-in-interest as follows: 
SUBJECT TO a 60 foot road and utility easement along the Western Property lines. 
Throughout the time that Ulrich has owned the Property, Ulrich has never demonstrated any intent 
to abandon the Ulrich Prope1iy Easement. Additionally, until late June, 2009, Bach permitted Ulrich 
to access Ulrich's property by traversing the Bach Property, albeit not via the Ulrich Propetiy 
Easement, but via altemative routes. 
Ulrich recently decided to develop the Ulrich Property and improve the Ulrich Property 
Easement by grading and paving the Ulrich Property Easement. On April24, 201 0, Plaintiff Thomas 
H. Ulrich telephoned Bach to inform him that surveyors would be present on the Ulrich Property 
Easement to survey the easement to prepare for the improvements. At such time, Bach repeatedly 
insisted that Ulrich has no easement and threatened Plaintiff Thomas Ulrich that if surveyors entered 
onto the easement that he would call the sheriffs office and charge the surveyors with trespass. 
Such insistence and threats by Bach prompted the filing of this current suit to quiet title in the Ulrich 
Property Easement in favor of Ulrich. On September 9, 2010, Ulrich filed a Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction, requesting that this Court permit the survey of the Ulrich Property Easement and to 
enjoin Bach from interfedng in arty way with such survey or removing any survey markers. On 
October 29, 2010, this Court entered an Order granting Ulrich's Motion for Preliminary Injunction. 
The survey of the Ulrich Property Easement was subsequently completed. Ulrich seeks to resolve 
all remaining issues regarding Ulrich's rights and interest in the Ulrich Property Easement. 
VII. SETTLEMENT DISCUSSIONS 
Because Bach is appearing in this matter prose, the parties have not had a chance to attempt 
settlement discussions. 
6- PLAiNTIFFS' PRE-TRIAL MEMORANDUM 
04-28-'11 14:15 FROM 208-523-9518 T-183 P0008/0017 F-256 
VHI. SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSES TO INTERROGATORIES 
Bach did not serve any interrogatories on Ulrich. Consequently, thete is nothing upon which 
Ulrich would base a statement that all answers or supplemental answers to interrogatories under Rule 
33 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure reflect facts known to the date of this Memorandum. 
IX. STATEMENT OF ALL CLAIMS 
Ulrich has asserted the following claims which remain pending in this matter: 
l. Quiet title in the Ulrich Property Easement in favor of Ulrich; 
2. A declaratory judgment that Ulrich's right, title, claim and interest in the Ulrich Property 
Easement is dominant and superior to any right, title, claim or interest held by Bach in the 
Bach Property; 
3. A permanent injunction and/or restraining order against Bach's interference with the Ulrich 
Property Easement; and 
4. Costs and attorneys fees against Bach incurred by Ulrich in prosecuting this action. 
X. ADMISSIONS OR STIPULATIONS OF THE 
PARTIES WHICH CAN BE AGREED UPON BY THE PARTIES 
Because Bach is appearing in this matter pro se, the parties have not been able to confer 
regal'ding any admissions or stipulations which can be agreed upon by the parties. 
XI. AMENDMENTS TO THE PLEADINGS AND ANY 
ISSUES OF LAW ABANDONED BY ANY OF THE PARTIES 
Ulrich has not made any amendments to the pleadings or abandoned any issues of law. 
Ulrich is further unaware of any amendments to the pleadings by Bach_ However, due to the nature 
of Bach's drafting of his pleadings, it is unclear whether Bach has abandoned any issues of law 
related to the claims made by Bach in this matter. 
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XU. ISSUES OF FACT AND LAW WHICH REMAIN 
TO BE LITIGATED AT TRIAL AND SUPPORTING LEGAL AUTHORITIES 
l. Whether Ulrich has right, title and interest in the Ulrich Property Easement through 
an express easement. 
''One who purchases land expressly subject to an easement or with notice, actual or 
consnuctive, that is burdened with an existing easement, takes the land subject to the easement." 
Akers v. D.L. White Const., Inc., 142ldaho 293,301, 127 P.3d 196> 204 (2005). (citing Checketts 
v. Thompson, 65 Idaho 715,721, 152 P.2d 585, 587 (1944)); see also I.C. § 55-603. "An express 
easement may be by way or reservation or exception., !d. (citing 7 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, 
THOMAS EDlTION § 60.03(a)(2)(I) (David A. Thomas ed., 1994). "An express easement by 
reservation reserves to the grantor some new right in the property being conveyed; an express 
easement by exception operates by withholding title to a portion of the conveyed property." ld 
''An express easement may be created by a written agreement between the owner of the 
dominant estate and the owner of the servient estate. It may also be created by a deed from the 
ownerofthe servient estate to the owner of the dominant estate." Tower Asset Sub Inc. v. Lawrence, 
143 Idaho 710,714, 152 P.3d 581, 585 (2007). ''Where the owner of the dominant estate is selling 
the property to be subjected to the servitude, an express easement may be created by reservation or 
exception." Id., 143 Idaho at 714-15, 152 P.3d 585-86 (citing Akers v. D.L. White Const., Inc., 142 
Idaho 293, 301, 127 P.3d 196,204 (2005)). "No particular forms or words of art are necessary (to 
create an express easement]; it is necessary only that the parties make clear their intention to 
establish a servitude." See Combe v. Weeks, 115 Idaho 433, 436, 767 P.2d 276, 279 (Ct. App. 
19 89)( disapproved of on other grounds, Rodriguez v. Oakley Valley Stone, Inc., 120 Idaho 3 70, 3 7 8> 
816 P.2d 326, 334 (1991)). 
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Teton West Corporation originally owned both the Ulrich Prope1ty and the Bach Property. 
When Teton West Corporation divided up the original property into what is now the Ulrich Property 
and the Bach Property, it expressly reserved the Ulrich Property Easement in the deed to the Bach 
Property and granted the Ulrich Property Easement in the deed to the Ulrich Property. Because the 
Ulrich Property Easement is an express easement, Ulrich is entitled to a declaratory judgment 
ordering that Ulrich has right, title and interest in the Ulrich Property Easement, and is entitled to 
an order quieting right> title and interest in the Ulrich Property Easement in Ulrich's favor. 
2. Whether Ulrich has abandoned the Ulrich Property Easement. 
Kolouch v. Kramer, 120 Idaho 65, 67,813 P.2d 876,878 (1991), is dispositive ofthe issues 
of abandonment and adverse possession in this case. The facts of Kolouch are nearly identical to the 
facts of the case at hand. In Kolauch, the Kolouchs owned a parcel of property. The deed to 
Kolouchs granted them an access easement over property owned by Kramer. Id., 120 Idaho at 67, 
813 P .2d at 878. When Kramer acquired the subject property, there was a utility pole, a board fence, 
and some trees in the easement area. Id. Subsequently, Kramer planted six spruce trees down the 
center of the easement, planted other trees within the easement, constructed a fence inside the 
noitherly boundary of the easement, and a concrete irrigation diversion at the end of the easement. 
!d. Kramer also placed several large boulders at the east end of the easement. !d. Years later, 
Kolouch decided to develop the propetty and to pave an access road over the easement in order to 
service the property. Id. In pursuit of that goal, Kolouchs filed a complaint for declaratory relief 
requesting a declaration that they were the owners of the easement over the K.ramer property, and 
further declaring that they were entitled to use the described easement for ingress and egress and for 
whatever further relief as the court deemed proper. !d. 
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The rule is well settled that mere non~use of an easement by grant does not affect an 
abandonment of the easement. Id As the Idaho Supreme Court noted in Kolouch, 
[T]he present case involves an easement by written grant which has not been used by 
the Kolouchs (owners ofthe easement) since its creation. It was not until sometime 
around June of 1989 that the Kolouchs decided to use the easement by developing 
a road thereon for comtnercial purposes. That desire prompted their filing of the 
complaint for declaratory relief. Under the holding in Quinn v. Stone, supra> it is 
clear that no abandonment has taken place, as mere non-use is insufficient to work 
an abandonment. 
!d. Likewise, in the current case> Ulrich has an easement by written grant which has not previously 
been used by Ulrich. It was not until some years after Ulrich purchased the Ulrich Property that 
Ulrich decided to use the easement by developing a road thereon for ingress to and egress from 
Ulrich,s property. Prior to that time, Bach permitted Ulrich to access the Ulrich Property using 
alternative routes over the Bach Property. The Ulrich's non-use of the easement during the interim 
did not constitute an abandonment of the Ulrich Property Easement. 
Further, "an abandonment of any right is dependent upon an intention to abandon and must 
be evidenced by. a clear, unequivocal; and decisive act of the party." 0 'Brien v. Best, 68 Idaho 348, 
3 57, 194 P .2d 608, 613 (1948). "(l]t requires very convincing and satisfactory proofs to support a 
forfeiture by abandonment of a real property right." I d. "[T]he acts claimed to constitute the 
abandonment of an easement must show the destruction thereof, or that its legitimate use has been 
rendered impossible by the owner thereof, or some other unequivocal act showing intention to 
permanently abandon and give up the easement." Id., 68 Idaho at 357-58, 194 P.2d at 613-614. 
Ulrich has engaged in no such action. Consequently, pursuant to Kolouch and 0 'Brien, the Ulrich 
Property Easement has not been abandoned. 
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3. Whether Bach has adversely possessed the Ulrich Property Easement. 
Bach has not adversely possessed the Ulrich Property Easement. "Where the defense to the 
claim is adverse possession, the party asserting such defense must prove by clear and satisfactory 
evidence that he or she has been in exclusive possession of the property for at least [20] years and 
that the possession has been actual, open, visible, notorious, continuous, and hostile to the party 
against whom the claim of adverse possession is made." Kolouch, 120 Idaho at 67-68, 813 P.2d at 
878-79 (internal citations omitted). Since the owner of the servient estate owns the underlying fee, 
and has the right to use his entire land for any purposes not inconsistent with the rights of the holder 
of the dominant easement, the use by the servient estate must be truly inconsistent ld, 120 Idaho 
at 68, 813 P.2d at 879 (internal citations omitted). In Kolouch, the Idaho Supreme Comt adopted 
the holding in Castle Associates v. Schwartz, 407 N.Y.S.2d 717,63 A.D.2d 481 (1978), regarding 
the rule which covers situations where, as in Kolouch and the case at hand, the owner of the 
dominant estate had not had occasion to use the easement. The Idaho Supreme Court quoted Castle 
Associates as follows: 
[W]here an easement has been created but no occasion has arisen for its use, the 
owner of the servient tenement may fence his land and such use will not be deemed 
adverse to the existence of the easement until such time as (1) the need for the right 
of way arises> (2) a demand is made by the owner of the dominant tenement that the 
easement be opened and (3) the owner of the sewient tenement refuses to do so. 
Kolouch, 120 Idaho at 68,813 P.2d at 879 (citing Castle Associates,407N.Y.S.2d at723, 63 A.D.2d 
at 487). The Idaho Supreme Court further stated: 
Applied here> we may paraphrase this rule to read that where the easement was 
created, but no occasion has arisen for its use, the owner of the servient tenement 
may plant trees, erect a fence, etc. and such use will not be deemed to be adverse (or 
inconsistent> to use Shelton's term), until the need to use the easement arises, etc. 
We think this rule makes sense in light of the well established rule that the owner of 
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the servient estate is entitled to use his land, even though encumbered by an 
easement, for any purpose not inconsistent with the purpose reserved in the easement. 
Accordingly, Kramer's use of his property, which was subject to the easement has not 
been advetse or inconsistent with the Kolouchs' rights prior to the time the 
Kolouchs' need to use the easement arose, and the trial court's finding to that effect 
was not clearly erroneous. 
Kolouch, 120 Idaho at 68-69,813 P.2d at 879-80. Likewise, Bach's use ofhis propertJ, which was 
subject to the Ulrich Property Easement, has not been adverse or inconsistent with the Ulrich's rights 
because Ulrich has not previously had a need to use the Ulrich Property Easement. Therefore, Bach 
has not adversely possessed the Ulrich Property Easement. 
4. Whether the proper remedy in this action is quiet title, declaratory judgment and 
permanent injunction. 
Bach has asserted that "if there is an adequate remedy at law, the equity action for quiet title 
and declaratory judgment is unavailable to plaintiff." First, both a quiet title action and an action for 
declaratory judgment are remedies at law. Idaho Code§ 6-401 specifically provides for an action 
to quiet title. Idaho Code § 10-1201 specifically provides for an action for declaratory judgment. 
Second, even assuming that quiet title and declaratory judgment were not remedies at law, Bach has 
argued that Ulrich's proper ''remedies at law" are "conversion, damages to plaintiffs' realty, 
interference with existing contractual relations or economic business relations and prospects of 
plaintiffs' developments commercially [sic] or their prope1ty [sic], negligence and even a claim for 
ejectment against defendant." While Ulrich may indeed be entitled to bring some or all of these 
causes of action, none of them accomplish what Ulrich ultimately seek to do in this matter- obtain 
from the Comt an order stating definitively which party has right, title and interest in the Ulrich 
Property Easement A legal remedy, i.e., damages, is insufficient in this matter because real 
property is considered to be unique. As the Idaho Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized, a 
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specific tract of land is unique and impossible of duplication by the use of any amount of money. 
See, i.e., Fazzio v. Mason, 2011 WL 941462, *6, *7 (March 21, 2011); Kessler v. Tortoise 
Developmeht, Inc., 134 Idaho 264,270, 1 P.3d 292,298 (2000); Perron v. Hale,l08 Idaho 578, 582, 
701 P.2d 198, 202 (1985); Suchan v. Rutherford, 90 Idaho 288, 295, 410 P.2d 434, 428 
(1966)(noting the general common law principal that damages are insufficient in disputes over real 
property due to uniqueness ofland). Only a quiet title action or declaratory judgment and permanent 
injunction can provide the relief requested by Ulrich. Consequently, Bach's argument regarding 
Ulrich's alleged failure to pursue "remedies at law" as listed by Bach should be disregarded. 
5. Whether Ulrich has failed to join any indispensable parties. 
With regard to Bach's assertion that Ulrich has failed to join indispensable parties, Ulrich 
has not sought to quiet title or requested a declaratory judgment and injunction against any party 
except any alleged interest Bach may have in the Ulrich Property Easement. Rule 19(a)(l) of the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides that, "[a] person who is subject to service of process shall 
be joined as a party in the action if (1) in the person's absence complete relief cannot be accorded 
among those already pa1ties, or (2) the person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action 
and is so situated that the disposition of the action in the person's absence may (i) as a practical 
matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons 
already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent 
obligations by reason of the claimed interest." Idaho R. Civ. P, 19(a)(l ). 
As the Idaho Supreme Court has stated, "joinder of all parties with an interest in the subject 
matter of the suit is not required; rather, only those who have an interest in the object of the suit 
should be joined." Tower Asset Sub Inc. v. Lawrence; 143 Idaho 710, 714, 152 P.3d 581, 585 
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(2007). In the current case, no other party> aside from Bach, has indicated any intent to interfere with 
Ulrich's interest in the Ulrich Property Easement. Further, the disposition of this matter in the 
absence of parties other than the Bach will not impair or impede the other parties' ability to protect 
their interests or leave them subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple or otherwise 
inconsistent obligations. Although the other property owners of the Bach Prope1ty may have an 
interest in the subject matter of the suit, as property owners> only Bach has attempted to interfere 
with Ulrich's interest in the property. Consequently> the other propetty owners do not have an 
interest in the object of the suit. Therefore, the other owners of the Bach Property are not 
indispensable pm1ies. 
6. Whether Ulrich breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing with 
regard to Bach. 
Regarding the breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, Bach has not 
alleged facts sufficient to bring the claim. In order for an implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing to exist, there must, at a minimum, be a contract between the parties. See, i.e., Idaho First 
National Bankv. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266, 287~88, 824 P.2d 841,862-63 (1991). 
Here1 no contract has been alleged, nor was there ever any contract between the parties. 
Consequently, Bach has not even raised sufficient facts to state a claim upon which relief could be 
granted, and Bach's claim for breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing must be 
dismissed. 
7. Whether Ulrich intentionally interfered with contract or interfered with prospective 
economic advantage with regard to Bach. 
Bach has not alleged sufficient facts for a cause of action for intentional interference with 
contract or interference with prospective economic advantage. The elements of intentional 
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interference with contract are (1) the existence of a contract; (2) knowledge of the contract on the 
patt of the defendant; (3) intentional interference causing a breach of the contract; and (4) injury to 
the plaintiff resulting from the breach. Barlow v. International Harvester Co., 85 Idaho 881, 803, 
522 P .2d 1102, 1114 ( 1974). The elements of interference with prospective economic advantage are 
( l) the existence of a valid economic expectancy; (2) knowledge of the expectancy on the part of the 
interferer; (3) intentional interference inducing termination of the expectancy; (4) the interference 
was wrongful by some measure beyond the fact of the interference itself (i.e., that the defendant 
interfered for an improper purpose or improper means); and (5) resulting damage to the plaintiff 
whose expectance has been disrupted. Highland Enterprises, Inc. v. Barker, 133 Idaho 330, 338, 
986 P.2d 996, 1004 (1999). Bach has pled none of the elements required for either intentional 
interference with contract or interference with prospective economic advanta e. (See Verified 
Answer and Counterclaim). Therefore, such claims should be dismissed. 
~V\ 
DATED thi~ day of April, 2011. 
Charles A. Homer, Esq~ 
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State ofidaho, resident of and with 
my office in Idaho Falls, Idaho; that I served a copy of the following described pleading or document 
on the attorneys and/or individuals listed below by hand delivery, by mailing with the correct postage 
. " thereon, or by facsimile a true and correct copy thereof on this QJf_ day of April, 2011. 
DOCUMENT SERVED: PLAINTIFFS' PRETRIAL MEMORANDUM 
ATTORNEYS AND/OR INDIVIDUALS SERVED: 
John Bach 
PO Box 101 
Driggs ID 83422 
COURTESY COPY TO: 
The Honorable Darren B. Simpson 
IN CHAMBERS 
Bingham County Courthouse 
501 North Maple, #310 
Blackfoot ID 83221-1700 
(YJ.. Mail ( ) Hand Delivery ( )Facsimile 
fj..) Mail ( ) Hand Delivery ( Facsimile 
Charles A. Homer, Es . 
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & 
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Charles A. Homer, Esq. (ISB No. 1630) 
Dale W. Storer, Esq. (ISB No. 2166) 
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. 
P.O. Box 50130 
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Telephone: (208) 523-0620 
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TETON 
THOMAS H. ULRICH and MARY M. ULRICH, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
JOHN N. BACH and all parties claiming to hold 
title to the hereinafter described property pursuant 
to that certain warranty deed recorded in the 
records of Teton County, Idaho on June 14, 1994, 
as Instrument No. 116461 and all unknown 
claimants, heirs and devisees ofthe following 
property: 
A portion of the South liz South liz Section 6, 
Towns hip 5 North, Range 46 East, Boise 
Meridian, Teton County, Idaho, being further 
described as: From the SW corner of said Section 
6, South 89 50'12" East, 2630.05 feet to the true 
point of beginning; thence North 00 07'58" East, 
813.70 feet to a point; thence North 01 37'48" 
East, 505.18 feet to a point; thence South 89 
58'47" East, 1319.28 feet to a point; thence South 
00 07'36" West, 1321.69 feet to a point on the 
Southern Section Line; thence North 89 51'0 1" 
West, 1320.49 feet along the Southern Section 
Case No. CV-2010-329 
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Line to the South 114. Corner of said Section 6, a 
point; thence North 89 50'13" West, 12.13 feet 
along the Southern Section Line to the point of 
beginning. SUBJECT TO a 60 foot road and 
utility easement along the Western Property lines. 
AND SUBJECT TO a 60 foot road and utility 
easement along the Southern Property Lines. 
Defendants. 
COME NOW Plaintiffs Thomas H. Ulrich and Mary M. Ulrich, husband and wife, 
(hereinafter "Plaintiffs"), by and through their counsel of record, Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & 
Crapo, P.L.L.C., and submit this Memorandum in Reply to Defendant and Counterclaimant 
John N. Bach's Opposing and Counter Memorandum Brief, dated April22, 2011. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
At the hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant John N. Bach 
("Defendant") requested that the Court permit him to file supplemental responsive briefing 
in addition to the Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Plaintiffs' 
Summary Judgment Motion, dated March 25, 2011, and the Supplemental Memorandum of 
John N. Bach, dated March 28, 2011, already filed with the Court. The Court agreed to 
permit Defendant to submit additional supplemental briefing, giving Defendant a deadline 
of April 22, 2011, to serve briefing, and permitting Plaintiffs to file a reply to such 
supplemental briefing. On April 25, 2011, Plaintiffs received a memorandum filed by 
Defendant titled in part: "Defendant and Counterclaimant John N. Bach's Opposing and 
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Counter Memorandum Brief' ("Second Supp. Memo."). Plaintiffs now submit this 
Memorandum in reply to such briefing. 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. Defendant's argument that Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum in Support ofMotion 
for Summary Judgment was untimely should be disregarded. 
On the first page of his Second Supp. Memo., Defendant states in his Preface that 
Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum in Support ofMotion for Summary Judgment was untimely. 
(Second Supp. Memo., p. 1-2). However, Plaintiffs did not receive Defendant's initial 
responsive summary judgment documents until the late afternoon ofMarch 28, 2011, and did 
not receive Defendant's additional supplemental briefing until March 30, 2011. Plaintiffs 
served their Reply Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment on March 31, 2011, as 
is reflected by the certificate of service attached to the pleading. Considering the late filing 
by Defendant ofhis responsive summary judgment pleadings, Plaintiffs prepared and served 
their Reply Memorandum as soon as was possible. Regardless, the fact that the Court has 
permitted Defendant to file a second supplemental memorandum in response to Plaintiffs' 
Reply Memorandum cures any prejudice to Defendant stemming from any alleged late filing 
of the Reply Memorandum. 
B. THE PROPER REMEDY IN THIS MATTER IS QUIET TITLE OR 
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT 
Defendant again asserts in his Second Supp. Memo. that Plaintiffs have an adequate 
remedy at law and argues that Suchen supports this argument. However, Suchen does not 
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support Defendant's assertions. First, Suchen was cited by Plaintiffs for the proposition that 
the general common law regarding disputes involving real property is that real property is 
unique and therefore equitable remedies, rather than remedies at law, are appropriate. This 
principle is not only noted by the Idaho Supreme Court in Suchen, but also in numerous other 
Idaho cases. See, i.e., Fazzio v. Mason, 2011 WL 941462, *6, *7 (March 21, 2011); Kessler 
v. Tortoise Development, Inc., 134 Idaho 264, 270, 1 P.3d 292, 298 (2000); Perron v. Hale, 
108 Idaho 578, 582, 701 P .2d 198, 202 (1985). While it is true that in the particular case in 
Suchen, the Idaho Supreme Court found that the property involved warranted a rare 
exception to this widely accepted principal, it is important to note that Suchen involved a land 
sale contract of which a party sought specific performance, something that is not at issue 
here. See Suchan v. Rutherford, 90 Idaho 288,295,410 P.2d 434,428 (1966). Regardless, 
the common law principle regarding the appropriateness of equitable remedies due to the 
uniqueness of land remains. 
Additionally, as Plaintiffs mentioned in their Reply Memorandum, both a quiet title 
action and an action for declaratory judgment are remedies at law. Idaho Code § 6-401 
specifically provides for an action to quiet title. Idaho Code § 10-1201 specifically provides 
for an action for declaratory judgment. Finally, again as Plaintiffs mentioned in their Reply 
Memorandum, even assuming that quiet title and declaratory judgment were not remedies 
at law, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs' proper "remedies at law" are "conversion, damages 
to plaintiffs' realty, interference with existing contractual relations or economic business 
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relations and prospects of plaintiffs' developments commercially (sic] or their property [sic], 
negligence and even a claim for ejectment against defendant." (Defendant's Memo. of 
Points and Auth., p. 3). While Plaintiffs may indeed be entitled to bring some or all of these 
causes of action, none of them accomplish what Plaintiffs ultimately seek to do in this matter 
- obtain from the Court an order stating definitively which party has right, title and interest 
in the Ulrich Property Easement. Only a quiet title action or declaratory judgment and 
permanent injunction can provide the relief requested by Plaintiffs. 
C. PLAINTIFFS HAVE NOT FAILED TO JOIN ANY INDISPENSABLE 
PARTIES 
Defendant argues that Tower Asset Sub Inc. v. Lawrence, 143 Idaho 710, 714, 152 
P.3d 581, 585 (2007) provides support for his claim that not all indispensable parties have 
been joined in this suit. Plaintiffs already discussed the issue of indispensable parties at 
length in their Reply Memorandum, and will not revisit the issue at length here. However, 
Plaintiffs do provide that Tower Asset Sub Inc. supports Plaintiffs' arguments regarding 
indispensable parties, as is clear from Defendant's statement regarding Tower Asset Sub Inc.: 
Starting at 403 Idaho 713, the Idaho Supreme Court held that: the issues of 
"Standing" is a subcategory of justiciability, a preliminary question to be 
determined by the Court before reaching any merits of the case. Held- since 
Hall's ownership of the easement not questioned he was not indispensable 
party since no quiet title action sought re his ownership. 
(Second Supp. Memo., p. 6). As in Tower Asset Sub Inc., Plaintiffs have not sought quiet 
title against anyone but Defendant regarding Plaintiffs' right, title and interest in the Ulrich 
Property Easement. Plaintiffs only seek quiet title as against Defendant because Defendant 
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Easement. Plaintiffs are not asking for quiet title as against any other party. As is noted in 
Pro Indiviso, Inc. v. Mid-Mile Holding Trust, 131 Idaho 741, 963 P.2d 1178, (1998), a case 
cited by Defendant, "[i ]tis not necessary that all persons with an interest in the subject matter 
of the suit be joined as parties, but only those who have an interest in the object of the suit." 
Id., 131 Idaho at 746, 963 P.2d at 1183. Consequently, it is unnecessary to join any other 
party in this suit. 
D. DEFENDANT HAS NOT RAISED ANY FACTS SUFFICIENT TO 
WITHSTAND SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS COUNTERCLAIMS 
In his Second Supp. Memo., Defendant states: 
Also, Barlow v. International Harvester Co. (1994) 95 Idaho 881, 893 
(inaccurately cited by Plaintiffs as 85 Idaho 881) 522 P.2d 1102, 1194, in 
which counts for slander and tort interference with contract issues were held 
to RAISE genuine issues of fact precluding summary judgment, the Idaho 
Supreme Court, specifically held: a) A contract voidable because of 
noncompliance may still be subject matter of action for interference with 
contract; and b) A Plaintiff cannot make a lack of mutuality of the contract to 
which he was not a party, available as an excuse for his wrongful and 
unjustiified [sic] conduct. (95 Idaho @ 893-895.); and c) Failure to join 
indispensable party is of such importance such cannot be waived. Barlow, 
supra, also analyzed and applied the principles of d) violation of tortious 
interference with contract, and with prospective economic advantages, per 
which cause of action recovery is not limited to those damages within the 
contemplation of the parties to the contract as the probable and foreseeable 
result of a breach, citing to: W.L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts, sec. 
129, pp 948-949 (4th Ed. 1991); Res (SecondofTorts, Sec 774A, CommentA-
C, pp 86-90, (Tentative Draft No. 14, 1969) Barlow, 95 Idaho@ 896) ... 
Plaintiffs are unsure as to what argument Defendant is making with the above statements. 
However, given that Plaintiffs cited Barlow to show the elements necessary to bring claims 
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made by Defendant to demonstrate that claim can survive summary judgment. However, 
Defendant has still failed to demonstrate any of the elements necessary to bring that claim 
in the first place, let alone survive summary judgment. Additionally, Defendant cites to 
Akers v. D.L. White Construction Inc., 142 Idaho 293,301, 127 P.3d 196,2004 (2005) (sic], 
stating: 
In Akers, A record land owner of reality brought actions against an adjoining 
land owner for i) trespass, ii) negligence and iii) quiet title. Case was 
remanded for purpose of conducting additional fact finding re whether at time 
of severance of alleged dominant and servient estate, use of access through 
servant (sic] easement "was reasonably necessary to enjoyment of alleged 
dominant estate." Such is also a factual genuine issue of fact herein. 
(Second Supp. Memo., p. 8). Again, Plaintiffs are unsure as to what exactly Defendant is 
arguing here, but to the extent that Defendant is arguing that some fact finding has to occur 
regarding whether use of access through the servient estate "was reasonably necessary to 
enjoyment of the alleged dominant estate," such argument is irrelevant to the matter at hand. 
Akers was, in part, remanded, because there was an issue as to whether there was an implied 
easement by prior use. That was the purpose of the remand regarding whether access through 
the servient estate was reasonably necessary to enjoyment of the alleged dominant estate. 
Akers,l42 Idaho at 305, 127 P.3d at 208. The case at hand does not deal with an implied 
easement by prior use. Rather, it concerns an express easement. Consequently, Defendant's 
arguments regarding easement by implied use are irrelevant, and there is no issue of fact in 
that regard. 
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Defendant next spends approximately a page and a half (from the bottom of page 8 
through the top of page 10 ofthe Second Supp. Memo.) making statements regarding what 
he perceives to be the application of First National Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121 
Idaho 266,287-88, 824 P.2d 841,862-63 (1991), to the case at hand. Plaintiffs cited to Bliss 
Valley Foods for the purpose of showing the elements necessary for claim for the breach of 
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. (See Reply Memorandum, p. 1 0). Plaintiffs are 
unsure of how Defendants statements regarding Bliss Valley Foods, pertain to the matter at 
hand, in the context of Defendant's claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, or as to any other claim or defense raised by Defendant. Defendant closes this 
section of his argument by stating: 
Thusly, even though the real estate purchase contract which defendant and his 
cojoint venturers purchased per their recorded spendthrift trust joint venture 
deed/agreement nowhere in negotiations or in any purchase contract or deeds 
is/are the individual names of the Ulrich's, [sic] Thomas nor Mary stated, 
designated or disclosed. No one is disclosed in name, by entity or title 
whatsoever as to the purported 60 foot easement, no one! 
(Second Supp. Memo., p. 9-10). Plaintiffs assume that Defendant is arguing that for the 
easement to be valid, it has to be personal to the users of the easement, or, in legal terms, an 
"easement in gross." However, this case does not deal with an easement in gross, but an 
express easement, which is presumed to be appurtenant. Coward v. Hadley, 150 Idaho 282, 
246 P.3d 391, 396 (2010), reh'g denied (Feb. 8, 2011). An easement appurtenant "is one 
whose benefits serve a parcel ofland. More exactly, it serves the owner of that land m a way 
that cannot be separated from his rights in the land. Id. (internal citations omitted). By 
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connection to the ownership or use of a specific parcel of land." ld. (internal citations 
omitted). Again, as Plaintiffs provided in their Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment, "[ o ]ne who purchases land expressly subject to an easement or with 
notice, actual or constructive, that is burdened with an existing easement, takes the land 
subject to the easement." Akers v. D.L. White Canst., Inc., 142 Idaho 293, 301, 127 P.3d 
196, 204 (2005). (citing Checketts v. Thompson, 65 Idaho 715, 721, 152 P.2d 585, 587 
( 1944)); see also I. C. § 55-603. The Ulrich Property Easement was denoted in both the Bach 
Deed and the deed ofUlrich's predecessors in interest. (See Ulrich Aff., ,-r,-r 6, 7, Ex. E and 
F). The Ulrich Property Easement was appurtenant to the land, and passed expressly with 
the deed when Plaintiffs purchased the Ulrich Property. (See Ulrich Aff., 'II 2, Ex. A). 
Defendant had express notice of the Ulrich Property Easement in his deed. Defendant cannot 
contend that he did not have notice of the Ulrich Property Easement at the time of the 
purchase of the Bach Property because it did not expressly include the names Thomas or 
Mary Ulrich. There is no basis in law for this argument. 
Defendant also argues that Plaintiffs "have never had, never claimed any form of 
actual or constructive possession of the 60 foot road right of way over the westerly boundary 
ofthe Peacock 40 acre parcel--- NEVER!" (Second Supp. Memo., p. 10-11). Plaintiffs 
have no need to claim constructive possession of the Ulrich Property Easement due to the 
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existence of the express easement in the Bach Deed and Ulrich Deed. Consequently, 
Defendant's argument regarding constructive possession should be disregarded. 
Additionally, Defendant argues "[n ]o showing has been made per any survey result 
or other relevant admissible civil engineer's plat or overview of the claimed Ulrich's 60 foot 
easement, that such Ulrich's easement abuts, adjoins and lies immediately upon the northern 
boundary line of the Peacock westerly 40 acre parcel." (Second Supp. Memo., p. 11). First, 
even though it is not relevant, the legal description of the easement does indicate that the 
Ulrich Property Easement abuts the northern boundary line. This is evident not just from the 
metes and bounds description in the Ulrich Deed, but also from the description in the Bach 
Deed, which states the Bach Property is "Subject to a 60 foot road and utility easement along 
the Western Property lines." (Ulrich Aff., Ex. F). Clearly, if the easement runs along the 
entire western property line, it will abut the northern edge of the Bach Property. Regardless, 
however, Defendant himself has entered into the record evidence that the Ulrich Property 
Easement abuts the northern boundary line of the Bach Property in the form of a plat which 
clearly shows the Ulrich Property Easement traversing the northwest corner of the Bach 
Property and abutting the southwest comer of the Ulrich Property. (See Affidavit of John N. 
Bach Defendant and Counterclaimant Pro Se, Re Objections and Opposition to Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Summary Judgment, Ex. 2). 
Finally, Defendant argues that Coward v. Hadley, 150 Idaho 282, 246 P.3d 391 
(2010), controls the outcome of this case. The facts of Coward are nothing like the facts of 
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this case. In Coward, the Hadleys disputed the existence of an easement over their property 
benefitting the lot directly to the south of their property, owned by Cowards. The history of 
the easement discussed in Coward was as follows: 
Freeman Daughters, an individual, acquired lots 1, 2, and 11 together in 1907. 
In 1922, Daughters conveyed lots 1 and 2 to Ole Sleteger. That deed ("the 
1922 deed") provided that Daughters and "his heirs and assigns shall have a 
permanent right of way over and across twelve feet on the east side [ oflots 1 
and 2] for the purpose of an alley." Daughters later conveyed away lot 11 with 
a deed noting that a permanent right-of-way existed over the alley on lots 1 and 
2 benefiting lot 11. 
Both lots 1 and 2 apparently came to be owned simultaneously by Martin and 
Nellie Mushrow a few years later, and they conveyed the lots separately to 
different third parties. The deed first conveying away lot 1 to Hadley's 
predecessor did not reserve any easement rights benefiting lot 2, which is now 
the Cowards' lot. None of the deeds in either chain of title refer to such a right-
of-way either. The easement did continue to benefit lot 11 until1950, when the 
owner of lot 11 at that time quitclaimed the easement back to the owners of 
lots 1 and 2. The next day, Hadley and her now-deceased husband, Irvin, 
purchased lot 1. After that time, the alley was a grassy area occasionally used 
by occupants of lot 2 to reach an old garage at the back of the lot. 
Cowardv. Hadley, 150 Idaho 282, _, 246 P.3d 391,394 (2010). In Coward, the express 
easement was quit claimed back to the property owners over which the easement traversed. 
Further, the issue in that case pertained to whether lot 2 had an easement over lot 1. The 
court found that the no easement had ever been created for the benefit of lot 2 - rather the 
easement which traversed lot 1 and passed over lot 2 had purely existed for the benefit oflot 
11. Consequently, the court found lot 2 had no express easement. The facts of this case are 
nothing like those of Coward. The Ulrich Property Easement was created when the Ulrich 
Property Easement was reserved in the Bach Deed and granted in the deed to the Ulrich 
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Property issued to Plaintiffs' predecessors in interest. (Ulrich Aff., Ex. E and F). The Ulrich 
Property Easement was additionally included in the Ulrich Deed. (Ulrich Aff., Ex. A). The 
easement was never quit claimed back to the owners of the Bach Property. Further, the 
Ulrich Property is the dominant estate in this matter, unlike lot 2 in Coward, which was not 
the dominant estate, but a mere piece of property over which the easement in question 
passed. Therefore, Coward has no effect on the outcome of this case. 1 
E. KOLOUCH V. KRAMER CONTROLS THE OUTCOME OF THIS CASE 
AND DEFENDANT HAS RAISED NO CONTRARY AUTHORITY 
In his Second Supp. Memo., Defendant has failed to set forth any legitimate 
arguments against the application of Kolouch v. Kramer, 120 Idaho 65, 813 P.2d 876 
( 1991 ), to this matter. Defendant argues at length that various cases "overturn" Kolouch, 
making it inapplicable. However, the cases cited by Defendant, Coward v. Hadley, 150 
1 Defendant also argues that "[t]wo main principles apply, supported by Coward, 
to wit: ... 'In construing an easement in a particular case, the instrument granting the 
easement is to be interpreted in connection with the intention ofthe parties, and the 
circumstances in existence at the time the easement was granted.' Kolouch v. Kramer, 
120 Idaho 65, 69, 813 P.2d 876, 880 (1991)" and "[a]n express easement does not grant 
rights in the easement to the parcels other than the dominant estate." (Second Supp. 
Memo., p. 10). Plaintiffs will not delve into the intention issue yet again, as this was 
addressed at length in Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum. Plaintiffs refer the Court back to 
pages 15 through 16 of Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum regarding this issue. Further, 
Plaintiffs do not understand the purpose of Defendant's statement that "an express 
easement does not grant rights in the easement to the parcels other than the dominant 
estate." The Ulrich Property is the dominant estate in question, so Plaintiffs are confused 
as to how that particular statement aids Defendant's argument. Regardless, nothing in 
either of the two principles above affect Plaintiffs' right and title to their express 
easement. 
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Idaho 282, 246 P.3d 391 (2010) and Trappett v. Davis, 102 Idaho 527, 633 P.2d 592 
( 1981 ), do not "overturn" or even contradict Kolouch, and Defendant provides no 
explanation as to how these cases support his argument. 
Further, it appears Defendant is attempting to introduce new evidence into this 
matter via his Second Supp. Memo. regarding an alleged "water well and subterranean 
seasonaly [sic] pond accumulations." At this point in the proceedings, it is entirely 
inappropriate and improper for Defendant to put new evidence before the Court. Further, 
such "evidence" has not been submitted to the Court via affidavit, as required by Rule 56 
of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Regardless, however, whether there is a "water 
well and subterranean seasonaly [sic] pond accumulations," such allegation is irrelevant 
to Ulrich's entitlement to the easement, as the Ulrich Property Easement is expressly 
established by deed. 
Defendant also reasserts in his Second Supp. Memo. that he placed various 
objects, including farm implements, no trespassing signs, shrubs and bushes, and other 
barriers along the "internal westerly 100 foot corridor" of the Bach Property, and that 
because he erected these items, summary judgment based upon the law of Kolouch v. 
Kramer is precluded. To the extent that Defendant asserts new facts regarding any 
barriers he erected or where he placed the barriers, Plaintiffs object to the introduction of 
such information due to Defendant's failure to introduce the information in a timely 
manner via affidavit, pursuant to Rule 56 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Any 
13- MEMORANDUM IN REPLY TO DEFENDANT AND COUNTERCLAIMANT JOHN N. BACH'S 
OPPOSING AND COUNTER MEMORANDUM BRIEF 
0106 
- ....... n. 
facts which go beyond what was stated in Defendant's affidavit should be disregarded. 
Regardless, however, Defendant's arguments regarding his erection of barriers and signs 
actually support the application of Kolouch due to the factual similarity of Defendant's 
actions to those of Kramer in Kolouch: 
At the time Kramer acquired the subject property, there was a utility pole, a 
board fence, and some trees in the easement area. Subsequently, Kramer 
planted six spruce trees down the center of the easement, planted other trees 
within the easement, constructed a fence inside the northerly boundary of 
the easement, and a concrete irrigation diversion at the east end of the 
easement. Kramer also placed several large boulders at the east end of the 
easement. Kramer maintains that, although there were physical impediments 
within the easement area at the time he acquired the property, the easement 
was still open for ingress and egress, and it was only after he planted the 
trees, etc., that the easement was no longer open to use. On the limited 
occasions that respondents have sought access to their portion ofLot 10, 
they have used a private roadway over the Stephenson easement, 
immediately to the north of the subject property. 
Kolouch, 120 Idaho at 67, 813 P.2d at 878. These facts are essentially identical to those 
in the matter at hand. Even assuming that Defendant placed the above obstacles in such a 
manner as to restrict access to the Ulrich Property Easement, Plaintiffs have been able to 
access the Ulrich Property without the need for use of the easement, including accessing 
the Ulrich Property via alternative routes over the Bach Property. The fact that Defendant 
erected "No Trespassing" signs in addition to planting trees, shrubs, farm implements and 
other barriers makes no difference. Plaintiffs were still able to access the Ulrich Property 
without use of the Ulrich Property Easement. It was only when Plaintiffs began the 
process for developing the Property that the need for the easement arose. Consequently, 
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pursuant to the law of Kolouch, Defendant has not adversely possessed the Ulrich 
Property Easement, and Plaintiffs still have right and title to the Ulrich Property Easement 
via the express grant and reservation of the Ulrich Property Easement in the Ulrich Deed 
and Bach Deed. 
F. THE CASE LAW RELIED UPON BY DEFENDANT REGARDING 
BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE IS INAPPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT 
HAND 
Defendant cites to Trappett v. Davis, arguing that it is controlling of the issues in 
this matter and that Plaintiffs somehow "acquiesced" in Defendant allegedly nullifying 
their rights to the Ulrich Property Easement. Any law related to boundary by 
acquiescence is completely inapplicable to the determination of the rights of a party to an 
express easement. Boundary by agreement or acquiescence has two elements: (1) there 
must be an uncertain or disputed boundary and (2) a subsequent agreement fixing the 
boundary. Cox v. Clanton, 137 Idaho 492, 494-95, 50 P.3d 987, 989-90 (2002). Neither 
of these elements is present in this case. Consequently, any arguments regarding 
boundary by acquiescence should be disregarded. 
G. THE AWARD OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR PLAINTIFFS WOULD 
NOT VIOLATE ANY OF DEFENDANT'S FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
RIGHTS 
Defendant asserts that if the Court awards Plaintiffs the relief requested in the 
Complaint that he will be deprived of his Fourteenth Amendment rights. First, if a matter 
can be decided at the summary judgment phase, there is no need for a jury trial. The 
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there is no question of fact. Consequently, if a matter is decided via summary judgment, 
there are, by definition, no issues for the jury to decide. However, even assuming this 
matter was not decided on summary judgment, under Idaho law, there is no right to a jury 
in a quiet title action. Loomis v. Union Pac. R. Co., 97 Idaho 341, 544 P.2d 299 (1975). 
Additionally, even if Defendant were entitled to a jury trial, pursuant to Rule 38 of the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendant has already waived any such right. Rule 3 8(b) 
provides: "Any party may demand a trial by jury of any issue triable of right by a jury by 
serving upon the other parties a demand therefor in writing at any time after the 
commencement of the action and not later than fourteen (14) days after the service of the 
last pleading directed to such issue." I.R.Civ.P. 38(b). "The failure of a party to serve a 
demand as required by this rule and to file it as required by Rule 5( d) constitutes a waiver 
by the party of trial by jury." LR.Civ.P. 38(d). Defendant made no demand for trial by 
jury in his Answer, or within fourteen days of filing such Answer. Consequently, 
Defendant is not entitled to a jury trial in this matter, and the denial of a jury trial is not a 
violation of his Fourteenth Amendment constitutional rights. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs respectfully request that their Motion for 
Summary Judgment be granted. 
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DATED thi~ day of April, 2011. 
Charles A. Homer, Esq. 
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C. 
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East, 505.18 feet to apoint; thence South 89 
58'47" East, 1319.28 feet to a point; thence South 
00 07'36" West, 1321.69 feet to a point on the 
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hut further reaue~ts nnd motion~ upon thie rourt'' rulinn anrl 
within thP full time neriod' of TRCP, Rule 16 et seo. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TETON 
) 
THOMAS H. ULRICH and MARY M. ) 






JOHN N. BACH and all parties claiming to ) 
hold title to the hereinafter described ) 
property, and all unknown claimants, heirs ) 
and devisees of the following property: ) 
) 
A portion of the South Yz South Yz Section 6,) 
Township 5 North, Range 46 East, Boise ) 
Meridian, Teton County, Idaho, being ) 
further described as: From the SW comer ) 
of said Section 6, South 89°50' 12" East, ) 
2630.05 feet to the true point of beginning; ) 
thence North 00° 07'58" East, 813.70 feet ) 
to a point; then North 01 °37'48" East, ) 
505.18 feet to a point; then South 89° ) 
58' 4 7" East, 1319.28 feet to a point; thence ) 
South 00°7'36" West, 1321.69 feet to a ) 
point on the Southern Section Line; then ) 
North 89°51'01" West, 1320.49 feet along ) 
the Southern Section Line to the South Y4 ) 
Corner of said Section 6, a point; thence ) 
North 89°50'13" West, 12.13 feet along the ) 










This matter came before the Court on the 6th day of May 2011, for the purpose of a 
Pretrial Conference, being held telephonically, the Honorable Darren B. Simpson, presiding 
sitting in open Court in Bingham County. 
Ms. Sandra Beebe, Court Reporter and Ms. Jaeme Freeman, Deputy Clerk each were 
personally present. Mr. Charles Homer, Esq., appeared telephonically on behalf of the plaintiffs 
and Mr. John N. Bach, appeared telephonically on his own behalf. 
The Court confirmed that the matter was still on track for the scheduled trial date and the 
parties confirmed that three (3) days would be needed for the trial as previously-scheduled. 
The Court inquired as to whether or not the parties had explored mediation. The parties 
confirmed they had not and agreed to meet and discuss if there could be any resolution to this 
matter. 
The parties confirmed that there would be no need for a court interpreter during the 
course of the trial. 
Mr. Homer requested that an adjustment be made to his previously-filed Expert Witness 
List allowing Mr. Chris Moss, of First American Title Insurance Company to testify in place of 
Mr. Grant Moedl, should Mr. Moedl be unavailable at the time of trial. There was no objection 
and the Court allowed the addition to the plaintiffs' expert witness list. 
Mr. Homer also inquired about the fact that Mr. Bach had not disclosed his witness or 
exhibit list according to the deadlines listed in the Court's Scheduling Order. Mr. Bach 
remarked that the Court's pending decision on plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment may 
influence the direction this matter may take, but said he would have his Witness and Exhibit List 
filed within ten (1 0) days. 
Mr. Homer requested a copy of the Court's form for Exhibit Lists and the Court directed 
the clerk to send copies of said form to both parties. 
The parties confirmed there were no other issues to address at this time. 
Court was thus adjourned. 
·1~ 
DATED this \\) day of May 
Minute Entry 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing MINUTE 
HEARING- PRETRIAL CONFERENCE was ~ersonally-delivered, faxed or mailed by first-
class U.S. Mail with pre-paid postage on this /~day of May 2011, to the following: 
I 
CHARLES A. HOMER, ESQ. ~ 
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO P.L.L.C. !;) u.s. Mail 
PO BOX 50130 
1000 RIVERW ALK DR., SUITE 200 
IDAHO FALLS, ID 83405 
JOHNN.BACH 
PO BOX 101 
DRIGGS, ID 83422 
0 Courthouse Box 
0 Courthouse Box 





Charles A. Homer, Esq. (ISB No. 1630) 
Dale W. Storer, Esq. (ISB No. 2166) 
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P .L.L.C. 
P.O. Box 50130 
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Telephone: (208) 523-0620 
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TETON 
THOMAS H. ULRlCH and MARY M. ULRlCH, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
JOHN N. BACH and all parties claiming to hold 
title to the hereinafter described property pursuant 
to that certain warranty deed recorded in the 
records of Teton County, Idaho on June 14, 1994, 
as Instrument No. 116461 and all unknown 
claimants, heirs and devisees of the following 
property: 
A portion of the South 12 South Y2 Section 6, 
Township 5 North, Range 46 East, Boise 
Meridian, Teton County, Idaho, being further 
described as: From the SW corner of said Section 
6, South 89 50'12" East, 2630.05 feet to the true 
point ofbeginning; thence North 00 07'58" East, 
813.70 feet to a point; thence North 01 37'48" 
East, 505.18 feet to a point; thence South 89 
58'47" East, 1319.28 feet to a point; thence South 
Case No. CV-2010-329 
AFFIDAVIT OF CHARLES A. 
HOMER IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION IN LIMINE AND 
FOR SANCTIONS 
1 - AFFIDAVIT OF CHARLES A. HOMER IN SUPPORT OF MOTION IN LIMINE AND FOR 
SANCTIONS 
00 07'36" West, 1321.69 feet to a point on the 
Southern Section Line; thence North 89 51 '0 1" 
West, 1320.49 feet along the Southern Section 
Line to the South 14 Corner of said Section 6, a 
point; thence North 89 50'13" West, 12.13 feet 
along the Southern Section Line to the point of 
beginning. SUBJECT TO a 60 foot road and 
utility easement along the Western Property lines. 
AND SUBJECT TO a 60 foot road and utility 
easement along the Southern Property Lines. 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County ofBonneville ) 
I, Charles A. Homer, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that the testimony given in this sworn 
statement is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, that it is made on my personal 
knowledge, and that I would so testify in open court if called upon to do so. 
And being so sworn I depose and say: 
1. I am an attorney licensed in the state ofldaho and I am counsel for the Plaintiffs Thomas H. 
Ulrich and Mary M. Ulrich, husband and wife ("Ulrichs"), in the above captioned matter. 
2. I have personal knowledge of the pleadings and documents filed by the parties and of 
correspondence exchanged by counsel. 
3. On March 10, 2011, I served a copy ofUlrichs' first discovery requests on John N. Bach 
("Bach"), a copy of which is attached to this affidavit as Exhibit A. 
2 - AFFIDAVIT OF CHARLES A. HOMER IN SUPPORT OF MOTION IN LIMINE AND FOR 
SANCTIONS 
8118 
4. On Aprill2, 2011, Bach served his responses to Ulrichs' discovery requests. I have attached 
to this affidavit as Exhibit B a true and correct copy of Bach's responses. 
5. Bach has not supplemented his discovery responses. 
\ \}"'(\ DATED this ___... _ <::J_ day ofMay, 2011. 
SUBSCRlBED AND SWORN to before me this t&Jf.-.- day of May, 2011. 
Notary Public for tate f Idaho 
Residing at: Blackfoot, Idaho 
My Commission Expires: 11128/2013 
3 - AFFIDAVIT OF CHARLES A. HOMER IN SUPPORT OF MOTION IN LIMINE AND FOR 
SANCTIONS 
f111.8 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State ofidaho, resident of and 
with my office in Idaho Falls, Idaho; that I served a copy of the following described pleading 
or document on the attorneys and/or individuals listed below by hand delivery, by mailing 
with the correct postage thereon, or by facsimile a true and correct copy thereof on this J }f\ 
day ofMay, 2011. 
Document Served: AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION IN LIMINE AND 
FOR SANCTIONS 
Attorneys and/or Individuals Served: 
John Bach 
PO Box 101 
Driggs ID 83422 
COURTESY COPY TO. 
The Honorable Darren B. Simpson 
IN CHAMBERS 
Bingham County Courthouse 
501 North Maple, #31 0 
Blackfoot ID 83221-1700 
G:\WPDATA\CAH\15313 Ulrich, Thomas\Pldgs\Limine.AFF.wpd:sm 
Cf) Mail ( ) Hand Delivery ( )Facsimile 
~)Mail ( ) Hand Delivery ( ) Facsimile 
Charles A. Homer, sq. 
Holden, Kidwell, Han & Crapo, P.L.L. 





Charles A. Homer, Esq. (ISB No. 1630) 
. Dale W. Storer, Esq. (ISB No. 2166) 
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. 
P.O. Box 50130 
1000 Rlverwalk. Drive, Suite 200 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Telephone: (208) 523-0620 
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TETON 
THOMAS H. ULRICH and MARY M. ULRICH, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
JOHN N. BACH and all parties claiming to hold 
title to the hereinafter described property pursuant 
to that certain warranty deed recorded in the 
records of Teton County, Idaho on June 14, 1994, 
as Instrument No. 116461 and all unknown 
claimants, heirs and devisees of the following 
property: 
A portion ofthe South Y2 Soutl} Yz Section 6, 
Township 5 North, Range 46 East, Boise · 
Meridian, Teton County, Idaho, being further 
described as: From the SW comer of said Section 
6, South 89 50'12" East, 2630.05 feet to the true 
point of beginning; thence North 00 07'5811 East, 
813.70 feet to a point; thence North 01 37'4811 
East, 505.18 feet to a point; thence South 89 
58'47" East, 1319.28 feet to a point; thence South 
00 07'36" West, 1321.69 feet to a point on the 
Case No. CV-2010-329 
PLAINTIFFS' FIRST SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES, 
REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION 
AND REQUEST FOR 
PRODUCTION OF 
DOCUMENTS 
PLAINTIFFS' FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES, REQUESTS FOR 




Southern Section Line; thence North 89 51'01" 
West, 1320.49 feet along the Southern Section 
Line to the South Y4 Comer of said Section 6, a 
point; thence North 89 50'13" West, 12.13 feet 
along the Southern Section Line to the point of 
beginning. SUBJECT TO a 60 foot road and 
utility easement along the Western Property lines. 
AND SUBJECT TO a 60 foot road and utility 
easement along the Southern Property Lines. 
Defendants. 
i ) 
TO: JOHN N. BACH, Defendant, appearing prose in the above-entitled matter: 
YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE That the Plaintiffs requires the Defendant to 
answer the following discovery requests within thirty (30) days from the date of service 
herein, pursuant to Rules 33(a) and 34 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
DEFINmONS AND INSTRUCTIONS 
In answering these discovery requests, furnish all information available to you, 
including information in the possession of your attorneys or investigators for your attorneys, 
and not merely information known of your own personal knowledge. 
If you cannot answer the discovery requests in full, after exercising due diligence to 
secure the information to do so, so state, and answer to the extent possible, specifying your 
inability to answer the remainder, and stating whatever information or knowledge you have 
concerning the unanswered portion. 
If you are unable to produce the requested documents, after exercising due diligence 
to secure the documents, so state and identify the reason for your inability to produce the 
PLAINTIFFS' FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES, REQUESTS FOR 
ADMISSION AND REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 




documents, the whereabouts of the documents if not in your control or possession, and the 
means whereby you lost control or possession of the documents. Identify any documents 
which once did exist if not now existing and state whatever information or knowledge you 
have concerning the information contained in those documents. If you object to answering 
any portion of any of the following discovery requests based on a claim of privilege or work 
product, please so state by providing a complete description ofthe basis for the privilege 
upon which you base your objection. 
Prior to answering these discovery requests, note the following definitions: 
1. "You" refers to Defendant, John N. Bach, as well as each of his employees, 
agents, representatives (including insurance carriers), investigators and attorneys. 
2. As used herein "Plaintiff' refers to Thomas H. Ulrich and Mary M. Ulrich. 
3. "And" includes "or" and "and/or." 
4. "Facts" means all circumstances, events, and evidence pertaining to or touching 
upon the allegations set forth in the pleadings in this matter. 
5. The term ''document" or "documents" shall mean any kind of written, typed, 
printed, graphic, photographic, videotaped or computer-generated matter of any kind or 
nature, however produced or reproduced, including data or information that exists in 
electronic or data storage devices in any medium, any electronic files in their original format, 
as well as all mechanical or electronic sound recordings, and written transcripts thereof, 
however produced or reproduced, including all marginal notations, drafts, duplicates, and 
PLAINTIFFS' FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES, REQUESTS FOR 






carbon copies thereof, whether in your control. or .not, in the possession of you or your 
counsel. If a document exists in both a paper or uhard copy," as well as electronically, then 
a request to produce such documents shall be deemed to be a request to produce both the hard 
copy and the electronic copy of the document. 
6. The term "electronic documents" shall mean any and all digital or electronic 
files, however stored, including, but not limited to, local or remote computer hard disk drive, 
floppy disc, CD-ROM. tape drive, zip disk, flash or thumb drive, or any other electronic 
storage format or medium. Additionally, requests for production of electronic documents 
means production of such documents or computer files in their native format. 
7. The term "identify'' when used with respect to documents, or the description 
or identification of a document, shall be deemed to request the nature and subject matter of 
the documents; the date thereof; the title or name thereof; the name, address, and job title or 
job capacity of the person who prepared the document or who has knowledge of it; and the 
name, address, job title or job capacity of the recipient(s) thereof. 
8. The term "identify" when used with respect to a person shall be deemed to 
request the persons' full name, job title, last known business and residence addresses, and 
telephone numbers. 
9. 11Communicate" or "communication" refers to every manner or means of 
disclosure or transfer or exchange of information, whether orally or by document and 
whether face-to-face, by telephone, mail, e-mail, personal delivery, or otherwise. 
PLAINTIFFS' FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES, REQUESTS FOR 







10. The term '!identify" when used with-respect to oral communications shall be 
deemed to request whether said communication was in person or by telephone, an 
identification of each person who participated in or heard any part of said communication, 
and the substance of what was said by each person who participated in said communication, 
and when such communication took place. 
11. "Evidencing" or "relating to" means consisting of summarizing, describing, 
referring to or mentioning. 
12. Whenever the plural appears, the word shall include the singular, and vice 
versa. 
13. All pronouns denoting gender which are in the masculine form shall be 
interpreted in light of the gender of the individual which the pronoun describes and vice 
versa. 
14. Where knowledge or information in possession of a party is requested, such 
request includes information and knowledge either in your possession, under your control, 
within your dominion, or available to you regardless of whether this information is in your 
personal possession or is possessed by your agents, attorneys, servants, employees, 
independent contractors, representatives, insurers, or others with whom you have a 
relationship and from whom you are capable of deriving information, documents, or 
materials. 
15. Each discovery request shall be accorded a separate answer, and each subpart 
PLAINTIFFS' FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES, REQUESTS FOR 





of a discovery request shall be accorded a separate answer~· 
16. PURSUANT TO RULE 26(e) OF THE IDAHO RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE, TIIESE DISCOVERY REQUESTS ARE CONTINUING INNA TURE, SO 




INTERROGATORY NO. 1.: Please identify each individual who answered or 
provided information necessary to respond to the following interrogatories, requests for 
production and requests for admission served concurrently herewith. 
INTERROGATORY NO.2.: Please identify each and everypersonlmown to you 
who has any knowledge or who purports to have lmowledge of any of the facts of this case. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 3.: With respect to each person identified in response to 
Interrogatory No.2, please set forth in detail the person's relationship to the facts ofthis 
case, and describe in detail the facts you believe are or may be known to such person. 
INTERROGATORYNO. 4.: ForeachfactsetforthinresponsetolnterrogatoryNo. 
3, above, identify any and all documents that describe, support, or otherwise reflect the facts 
known to each person. 
INTERROGATORY NO.5.: Please identify each person you expect to call as a lay 
witness in the trial of this matter, and provide an explanation of each such witness's intended 
PLAJNTIFFS' FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES, REQUESTS FOR 






INTERROGATORY NO. 6.: Please identifY each person you expect to call as an 
expert witness in the trial ofthis matter. For each such expert, state the following: 
(a) A complete statement of all opinions to be expressed by the expert and the 
basis and reasons therefore; 
(b) The data or information considered by the expert in forming the opinions; 
(c) The expert witnesses' qualifications, including a list of all publications authored 
by the expert within the preceding ten years; 
(d) The compensation to be paid for the expert witness' testimony; and 
(e) A listing of any other cases in which the expert has testified as an expert at trial 
or by deposition within the preceding four years. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 7.: Please identify and describe in detail the factual 
basis for each cause of action alleged against Plaintiffs in Defendant's Counterclaim, and 
identifY each document Defendant contends constitutes evidence of or provides support for 
each cause of action Defendant alleges in this action. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 8.: Please identify any and all documents or other 
tangible evidence which supports or tends to support the denials, the assertions and/or 
affirmative defenses set forth in Defendant's Answer in this matter. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 9.: Please identifY any and all documents or other 
tangible evidence which supports or tends to support the allegations set forth in Defendant's 
PLAINTIFFS' FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES, REQUESTS FOR 





Counterclaim in this matter.· 
INTERROGATORY NO. 10.: Please identify in full and complete detail any 
statements, affidavits, photographs, drawings, illustrations, written documents, electronic 
messages, diaries, calendars, notes, journals, tape recordings and/or video tapes of which you 
are aware that pertain to any issues in this litigation. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 11.: Identify and describe each exhibit which you intend 
to introduce at the trial of this matter. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 12.: Identity and describe in detail the factual basis for 
each affirmative defense Defendant asserts in his Answer, and identify each document 
Defendant contends constitutes evidence of or provides support for each affirmative defense 
Defendant asserts in this action. 
INTERROGATORY NO. B.: Identify any information that Defendant, or anyone 
acting on Defendant's behalf, has that Plaintiffs or anyone acting on Plaintiffs' behalf made 
any admission or declaration against interest in any way that would tend to support 
Defendant's version of the facts of this case. If you contend such information or statements 
exist, please state: the time and place where such admission or declaration was made, the 
substance of the admission or declaration and the names, addresses, and phone numbers of 
all persons present when such admission or declaration was made. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 14.: If you denied any of the Requests for Admission 
PLAINTIFFS' FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES, REQUESTS FOR 
ADMISSION AND REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS PAGES 
EXHIBIT A 
) 
.served herewith, identify each and every fact upon which you base your denial and identify 
any witness with knowledge of such facts. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 15.: If you have withheld any document from production 
on the basis of a claim of privilege, please state the following: 
(1) identify the document, including the author, date, number of pages, recipient 
and topic; and 
(2) identify the privilege claimed. 
II. 
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 1.: Please produce each and every 
document which supports or tends to support allegations set forth in the denials, assertions 
and/or affirmative defenses set forth in Defendant's Answer in this matter. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 2.: Please produce each and every 
document which supports or tends to support allegations set forth in Defendant's 
Counterclaim in this matter. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 3: Please provide copies of all exhibits, 
documents and witness statements which you intend or expect to utilize at trial of this cause. 
REQUESTFORPRODUCTIONN0.4: Pleaseproduceanyandallexpertreports 
prepared by any expert retained by you in this matter. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 5: Please produce any and all documents 
PLAINTIFFS' FIRST SET OF INTERROGATOR1ES, REQUESTS FOR 
ADMISSION AND REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS PAGE9 
EXHIBIT A 
identified in response to the above Interrogatories or used to derive the information for your 
answers to Plaintiffs' First Discovery Requests. 
REQUEST .FOR PRODUCTION NO. 6: If you denied any of the following 
Requests for Admissions, please produce any and all documents on which you base your 
denial. 
m. 
REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 1.: Admit that Exhibit A attached hereto is a 
true and correct copy of the deed granting title to the therein described property from Teton 
West Corporation to Jack Lee McLean, Trustee ofthe Jack Lee McLean Family Trust, as to 
an undivided one-fourth interest; Milan Cheyovich and Diana Cheyovich, Trustees of the 
Cheyovich Family Trust, as to an undivided one-fourth interest; Wayne Dawson, Trustee of 
the Dawson Family Trust, as to an undivided one-fourth interest; and Targhee Powder 
Emporium, LTD, as to an undivided one-fourth interest. 
REQUESTFORADMJSSIONNO. 2: Admitthattheoriginal of the Deed attached 
hereto as Exhibit A was recorded in the records of Teton County, Idaho, prior to the time 
Defendant, John Bach, acquired an interest in the property described in such Deed. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 3: Admit that Exhibit B attached hereto is a 
true and correct copy of the deed granting title to the therein described property from 
Philip J. Sarasqueta and Marilyn R. Sarasqueta, husband and wife, and Louisa F. Sarasqueta, 
PLAINTIFFS' FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES, REQUESTS FOR 
ADMISSION Al\r:D REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS PAGE 10 
EXHIBIT A 
Trustee .of the·. Sarasqueta Living Trust dated October 30, 1990:; .to Thomas H: Ulrich and 
Mary M. Ulrich, husband and wife. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 4: Admit that Exhibit C attached hereto is a 
true and correct copy of the deed granting title to the therein described property from Teton 
West Corporation to Philip J. Sarasqueta and Marilyn R. Sarasqueta, husband and wife, and 
Louisa F. Sarasqueta, Trustee of the Sarasqueta Living Trust dated Oct ber 30, 1990 . 
.>( ........... 
Dated this l!_ day of March. 2011. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State ofidaho, resident of and 
with my office in Idaho Falls, Idaho; that I served a copy of the following described pleading . 
or document on the attorneys and/or individuals listed below by hand delivery, by mailink 
with the correct postage thereon, or by facsimile a true and correct copy thereof on this 1Jl 
day of March, 20 11. 
Document Served: PLAINTIFFS' FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES, 
REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION AND REQUEST FOR 
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 
Attorneys and/or Individuals Served: 
John Bach 
·POBox 101 
Driggs ID 83422 
NJ Mail ( ) Hand D ivery ( )Facsimile 
Charles A. Homer '----
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, .L.L.C. 
G:\Wl'DATAICAH\15313· Ulrlch, Thomas\Diseovery\Discovery, Requesu,VOl.wpd:Mlll 
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1 ARRANTY DEED 
For Value Re£Clvtld PHILIP J. Sl\RASOUE'l'A & MARILYN R. SARASQlJE'l'A, husband and 
wife, and LOUISA S. SARASQUBTA, Trustee of the SARASOUE'l'A LiVING TRUST, 
dated Octobe:r; 30, 1990 . · · . . . . . · 
Hetein_afler ealled the Grantor, hereby gr.mts, bi!Jgain.s, 6<:11s and cmxvcys 1ltiiD 
THOMAS H. ULRICH and MARY M. ULRI CH, huSbi!llld and wife 
whose address is: 281 W. Hl'.nVEST RUN, IDAHO FALLS, ID, 83404 
Herelmfter called the Grantco, 1lu> following described premises aitullled in Teton County, ldiho, 1o-wit: 
_SEE ATTACHED BXHIEIT A 
SUBJECT ~0 THE RESTRICTION 'l'HA'l' 'mlS P.IUlC~L C\NRO'l' BE SOLD SEPARATELY OR 
SUBDXVIDED WITHOUT BEING JOINED TOGETH!R ~1HT BH FOLLOWXNG DESCRIBED 
PROPER'l'Y: A portion of the North l/2 South 1/2 Section 6, Township 5 North, 
Range 46 East, Boise Meridian, Teton County, Idaho being further desQribed 
as: From the SW corner of aai"d Section 6, North 0 degrees l7'55" East, 
1312,45 feet and south 89 degrees 58'22" East 2639.46 feet to the true 
point of beginning1 thence North 00 degrees -04'52" East, l3l8.71 feet to a 
point on the East-West 1/4 Line of said section 6; thence North 89 degrees 
53'27" East, 1320.33 feet along the East-West 1/4 Section 1~ne to a point; 
thence South 00 degraes 07'36" West, 1321.69 feet to a point; thence North 
89 degrees 58'47" West, 1319.26 feat to the point of beginning; LESS a 
portion of the Noi:th"l/2 South l/2 Sootion 6, 'l'ownahip 5 North, Range 46 
East, Boise Meridian, Teton COunty, Idaho being further described as: From 
the SW Corner of said seotion ·6, North 0 degrees 17'55" Bast, 1312.45 feet 
and south 89 degrees 58'22~ Bast 2639.46 feet; thence North 00 degrees 
04'_52''. East, 659.35 feet to the true point of beginning; thence North 00 
degrees . 04'52n East, 659.36 . £eet to a point on the Bast-West 1/4 Line of 
said Section 6; thence North 89 degrees 53'27" East, 660.16 feet along the 
East-West 1/4 Section line to a point; thence South OO. degrees 04'52 West, 
659.36 feet; thence South 89 degrees 53' 27" West, 660.16 feet to the point 
of begirining AND MUS'l' COMPLY Wl 'fH '!88 'rlt'rON COUN'rY' SIISDXVISION ORDINANCE. 
Subject to reservations in United States and State Patents; existing and 
recorded Right-of-ways, Easements, Zoning, Building and Subdivision 
ordinances; T~xes and Assessments es prorated between the parties hereto. 
TO HAVE AND TO HOlD tht Sllid prein!r;es, with thc:ii appllrtl:l!anCeS Ullto the said Omah:c ..,d to tbc Gtantca's heita 
and riSslgns !Drever. And the said Gnmtor does boreby covomant to and witb tho said OrllnUe, thai tha Gtantor Is the ovmcr ip fee 
simple of said prcmis.s; 1hill IOald premises are free frOtn all cnC11mlmulcea except amen! yea15 taxes, leviea, and assessments. 1111d 
except U. S. Patent ttservalioos. tt51rlC11<mS, e.u;emem of ttconl, and easemcnls Yisible upon the premises, and that Grantor wDl 
warrant tu~d dcfcrul lb., same from aU claims whiiiOOOVor. 
Dated: 
TRUST DATED OCTOBER 30, 1990 
STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF TETON 
On tbill (o ih day of .December. in the year 1996, befote me, a Nowy l'Pblic in and fur said S~a~~:, ~ly appeared 
PHILIP l SARASQUErA and &fAIULYN R. SARASQUETA. lalown or identified to mG to be the pem>n(s) whose name(s) are 
subscn'bed to tha within lnstnlment, 1111d acknowledged to me lbal tbgy executed the SMIO. 
125858 
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Nota:ry PubUc o 
Rmding at "fw,t-l F"'W-S. , ;1:.)> 
Commis&ion Bxpites 9 -I 5-9 j 
STATE OF lDAKO ] 
. ss 
County of Te1ori 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the above and lore-
gowg 1s a full. true and cmrect copy of the 
oro g•na 1 thetjoJ- orr, tile If\ my office 
Dated .•• ; .f) /l?rUQ • · • 
- - ·t-.1 ~ c:· u "1.). 




• •• J--<.. ,..._, .• ) 
O)UNfY OF - ( / . ') / ' 
ST/INI.f4-"1U ~ ) ' . \ ... 
On this 1' a . day Qf December, in the year 1996, before me, a Nolaly J'Q'blic in 1111d for said State, 
personally appealed LOUISA S. SARASQUBTA, linDWn or fdlllltified to me to be lb~ Thlst'c of 1he Tr\l&t 1bllt cxeCUicd the 




STATE OF IOAHO } 
County oi Teton ss 
1 HEREBY CERTIFY that the above and fore· 
gomg as a lull, true end_correct copy of the 
onganal ther!Jfrn f.!e m myofface 




·· .. J , J 
COUI'ORATIO~ WARRANT\' DU:ll 
\ R ::.:~EIVE.O 
_I 
JUN 171994 
I i::TON Co ld 
ere!~'. Ht'co~~t.?r 
HilS INDE~TURE is made this !l!!:day Clf June. j994, bctw~en TETON WEST 
. . 
COil J>ORATIOl\, n Nevada corpora!ion duly rmthorized to ilo business in the State of Idaho. ami 
hnvmg its principal office in Idaho at Driggs in the Count~· . of Teton, State of Idnho. the 
"GIC\~TOir'. and PHILIP J. SAR.ASQeETA and MARilYN R. SARASQUETA, hulllband and 
\':ifl-. and JOAQCP,;.; F. SARASQl'ETA nnd LOUISA SARASQUETA. husband and wife. whose 
rnail1ng address is 1~05 Gnlena. '{win Falls, Idaho 83301, !11e "GRANTEE". 
Wll!'\ESSE'n I. thnt GRA~TOR. having been duly authorized br resolution of its Board of . 
Dirct.: .. ,rs. for :md m consideration cfthe sum ofTen Dollars {$1 0.00) lawful money of the United 
State~ of America. and other good and vnluablc consideration. to it in hand paid by GRANTEE, 
rccdpt whereofis hereb~; acknowledg~d. has granted .. bar~ned and sold. and b)' these presents does 
grant barg~in. sell. convey and .confinn unto GRANTEE and to GRANTEE's heirs and nssigns 
foreYcr. all the following described propcrty in the County ofTeton. State ofldaho. to--wit: 
{The legal description of the real propcr1y is set ft:irth in Ex.hibit "A • 
attached hereto and by this reference incorportlted herein) 
SPF.ClFiCAll Y INCLL.DlNG the fotl<m'ing described portions ofthc follo\\ing described 
wat~r rights appurtenant thereto: 
W!lter 
B~t ~Q. 




Proportion of Right Allocated 
~
.39cfs 
..... 1 ·rw ( ·1 t11 all exi5tin~· easements or claims of easc~t>nt~ . ratcnt rcservn~ioos. rights nf 
" . I \ . ph>t~dhc w\ c:nar.ts. 7.t•ning ordinam:&.-s. and applicable budding codc~.laws and regulation!-. 
' .. 
~- ' ( ). 
'· ··< :: C' ·; · · ·iA:. 
~--.~\,_.· ....... \::;:~:: .. . , .. , - .... -· .... ,; . 
~ ~.: . . . . . ., .... _ . . . .~;;· t:-: . . 
tncroochmctits, uverl3fJS, boundary iinc disputes mid otlrer mau~rs which wout(fbc di!it- lnsed~h)· an . 
. ; . . . r~: .~~- . 
nccuratc sutvcy or irupcetion of the premises. . ._ . ~ - --~,--- . 
• • : • • , ;. 1 i~~~~t .. '· .. 
TOGETHER with the tenements. hereditaments and appurtenancts thereunto belonging ot _ .. _ ................ 
in anywise appertaining. alsO any ·reversions. remaindets, rents, issues and profits therefrom. dhd all 
estate, right. title· and interest .in and to said proJ)crty, as well in taw llS in equity ,:of the O~R. 
· TO HAVE. AND TO i~OLD, the Bbove described premises and nppnrt~nances unto· the " · . ·. 
GRANTEE and to GRANTEE's heirs and assigns forever. The GRANTOR shall warrant and defend 
said prem!se_s in the quiet and peaceable possession of the GRANTEE ngeinst GRANTOR and 
GRA?--:TOR's successol"!, and against every pcrwn whomsoever who lawfully liolds (or who later 
lawfully claims to have held) rights in the premises as of the date her~of. 
In construing this deed and where the conte&t so requires, tbe singular includes the plural. 
lN WITNESS WHEREOF, the GRANTOR has caused its corporate name to be affixed by 
its duly authorit.ed officer. 
TETON WEST CORPORATION 
By:~L3/UL 
lts:Pm~ . · . 
.. 
. .... 




~ -cn:U'OR.-\TION WARRA~TY DEI:D 
. . . -·-- ~- ·--
. 013 ff ....,.. __ -.. EXHIBIT A 
¥ • 
() 
IN \\1T:-iESS W'JIEREOF, I have hereunto ;: ·t my hand and affixed my official seal, the day 
ana year in this certificate first above writtea. 
I •' 
\. 
• I :.J~ 
... . .. . .. 
(seal) .. .. --
G:\WPOA. T A\.KWF\0852-.SAR.ASQQ I.CWD:SJW 
_Ql4U EXHIBIT A 
EX~IBIT "A" 
A portion of the· North 1/2 South l/2 Section 6, Township 5 North, 
Range 46 East, Boi.se Meridian, Teton county, Idaho being further · 
described as: From the SW Corner of said Section 6, North 0 
degrees 17'55" East, 1312.45 feet and· South 89 degrees 58'22" 
~ast 2639.46 feet to the true point of beginning: thence·North 00 
degrees 04'52" East, 1318.71 feet to a point on the Eas~-West 1/4 
Line of said Section 6; thence North 89 degrees 53'27''. East, 
1320.33 feet along the E~st-West 1/4 Section ~ine to·a point; 
thence South 00 degrees 07 '36" West, 1321. 69 f~et to a point; 
thence North 89 degrees 58' 47" West, 1319.28 feet to the point of 
beginning. 
Together with a 60 foot road and utility easement being the 60 
feet directly East of the following described lines: Beginning 
at a point North 89 degrees 50'12" West, 12.13 feet from the 
South 1/4 corner of sa£d Section 6; thence North 00 degrees 
07'58" East, 813.70 feet to a point; thence North 01 degrees 
37'48" East, 505.18 feet to the SW property corner, and subject 
to a 60 foot road and utility easement being the 50 feet direct~y 
east o£ the following described line: · Eeg:!:-mrlng· at. the Southwest 
Property Corner and running North 00 degrees 04 '52" East, 60 feet 
to a point. 
SUBJECT TO Grant of Easements recorded in Teton County, Idaho, 




JOijN N. BACH, P,O. Box lOl 
Driggs, I'D 83422/Tel~ (208} 354~8303 
Defendant/Countercla±mant Pro Se 
SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, rDAHO, COUNTY OF TETON 
THDr·1AS H. ULRICH AND MARYMt. ULRICH~'. CAsE No~' CV 2010.-329 




CI..AIUA.NT JOHN N. BACHtS 
ASSERTIONS OF PRIVILEGES, 
OBJECTIONS TO, ALTERNATE 
JOHN N, BACH and all parties cla:tining REFERENCED .RESPONSES~ and 
to hold title to the hereinafter descn: . ANSY.!ERS, ALTERNATIVELY TO: 
ci:ibed proper pursuant to that certain . 
warranty deed record in the records of · Plaintiffs,. First Set of 
Teton County f Idaho on June 14, 1994 Interrrogatories, Requests 
as Instrument No. 116461 and all unk.,-. ·;.<'For Admission and Re!g;uest 
nown claimants, heirs and devisees of For Pit'Oduction of rxx::unents. 
the following property: 
A portion of the South% South liz Section 6, 
Township 5 North, Range 46 East, Boise 
Meridian, Teton County, Idaho, being further 
described as: From the SW corner of said Section 
6, South 89 50'12" East, 2630.05 feet to the true 
/ 
point of beginning; thence North 00 07'58" East, ,.. 
813.7 0 feet to a point; thence North 0 r3 7'48 II 
East, 505:1_8 feet to a_point; thence South 89 
58'47" East,-1319.28 feet to a point; thence South 
00 07'36" West, 1321.69 feet to a point on the 
Southern Section Line; th(1nce North 89 51'0 1" 
West, 1320.49 feet along the Southern Section 
Lin~i to the Soutfi % Corner of srud Section 6, a· 
point; thence North 89 50'13n West, 12.13 feet 
along_the South em Section Line to the point of ·-
beginning. SUBJECT TO a 60 foot road and 
utility easement along the Western Property lines. 
AND SUBJECT TO a 60 foot road and utility 





C?COMES NQW JOHN N. BACH,. ·~1:ie~erida.i!lif. r appea;rin.g pro se 
in the above entitled matter", having only been served in that 
nestrict.ed capacity, with Plaintiffs'' First Set of Interrogat.;.. 
aries, Reuquest for Admission and Request ~or Production of 
Documents, purportedly on Thursday, Marcn l.Or 2011, but whi..-
ch First Set was not received in .his mail until S.aturday ,, March 
12, 2011, and does hereby, this. Tuesday, April 12, 20!hl, witlldn. 
and on the 3 3rd day r.ili!se, state, as ser.t ·arld respond with his: 
1.) Privileges, attorney client, w0rk pioduct and·a:a:coutant-
·client/rights of privacy-confidentialities as to all Interroga.,... 
tories Numbers 1 through 15 and all subparts thereof( 2.) Reiter.,.. 
ating all afores ~-,_Privileges and Rights of Privacy, Confiden .... 
tialittes to all Reques~s for production, Numbered Requests 1 
through 6; arid 3.) Reiterating and incorporating also herein, 
all sa:idi privileges, rights of confidentialities, etc., to 
Reuests·for Adimission ·No. 1, th~ough Admission No. 4, and, 
wherever appropi:±ate, per the provisions of I.R,C.P, 
refer to and incorporate alternatively, the designated public 
recordS 1 ' fileS and dOCumentS aS answerS and respOilSeS a!;> set. 
public records, files,. actions,. etc. r 
'ANSWER TO INTE~RO~~TQBY NO. 1: John N. Bach is the only indiv-
idual who has provided the afore stated objections, privileges, 
referenced/incorporated public records, files, etc., · :Iand all 
responses to the said FIRST SET of said combined interrogatories, 
request for adimission and production. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 2, Each person known to John N, Bach 
who has any knwoledge or purp.opts. to have knowledge of the facts 
2 
EXHIBIT 8 
<bf the Plaint.;l:f;fs t· cases are set. :forth already in the Defert-
dant;~s statE;Inent al:t'eady· filed and served in with the CO"!Jrt re · 
the witnesses, defendant intends to call at time of trial~ 
ANS~ER .~o INTERROGATOR¥ NO. 3; Other than :my sister, Diana 
Cheyovich; and her nus}Jand r. my brother in law r Ml.lan Cheyovich, 
all other named indwidiia1h.s,. on said list qf persons I may· call, 
are friends, neighbors or visitors and assod'::i:ates of;mine and 
my deceased wife, Cindy, who hi;l.ve .been on our forty acre parcel r 
. and seen, observed, assisted in enforcing or pronfu:Pif.:limg any 
trespassing violations, incursions or· intru~;ion!;l on said 40 acre 
par~el", etc: 
ANSWER TO' rNTERROGATQR¥" NO •. 4; First,. objections i::; raised{ made. 
and asserted to this interrogatory as violating tne provisions 
of IRCP, Rule 33 (a) (3} , when count~ng the sub.,-parts of Interro.,.. 
gatorires;;Nos 1, 2, arld 3,. exceeds 40 interrogatories, However, 
without any of the aforesaid objections and this objection to 
. interrogatories and all subparts exceed;i.ng 40 r Defendant refers 
to EXIBitT ~l't and irtcorpov.a:bes the same im·.full per lRCP ,. Rule 
33 C:c) 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY'. 5: . As I understand 1'a lay witness is 
not an expert one nut a percipient witness to the .events, occur-
rences, etc·. , Thu~·r all. witnes:ses :r a.l:t>ea,dy na;me.d prior a.;r:e 
lay w.i tnesses except· poss-iblf. Travins Thompaorni a real tor and 
developer. 
ANSWER TQ. !.Nf~~W9G~'1QR!_l; Possipley Travis Thompson but I 
haven •·t made that d~cision yet deperidirig on the matters under 
consideratio:h by the Court. I also renew and assert the objections 
. i raised to t"nter:r;ogatory 4, s:upil!a:1:. whicn:1.is incorporated herein, 
3 
EXHIBIT 8 
"'""' -- _ .. 
I may have. to decide d.iltrtlll.g. the trial whether :r may be. 
called as ari expert w±tne$5·?· in _the event, such information 
as may be requested per sul:>parts (a) through (e) , which aie 
also objected as in vio1at:Lon. o;f teh 4o·· li:init irite'l:-riiga:J!:;lorjes 
wiil~.be estahl:ished by foundational· p:r:'ooof arid showing~. 
AN&WE.R TO TNT~'R_R0~~\ ·. 7; · Ag~in all objections as to the 
excess of 40 fnterr()gat0r;i:.es is raised~! asserted and. presented. 
Such detailed and pedantic basis is already set forth not drily 
in all those J!:hl.IJ.l:ic files in E:XH::i$I'T"- ~!1" (· incorporated herein, 
but per IRCP, Rule 65 by all filin~ns, presentations~ etC.',. and 
offered objections and.evidence/crOss examination bymyself 
apposing Plaintiffs t. hearing re restraining order and prelilu:... 
inary injunction, the lack of~any :foundat.&!;Dnal snowing to issu.,.._ 
ance of any. preliminary or permanerit injiinctj:on as fourid by. the 
Court,. s memorandum decision tlie:fa.<!tfter, · RoW-ever, the verified 
answer with affiramtive defenas ·and the countercl.aim coun·ts, 
along with the affidavits filed sofar by defendant an'd still 
to be filed .. on or before' April 22, 2011, cover the same. 
ANSWER': TO INTERROGJ\TO'RY NO~ 8: Same objections and p'rivileges 
as asserted to all previous interrogatories are r·aised and assert 
ed :fu.erein. See alflib Exhipt ••r•f which is incorporated herein and 
the answer to interrogatory No. 7. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATO~Y· NO'~-. 9; ·.· SAME. OBJE.CT:CONS ,. PRIVILEGES & 
-, 
Responses a.s rai.sed supra and per Interrogator~es 1 through 8. · 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY 10: - . •' ·-·· .. Same opject;ion,s- r· pr;i:.vi:leges a:nd 
response as raised ininterrogatories 1 through 9. Further, 
all such documents; photographs are alreayd contained in each 




action~~ ·Any photographS: not produced or attac;hed per· 
any Affidavits filed h.et€d.n by myself as defendant<-:mll 
be made ava.tlable for lrispect,ion 'and Photocopying at plairi:...; 
tiffs'· expense upon arraigrini€mts made re sight of inspection 
and copying or duplicating. The letter I received from Thomas 
Ulrich in July 2009 will not pe produced as under the privileges 
raised hereina supra and infra, its us-e is· for purposes of cross~ 
a6camination of the plaintiffs·;_ P:laintiffs should have' ·a. copy 
thereo~ per their own records and correspondence. 
ANSWER.~!.HO INTERROGATORY: NO. 11. ; Same obj ect-iions, privileges, 
and alternate answensa.as set forth in Interroga"~;:ories 1 through 10. 
H1have not decided which exhibit or exh:L)Dits, other than on cross-
examinations I intend to int~roduce at time of trial other than 
those exhibits aleady presented to the court at all bearings to 
date or attached as exhibtts to my affidavits filed with the court. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 12; Same object-ions, :·•privileges, 
alternate an:S"WeJZSas set fort:li in Interrogatories 1 through ll, 
SU;pra. 
ANSWER .TO_ INTER~OG~TO~Y -~9 ~. 13. . · Sani.e- objections, pri vileg.es and 
alternative anwers as .set forth to inter:t.ocyatories i9through 12. 
ANSWER TO INTE~ROGATORY NO. 14: Same objections, privileges and 
alternate. answers as set forth.~.in Interrogatories 1 thourgh 13 F 
Moresot I have stated my objections on th.e record at several 
hearings and in memoranda filed w·l:b.b . the Court,. The rulings of 
the court are a matter of record, I do not admit any requests for 
Adnission but stand by my objections to preserve the issues in 
the event ·of any: appeal. 
5 
EXHIBIT B 
ANSWERS TO lNT~gR0GA':I'QRY\.~O t·'-15: . -A:p :11 ··bl:ij ect;hpns r privi 'r 
leges assert-ed/ra~sed arid alternative answers to all previous-
interrogatories are reasserted,. ~aised and incorporatated herein. 
The particular privilege e>f work product is weful knwon to counsel 
for Plaintiffs and such privilege a:Long w;l:,th all othe:r;- privileges 
;~re ·.set· ·:ierth in the Idaho ·Rules of Evidence. 
The letter of .July, 2009 from Plaintiff Thomas Ulrich, be~ 
ing<;i:n'':his own hardwriting, contains adrrtissions,. declarations ag" 
ainst interests and confirmation of a personal agreement,.'.:'ihlliel.erst-::-
anding andexecuted in fact, along with waiver and abandonment 
hi31s±s.,: novation, estoppel in different forms, but are objected 
to as within any request for production of documents un(ler · ttctse 
interrogatory nor subsequent request for production, the latter 
which is not in the proper required format per r~~.c.P., Rule 
34(b) (1) (2), and is further not discoverable,. unless and until 
such letter/document is covered during cross e:xa:ndnation,. rebuttal, 
or denied accurately by the plaintif-fs"', . thieir witnessesi:.or counsel, 
at time of trial. This letter has not been produced 1 not oeen 
included nor disclosed in any of plaintiffs t·. affidavits nor 
purported verified com~laint herein. 
Most inadequate and without foundational sho~d.ng 
or chronology as in fact having occurred,. 1 both :Py plain:td:ffs:\' 
failure and deficiency of wording of th.ia lnterrogatory NOt. l~~ ,. 
are the two (2) supparts {1) and (2). Additionally, the. hereafter 
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION,. NUMJ3r.:RED 1 thr:oug:tl 6 ~· particularly No 6, 
is a disguised form of interrogatory, which seeks to reinsert 
each pr_evious improper request for production as multiple int.ex:-..,-. 
rogatories. in place of requests for production 1 through 5 1, making 
~ 1 a· ot understandable. them uncertain, va.guef eompoundr comp e}; an n 
6 EXHIBIT B · 
- ~47 
Defendant JOliN N. BACH refers tp all .his objections, 
privileg~s, or alternate answers/responses to the foregoing 
interrogatories No, 1 thro1.1gh 15, and incorporates all ·of the· 
same herein in direct response and denial of each of the Requests 
for I?.m:mduct.~cmsc;·dtl through 6. · 
Under I. R.C,P r-. Rule 34 Cbl (2) , l?laintiffs were req1.lired 
("'shall t•) to set. forth the item~ to pe inspected either by indiv:-:-
idual item or by category and (to) describe the eac~h itenf and 
category with reasonable particularH:yy'1· Also required which was 
not complied with by Plaintiffs anddtherefore objected·to as 
vchid and· invalid request:s· for product;ton was 1 ~'"l'he request shall 
specify a reasonable time, place and manner o;l! malcing the in~ec~ 
tion and performing the re:hated acts. \t· W:Lthout any waiverof 
each and all of the foreg~ing opjec:tions, Defendant '·Responds~ 
-DENX'ES_ ~?UEST FOR PRODUCTION' NO', <~.•. Alternatively r see anawers 
per EXH.IBIT "I~", IRCP r Rule 33:{c} • 
DENIES REQUES FOR PRODUCTION _NO. 2. Incorpora tea ~lliPi t lt::t u· 
DENIES. REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION ·No. 3. Incqrporate:s E.xhibit '"' ~~ 
DENIES REQUEST FOR PRODUCITON NO, 4. Incorporates Exhi:Pit ,.I,,. 
DENIES REQUEST FOR PRODUCITON NO, s. Incorporates ExhlLTh±t /}!·! 1' 
DENIES REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 6! .Incorporates Exhibit It I It 
Moreoever most of the documents, materials apparently 
desired or sought have already been produ,ced 1 ·offered and rec .... 
. . . 
eived by the Court re motions-alreas:ty': had or still. be fore. 
the court to be further briefed and subm;ttted by April 22,. 2011,. 
EXHIBIT B 
4'11 /1'. i;.; 
- - \J ':1; 
III. REQUES~S FOR ADMISSIONS 
Request for Admission No. 1; Denied in part, :because there 
is the warrant Deed which is attached to Defendant JOHN N. 
BACH"s adlftf.id~:v;tt in opposition to Thomas Ulrich''s motions for 
summary judgment; moreover there is a correc~ o~'correction deed, 
not mentioned which was recorded. 
Request fo Ad;mis·s:;i:.em No\. · 2; Eased upon th.~. g;r;a:.mma,tical struc~ 
ture of this request and in view of th.e aforesaid den;ial in ·.: 
part to No 1~ this Request for amd;i:.ss!on No 2,. is also denied~ 
See and as they are incorporated herein, Penia1s to Request for 
Production Nos 1-tinough 6, supra. 
Reg~~_sj::_£.or __ Admission No. 3: ·Denied, as per ·the answers 'to· 
interrogatores and denials of Reque:st for Prodcution. Defendant 
objected to the admission of said Exhibit B and stands by his 
o:bjections and deniai of the vaiidity of said Exhibit B~ Moreover, 
,...,., . 
~ . ..,. ,.1 
the Denials to the aforesaid Admissions No, 1 th..rougl.'f ·2 :ire 
reasserted herein and the denial of Request for Admission No. 4, 
infra. 
Request fo;r- Admissi'O~O. 4 : .. Denied, The uncertainty and 
:'#, 
and lack of ~~t~rization of the purported ~~13l:'r.' H1\\~, and, th~ 
statements of said EXHIBIT 14'A.tt- as to the ~~su:aJE.C'L''~'tKl ~Mi'l'L' OF 
EaE;ements record in Teton County, Idaho, R.ecorder ''s: Numbers 
115883, 116087, 116079, and .116078, :followed by the stamp of 
FILED AT THE REQUEST OF First American on June 17 f· l-,992 wh.en.. 
purportedly. the previous pages and said EXH:ca:tT 11'A 11' was filed 
abeut ~~:f.ii~os:t-:two ~:.(2 J. . yea:r:s later, casts more than incompleteness 
of said deed being true and correct in granting_ any title'· 
.. 8 
EXHIBIT'S 
E X H I- B I T t.t I 1~ 
Pe.r the provisions of l .R~'C • P • Rule 33(c) , as and 
for an optional sufficient answer to each of the 15 Interroga.,.. 
tories and alternate answer/response·to the incomplete and defi,.. 
cient. R:!quests for ProdQ.ction, l thnoug.h:;6, defendant does hereby 
designate· the p\lblic and business recordsfrom which. the answers 
responsesm~y, be derived and/or ascertained .. Such records are: 
l. The rezo:riJ.,ing . and subdivision application by 
the Bai-l·o:W.!in bf the STILLWATER R.ANC:S SUBDlVISION 1 
Tetonia{ Teton County. 
2. The rezonin~i and subdivsion applicatton :t::>y the 
Ulrich 1's of Carrington Crossing and GROUSE LANDING, 
Tetonia, Teton County.· 
3. State of Idaho v. John :t-Jicholas Bach, \rE,ton CR 04" 
filed in Teton County, BUT venue granted transferred 
to Bonneville County,· conta;tning prel.imi.nary hearing 
transcripts, etc, ~ of the tresvasses: ot B.lal:te Lyle 
and Shauna Crandall.over the wester1y portion of 
Peacock 40 acres • Dismissed for lack of credi.bility 
byyLyle/Crandall. 
4.. Cheyovt.ch. ·Qi ~l3a.cl\ v ~ :·St.a,<Q.a. >o:f. ·~AA~:~ Pepii. '<i<f' ~a,n.&~, 
Idaho·. 'l'r'al\s?lpon.~at';i::op.:~D'ept~:· '.Cetion, ,G.~nty·~! ~r 06:~-09:1, 
& t .. s.c. PK'l's 3383B & 347:L1r.· i C;i,exl(l.\s: YPl'Wl!e~ 
5. Teton County· Public Roads/Ri.o;;Jt.L.ts: of. W:ay·i r.:ea.rt.ngs: 
. . . 
and County Road/Easements ':Ma,p( 20.04 th,rO"':l;:Jh. J?resentt 
:6 ~ Dawso:r::t 'v. John N \ Bach.,. J:n.t~:r;venbr. J\pJ?ea)... P:Jt;t:(a wi:tn 
Trasncripts, ISC Dkts 31712 an,d 38370~. (}\.}?l(ea!l f:r:·om 
Judge Darren Simpson's Second Amended Judgment, Oct 20lO. 
9 EXHIBIT B 
{J 5( 
VERIFICATION OF JOHN N. EACH, 
STATE OF IDAHO 
COUNTY OF TETON 
I; JOHN N. BACH, of Driggs, Idaho 1 have read and given/stated 
the foregoing Assertions of J?rivileges,·ohjections to, Alter~ 
.. , .. nc 
natee:Jmfcr.encedb Responses, and Answers, Alternativ:ely to/ Plaintiffs' 
First Set of Interrogatories 1 Req:uests for AC!rni.ssion and Request for Product..-
tion of Documents, and do hereby state of my own personal knowledge, 
particpation and understanding, that foregoing are tn.ue and 
DATED: April 12, 2011 
ens~ of whatever ~turn 
71. ~1lf67/ti 
correct:' as I understand the same stat 
given they are. 
BACH 
I, the·~ undersigned Notary. of Idaho 1 hereby attest, affirm and 
state that on this date April 12, 2011, appeared before me, 
J~~N N. BACH, personally known tome, did give the foregoing 
privileges, objections and referenced reponses and answers, 
signing the· same in my 1 :presence and wi tnes ·· ng thereof~ 





'Residing iti Teton County 
Commission Exp~es on 06108/2013 
EXHIBIT 8 
Charles A. Horner, Esq. (ISB No. 1630) 
Dale W. Storer, Esq. (ISB No. 2166) 
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P .L.L.C. 
P.O. Box 50130 
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Telephone: (208) 523-0620 
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRJCT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRJCT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TETON 
THOMAS H. ULRICH and MARY M. ULRJCH, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
JOHN N. BACH and all parties claiming to hold 
title to the hereinafter described property pursuant 
to that certain warranty deed recorded in the 
records of Teton County, Idaho on June 14, 1994, 
as Instrument No. 116461 and all unknown 
claimants, heirs and devisees of the following 
property: 
A portion of the South Y2 South V2 Section 6, 
Township 5 North, Range 46 East, Boise 
Meridian, Teton County, Idaho, being further 
described as: From the SW corner of said Section 
6, South 89 50'12" East, 2630.05 feet to the true 
point of beginning; thence North 00 07'58" East, 
813.70 feet to a point; thence North 01 37'48" 
East, 505.18 feet to a point; thence South 89 
5 8'4 7" East, 1319.28 feet to a point; thence South 
00 07'36" West, 1321.69 feet to a point on the 
MOTION IN LIMINE AND FOR SANCTIONS 
Case No. CV-2010-329 
MOTION IN LIMINE AND 
FOR SANCTIONS 
Southern Section Line; thence North 89 51 '0 1" 
West, 1320.49 feet along the Southern Section 
Line to the South 1;4 Corner of said Section 6, a 
point; thence North 89 50'13" West, 12.13 feet 
along the Southern Section Line to the point of 
beginning. SUBJECT TO a 60 foot road and 
utility easement along the Western Property lines. 
AND SUBJECT TO a 60 foot road and utility 
easement along the Southern Property Lines. 
Defendants. 
COME NOW Plaintiffs Thomas H. Ulrich and Mary M. Ulrich, husband and wife, 
(hereinafter "Ulrichs"), by and through their counsel of record, Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & 
Crapo, P.L.L.C., and hereby move this Court for an order: 
1. Precluding defendant John N. Bach ("Bach") from introducing any exhibits at 
trial in this matter because exhibits were not appropriately produced in response to discovery 
requests and were not disclosed in defendant's pre-trial memorandum entitled "Pre-trial 
Tviemorandum Part" 1" dated May 2, 2011 ("Pre-Trial Memorandum"); 
2. Excluding all fact witness testimony of witnesses at trial in this matter because 
they were not disclosed in defendant's Pre-trial Memorandum. 
3. Excluding all testimony of expert witnesses at trial in this matter because expert 
witness opinions were not appropriately produced in response to discovery requests, and as 
required by the Court Trial Scheduling Order entered January 11, 2011 by the court 
("Scheduling Order"), and excluding all testimony of expert witnesses at trial in this matter 
because expert witnesses were not disclosed in defendant's Pre-Trial Memorandum. 
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